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1 Introduction
My motivation to conduct research in economics derives from the aim
to contribute to improved living conditions for the people on this planet.
One important question to achieve this addresses the extraction of natural
resources over time. For many products, natural resources constitute a neces-
sary production input. Moreover, their extraction now may affect the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs. Even renewable resources
are usually exhaustible, such that extraction paths exist that would leave
the resource fully exhausted in finite time. Optimal resource management
takes such inter-temporal effects into account. However, the determination
of optimal extraction paths is often complicated.
First, it is important to assess the welfare society derives from a natural
resource in the current state and to see how the availability of other factors
of production impacts these benefits. As will be shown in chapter 1, a fishery
can generate rents even under open access, if production factors are supplied
locally. Second, this assessment should include future benefits’ development
given environmental and economic changes (chapter 2). Chapters 3 and 4
show that the inter-temporal aspect increases in complexity when factors of
production are not flexibly adaptable over time, or when learning-by-doing
occurs, such that today’s production affects productivity in the future. In
summary, numerous constraints affect resource use and production now and
in the future. This dissertation addresses some of these constraints in order
to help to improve resource management. It contributes to different strands
of literature, in particular resource, development and energy economics.
This cumulative doctoral thesis consists of four individual research arti-
cles. The first chapter, titled “Empirical bio-economic modeling of ar-
tisanal fisheries’ food security contribution: A new approach and
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application to the Senegalese purse-seine fishery” is joint work with
Lorena Fricke and Jo¨rn Schmidt. It will be presented at the Annual Science
Conference (ASC) of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) in Hamburg coming September 2018. Currently, this paper is under
review at “Food policy”.
Fish is an important source of protein, especially in many developing
countries. Artisanal fisheries provide livelihoods for millions of people. How-
ever, local markets provide significant non-linear links between quantities
and prices, and data is often scarce and of poor quality. Due to that, prob-
lems of endogeneity complicate the assessment of welfare derived from these
fisheries as well as the estimation of environmental effects. This paper de-
velops a bio-economic model and presents a two-step estimation procedure
to overcome these difficulties. Local factor inputs and local demand lead to
rent generation. In an application to the Senegalese purse-seine fishery, we
find that total rents account for 2% of per capita yearly food expenditures for
the coastal inhabitants. Yet, we also find environmental impacts that may
affect this rent in the future. Our estimates can be used for robust prediction
beyond the currently observed environmental state.
I have substantially contributed to this paper during all major stages of
research. The model builds on previous work in Lorena Fricke’ dissertation
(Fricke, 2016) and by Quaas et al. (2017). With support from Lorena Fricke
and feedback from my co-authors and supervisor, I took the lead concern-
ing model adaptation to the Senegalese fishing sector, data preparation and
analysis as well as estimation and writing.
The second chapter, “Climate change adaptation and the role of
fuel subsidies: An empirical bio-economic modeling study for an
artisanal open- access fishery” is joint work with two colleagues from
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climate sciences – Anna Deppenmeier and Teferi Demissie – as well as Jo¨rn
Schmidt, who has a background in marine biology. This paper has been
submitted to “PLOS ONE”. Therefore, the paper is written as to suit readers
outside the economic research community.
This paper builds on the first chapter and studies how climate change
can impact open-access artisanal fisheries and their role for food security.
The paper extends the model from chapter 1 to include biological dynamics
affected by climate impacts. In addition, we introduce fuel as a production
input. The model is estimated and results are used for a simulation of the
fisheries development under four different climate projections and two policy
scenarios concerning fuel subsidy reform. We find that the regions’ catch
potential increases with climate change. However, this escalates over-fishing
which outruns the incipiently favorable climate change effects under three
of four climate projections. If fuel subsidies are abolished, ecological sus-
tainability as well as fisheries’ welfare contribution increase regardless of the
climate projection.
I have substantially contributed to this paper during all major stages
of the research process. All co-authors developed the research question. I
developed the biological part of the model with advice from Jo¨rn Schmidt.
The economic model builds on the previous chapter, which I extended to
account for the effect of fuel as a production input. The empirical part and
the simulations were carried out by myself. Martin Quaas recommended the
stochastic runs to better assess climate variability effects. Anna Deppen-
meier and Teferi Demissie contributed the climate projections used in the
simulation.
Chapter 3 is entitled “Over-capitalization in fisheries with irre-
versible investment and factor substitution”. I presented this paper
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at the international conference organized by the International Institute of
Fisheries Economics & Trade (IIFET) in 2017.
While previous chapters assumed that production inputs such as capi-
tal, labor and fuel can be flexibly adapted, inter-temporal resource manage-
ment is even more complex when production inputs have to be optimized
inter-temporally as well. Investment into fisheries is often irreversible. For
fisheries, this can complicate the problem of over-capitalization. This paper
extends the previous literature, that typically assumes capital and effort to
enter harvest production as perfect complements, as my model allows for the
substitution of imperfectly malleable capital with flexibly adaptable inputs.
By means of Hamiltonian derivation and numerical analysis, qualitative and
quantitative consequences of substitutability are highlighted. Successful fish-
eries management needs to take the level of potential factor substitution in
the respective fishery into account.
This is a single-authored paper, although it benefited from extensive dis-
cussions with Martin Quaas.
Chapter 4, titled “Increasing marginal costs and the efficiency of
differentiated feed-in tariffs” is joint work with my supervisor Martin
Quaas. This paper was presented at the Ulvo¨n Conference on Environmental
Economics 2014 and the international conference of the European Associa-
tion of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE), as well as at the
Cologne International Energy Summer School (CIES), in 2015. It has been
submitted for publication at “Energy Economics”.
Another way in which a resource may shape inter-temporal production is
learning by doing. The paper studies optimal subsidies for renewable energy
generation. In our model, the policy-maker intervenes because learning-by-
doing spillovers constitute a positive externality. Sites for renewable energy
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generation are in limited supply, such that marginal costs increase at the
industry level. Scarcity of sites means that the resource constrains another
input inter-temporally, namely learning. We use an analytical modeling ap-
proach to study optimal subsidy differentiation between technologies and to
derive a condition under which less efficient technologies should receive higher
support, as common in actual policy-making. We underline the importance
of site scarcity for this condition.
I have substantially contributed to this paper during all major stages of
the research process. The research idea and model were jointly developed
with my co-author Martin Quaas, who also contributed the proofs in the
Appendix. We shared writing the paper. My contribution to this paper
includes furthermore the literature review and the numerical example that
links our findings to empirical estimations of learning rates.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, artisanal fisheries received substantial scientific attention, es-
pecially concerning their implications for food security (e.g. Belhabib et al.,
2015; Failler, 2014; Kawarazuka and Be´ne´, 2010). Fish constitutes the cheap-
est and quantitatively most important source of protein in many countries
where food security is an issue (World Bank, 2007). Worldwide, around 90%
of fishers belong to the artisanal sector (FAO, 2005; World Bank, 2008), that
thus serves as a safety net for thousands. Because 90–95% of their landings
are humanly consumed, their contribution to food security is invaluable.
While economic welfare analysis is a standard endeavor for industrial fish-
eries (Arnason et al., 2004; Costello et al., 2016; Quaas et al., 2017; Willmann
and Kelleher, 2009), studies on artisanal fisheries have been criticized to fo-
cus on profit, marginalizing labor buffer and food security benefits (Be´ne´
et al., 2010; Andrew et al., 2007; Schuhbauer and Sumaila, 2016). Welfare
impacts are often given in qualitative terms or as proxy indicators like em-
ployment. Dynamic equilibrium changes are disregarded (e.g. Adeogun et al.,
2009; Failler, 2014; Lam et al., 2012). These studies are convincing as to the
current status. However, with changing climatic and economic conditions,
the equilibrium of fish quantity and price changes. To enable meaningful sim-
ulations of future impacts and to assess the actual vulnerability to relevant
drivers, a dynamic equilibrium analysis is required. We identify two main
reasons for this imbalance: Firstly, welfare analysis needs a methodology to
disentangle simultaneous changes in prices and quantities. Secondly, data
scarcity inhibits welfare analysis (Schuhbauer and Sumaila, 2016).
The separate analysis of supply and demand systems is still standard. The
majority of demand analyses (e.g. Asche et al., 1997; Gallet, 2009) uses the
almost ideal demand system, which does not embed productivity changes.
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Supply estimation either directly estimates cost functions (Cheilari et al.,
2013; Daure`s et al., 2013; Quaas et al., 2017) or assumes perfectly elastic
demand, where one fishery is too small to impact the world market price
(Arnason et al., 2004; Kronbak, 2004; del Valle et al., 2001). Only two studies
in fisheries economics use a simultaneous equations approach: Tsoa et al.
(1982) use a semi-reduced form that incompletely alleviates endogeneity bias,
because they lack the biologic data. Angrist et al. (2000) use stormy weather
as instrument, arguing that this shifts supply but not demand. However,
they do not embed this instrument into a full welfare analysis.
The standard single-equation approach is not readily applicable for small-
scale artisanal fisheries. They are typically characterized by fishing under
open-access conditions, localized markets for labor and landed fish, and a
large number of actors involved (Guyader et al., 2013; Willmann and Kelle-
her, 2009). These characteristics translate into scientific challenges: First,
output is determined by economic behavior of fishers in an open access fish-
ery. It can not be assumed exogenous as is possible in a managed fishery.
Localized markets lead to a pronounced inter-dependency of factor and fish
prices and quantities. The analysis of either the production or the demand
side alone is flawed due to endogeneity. On the other hand, in food security
studies that assume constant prices (Cisse´ et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2017;
Lam et al., 2012), demand is implicitly assumed perfectly elastic such that
consumer welfare does not depend on harvest. A second endogeneity issue
arises from the high number of actors, that makes it difficult to obtain exact
effort measurements. Days at sea, though inaccurate with respect to dura-
tion and distance, is often the best measure available. However, it is likely
that actors adapt their effort per day at sea to environmental factors, such
as the proximity of biomass. An empirical strategy is needed that can deal
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with this twofold endogeneity.
We propose a theoretical bio-economic model to explain the impact of
variations in catchability or biomass on output and prices. We include
biomass changes, seasonality and weather impacts as productivity drivers.
Artisanal fisheries are particularly prone to these, as their movement is lim-
ited by safety and freshness considerations. Market development, consumer
dependence on the fish and the sectors relevance to factor markets all impact
the resulting equilibrium. We are therefore able to determine the relative im-
portance of main drivers and the particular vulnerability of different regions
to these drivers. Based on this, we present an estimation approach that effi-
ciently utilizes scarce data by directly estimating dynamic model equations.
It averts endogeneity bias by means of a two-step estimation procedure and
can control for unobserved effort heterogeneity. Hence, the results from our
model can be used to predict effects of climate change. By contrast, an un-
corrected catchability might no longer hold once markets or the environment
change. We apply our model and empirical approach to the Senegalese small
pelagic purse seine fishery targeting Sardinella aurita.
The paper is structured as follows: The model is developed in section 2.
Section 3 describes the data and the estimation approach. Empirical results
are presented in section 4. We analyze the ensuing consequences for fisheries
livelihoods and food security in section 5, followed by conclusions on food
policy in 6.
2 Model
In the following, we explain the theoretical model that is partly based on the
model by Quaas et al. (2017). The general time period t is one month. Part
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of the data is only available per year, denoted by subscript y. In addition,
we account for dependence on the month using subscript m. We use regions,
denoted by subscript i, to distinguish fleets and markets. Thus, we assume
that fleet locations and their corresponding markets are congruous.
In region i at time step t, fishers harvest amount hit by use of factor
inputs effort Eit and Biomass xy. Biomass xy is an exogenous production
factor, its stock elasticity or schooling parameter (Clark, 1990) χ > 0 is
expected to be positive. As is usual for an open access setting, they take
biomass as given, and do not take into account their impact on future stock
levels. Fishing effort Eit can be thought of as an intermediate product that is
produced by means of labor lit and capital kit. We follow estimation results by
Comitini and Huang (1967) and Squires (1987) and assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function. This implies an elasticity of substitution – moderate
substitutability – between the production factors. For example, capital can
substitute labor by use of motors instead of rowing or by use of fish locating
devices instead of visual spotting of fish. Harvesting is described by the
generalized Gordon-Scha¨fer production function (1).
hit = qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y Eit (1 + τq i)
∆t, (1)
Catchability qi(m,Wit) of the fish species depends on an exponential func-
tion of linear additive monthly impacts δm and environmental factors Wit.
The latter exert a monotone convex impact on the respective monthly base-
line value. Catchability is assumed to be of the following form:
qi(m,Wit) = qi9 exp
(
12∑
m=1,m 6=9
δmDm + f(Wit)
)
≥ 0 , (2)
where qi9 is the reference baseline catchability in September. This ref-
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erence month is chosen for interpretational ease: According to our data,
catchability is lowest in September. However, qi(m,Wit) varies throughout
the year, following Eide et al. (2003) and Pech et al. (2001). We interpret
this as a variability of the accessibility of the resource to fishers, for exam-
ple due to migrations of the stock. This limited accessibility is a matter of
technology, for example the depth that the gear reaches, the speed a boat
can use to fish fast-going fish or the distance to shore a canoe can travel. In
particular, boats are confined to fishing within the limits of their respective
port regions, considering that they have to land the fish in fresh condition.
This frontier is exogenous and can not be extended by inputting more of
any factor of production. Monthly dummies are used to control for season-
ally recurring effects, such as cyclical bio-dynamics. We assume that these
are homogeneous across regions, but relax this restriction in the robustness
checks. We include climate shocks to let regional seasonality differ and to
control for environmental impacts that were not captured by monthly dum-
mies. These explicit environmental impacts f(Wit) are specified as a linear
sum of weather influences, e.g. sea surface temperature, precipitation, and
wind. These factors may affect the location of the fish in the fishing area or
technical aspects, e.g. weather conditions that reduce visibility or cause cur-
rents. Weather effects are used as controls and as examples for endogeneity
bias. For these purposes, it suffices to use shock terms, i.e. deviations from
the monthly average normalized by the standard deviation. In addition, this
strategy helps to avoid multi-collinearity issues.
A region-specific time trend τq i is introduced in harvest production (1),
given as a percentage progress rate per month. The trends is subject to
elapsed months ∆t since the start of the study period (January 2001). It
accounts for an unobserved dynamic development in productivity. This may
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have different reasons, in particular the following two. The first is exogenous
progress in production technology. The other perceivable channel is a con-
tinuous consolidation process, where less productive boats leave the sector.
This measurement error would show up in terms of a positive time trend on
catchability.
In each period, fishers minimize their costs subject to factor supply. In-
dividual fishers are price takers with respect to labor and capital prices, but
inverse supply functions of both inputs are assumed to be iso-elastic, upward
sloping functions of factor use in the fishery (Quaas et al., 2017). The as-
sumption behind upward sloping inverse supply functions is that factors are
supplied on local markets and neither capital nor labor used in the fishery is
perfectly flexible (Clark et al., 2005). The assumption of local capital markets
is not uncommon for in fisheries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2010; Riekhof, 2016),
where issues of asymmetric information, trust and verifiability prevent fishers
from benefiting from the formal capital markets. Once invested, capital does
not move easily out of the market, the scrap value for canoes is typically
low. In a situation with low capital demand, already invested capital is used
first and will be supplied at a low price. Barriers to labor mobility are for
example needed fishing skills and social affiliations. A limited labor mobility
into and out of the fishery is the result, which was for example found for the
Maldives case by Ghosh and Siddique (1998).
Fishers face a constant returns to scale technology, such that their factor
demand function is linear in effort. However, upward sloping inverse sup-
ply functions entail that factor prices are not independent from harvest and
stock levels. This leads to non-linear costs in the equilibrium between factor
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markets and the fishery. Then, the fisher’s equilibrium cost function reads2:
Ci t(hit, xy) = ci (1 + τc i)
∆t
(
hi t
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y (1 + τq i)∆t
)1+e
, (3)
with the region-specific scaling parameter ci > 0. The size of e controls
the extent of effort expansion as a reaction to increases in marginal revenues.
If e > 0, costs are increasing and convex in harvest and actual effort Eit.
The time trend τc i for this equation incorporates unobserved trends in factor
prices as well as size of effort units.
We assume an iso-elastic inverse demand function,
pi t(hi t) = p¯i h
−ν(Bi y)
i t , (4)
where 0 ≤ ν(Bi y) < 1 is the inverse price elasticity of demand. As ν < 1,
revenues pit hit increase with harvest. Note that ν(Bi y)+e > 0 has to hold in
the strict sense, since otherwise, the profit maximum is not well defined. The
constant p¯i is different for each region if base price levels differ
3. Differences
could be due to a lack in transport and cooling possibilities to take advantage
of price differences. Even if means are available, transported fish is not as
fresh, and fresh fish of other species may constitute a closer substitute.
A particular concern is the correct estimation of the inverse price elasticity
function ν(Bi y). Market size could be a major determinant of inter-regional
differences. A region with a higher population density Bi y is likely to produce
or attract more substitutes, such that consumer behavior is more price elas-
2See Appendix A.2 for the derivation of the cost function.
3A trend to capture unobserved trends in income was omitted since it was found to be
not significant in estimation.
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tic4. We expect a convex negative relationship between population density
and inverse demand elasticity ν(Bi y). The following structure is assumed:
ν(Bi y) = exp(ν0 + η Bi y) (5)
To control for an effect of outside opportunities linked to other fishing
activities on cost elasticity parameter e, we run a robustness check concerning
specialization with respect to species (see A.3). However, this leads to a
reduction in usable observations and the gain in explanatory power is low,
such that we use a constant e in the main model.
We consider an open access situation, where fishers enter the fishery when
profits are positive and leave the fishery when profits are negative. The indi-
vidual fisher takes factor prices as given. Marginal cost equals average cost
in the supply decision. Using the zero profit condition, pi t(hi t) =
Ci t(hit,xy)
hi t
,
with Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), we obtain the open access harvest function (6).
This is the static equilibrium quantity between fishers behavior, factor mar-
ket supply and fish demand. It changes from period to period with changing
environmental impacts and stock size.
hoai t =
(
p¯i
ci (1 + τc i)∆t
(
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y (1 + τq i)
∆ t
)e+1) 1ν(Bi y)+e
(6)
Using (6) in (4), we derive the open access price level (7).
poai t = p¯i
e
e+ν(Bi y)
(
(qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y (1 + τq i)
∆ t)e+1
ci (1 + τc i)∆t
) −ν(Bi y)
ν(Bi y)+e
. (7)
4One might use population mass to represent market size. We prefer to use density, in
order to account for the differences in market size.
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Open access harvest and open access price are constant elasticity func-
tions of biomass. The stock elasticity of open access harvest, χ (e+1)
ν(Bi y)+e
and of
the open access price, −ν(Bi y) χ (e+1)ν(Bi y)+e , allows us to assess to what extent
producers and consumers bear the consequences of over-fishing and climate
change.
The net trend on open access harvest is given by
τhoa =
(
1 + τc i
(1 + τq i)e+1
) −1
e+ν
− 1 (8)
If it is positive, fishing pressure, all else constant, increases over time. We
interpret it as trend in sector competitiveness and expect τhoa > 0. The net
trend on the open access price is given by (9).
τpoa = (1 + τhoa)
−ν − 1 (9)
Producer and consumer rents are incurred, even though profits are zero.
Consumer surplus (CS) (10) is the amount to which consumers’ willingness
to pay exceeds the equilibrium price. All individuals but the marginal one
would rather pay more for Sardinella aurita than substitute it with another
good. A higher consumer surplus signals a greater relevance of the fish as
food resource. It can be compared to producer surplus, the rents to capital
owners and workers. We interpret the sum of these rents as fishers’ surplus
(FS) (11). Fishers do not have equal willingness to accept a certain labor
and capital price. The marginal individual would exit were his or her income
only a bit lower. For him or her, the sub-sector does not hold any value above
other opportunities to work or invest. The rent calculated is the income to
fishers who do not represent the marginal individual in excess of what they
would have earned had they been the marginal individual. The contribution
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of the sub-sector to food security thus consists of a livelihood aspect and a
direct consumption aspect. They constitute the food security benefit that
would not exist without the fishery and that could not easily be achieved by
other sectors or food substitutes.
CSi =
ν(Bi y)
1− ν(Bi y) p¯i h
1−ν(Bi y)
oa i t (10)
FSi =
e
1 + e
ci (1 + τc i)
∆ t
(
hoa i t
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y (1 + τq i)∆ t
)e+1
(11)
3 Empirical approach: Estimation model
3.1 Case study and data resources
Small pelagic fish are the main target of the Senegalese artisanal fishery
with catches of 284,000 tons per year on average between 2002 – 2006, that
account for more than 70% of the total landings (Thiaw et al., 2017). The
most important species for the Senegalese fishery is Sardinella aurita. It is
caught by purse seiners (De`me et al., 2012; Diankha et al., 2017).
Due to data availability, this study considers landings between 2001 –
2009 in four areas (see Figure 1), namely Fleuve, Thie`s Sud, the Dakar area
called Cap Vert and Thie`s Nord. Data on effort (fishing days at sea, DAS)
and catch (tons) per fleet, species, and region on a monthly time scale is
available from the extensive database provided by the Centre of Oceano-
graphic Research of Dakar-Thiaroye (CRODT) of the Senegalese Institute
of Agricultural Research (ISRA), as described in Thiao (2009).Our data-set
used for estimation is described in Table 5 in the Appendix, section A.1.
Effort is recorded in terms of DAS on a daily basis. The technician notes
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down the number of boats not onshore at the same time of the day, and
record one DAS for each canoe missing. No discrimination is made between
longer or shorter days, days with longer or shorter journey or days with a
larger or smaller crew. However, some of this variation may be the result
as the fisher composes the optimal effort, for example when the resource is
farther from or closer to the shore. This problem has been mentioned by
Thiaw et al. (2017) and Diankha et al. (2018). Catch per day at sea (CPUE)
are randomly sampled and multiplied by the total number of fishing days
to compute total catch5. Catch is dominated by Sardinella aurita. Over
the study period, its share in total purse seine landings is above 80% for all
regions but Thie`s Sud. For the latter, it is still the vast majority with 57%.
Atlantic Sardinella aurita are a migratory schooling species (Thiaw et al.,
2017). Catches are highly variable throughout the year: Catch per day at
sea is lowest in February and October/ November for most regions. It peaks
in June and in December. Annual biomass data is available from 1995 until
2006 from the R/V Dr FRIDTJOF NANSEN project (hydroacoustic and
trawl surveys) (Toresen et al., 2001, 2002; Krakstad et al., 2003, 2004, 2005,
2006). The time series is complemented by estimates from national trawl
surveys for 2007-2009(FAO, 2008, 2011a,b), that were inter-calibrated with
the Nansen surveys. This combined time series was used in yearly FAO
stock assessments for 1995-20096. The surveys were carried out in the fourth
quarter of each year, usually in November. We focus on the part of the
stock that was found in the Senegalese and Gambian coastal areas, which
fluctuates around 200,000 tons.
5CRODT does not distinguish landings and catch. Discards are assumed to be very
small.
6The working group partly used regression models to account for regional gaps.
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Figure 1: Major Senegalese landing areas
The species is climate sensitive (Thiaw et al., 2017; Tiedemann et al.,
2017; Zeeberg et al., 2008). Its abundance has been linked to changes in
sea surface temperature (SST). Diankha et al. (2015) find an optimal tem-
perature of 22.7➦C, and a generally high abundance between 20➦C and 24➦C
for Senegalese waters. SST in Senegalese waters fluctuates between 18.85 –
28.6➦Celsius (2001 – 2009) around a mean of 23.3 – 24.5➦Celsius, depending
on the region. To control for inter-annual weather impacts on the biomass
and impacts on fishing behavior, we use monthly reanalysis data from the
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF, 2012).
The data-set we use is the ECMWF Interim reanalysis product. Weather
data is used in terms of deviations from a long-term mean, to control for
irregular events and regional differences (we provide a data summary in the
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supplementary material B.1).
Small pelagic fish is sold mainly on local markets (Ba et al., 2017; De`me
et al., 2012). Roughly 100,000 tons (40%) of the artisanal Sardinella landings
supply the local market for fresh fish, and the remainder is processed locally
(Failler, 2014). The closest substitute to Sardinella aurita, in terms of price
correlation, markets and nutrient content, is Sardinella maderensis (Ba et al.,
2017; Failler, 2014).
Price data is available on a monthly time scale for Sardinella aurita from
CRODT. We use ex-vessel prices for good quality fresh fish to generate mean
monthly prices per region. For all regions but Fleuve, this approach leads
to a data-set with only few and non-systematic gaps. Where the gap con-
cerns only Sardinella aurita, we substitute its price by the price for Sardinella
maderensis (6% of observations). Fleuve is the region farthest from the cap-
ital and therefore suffers from more frequent gaps. We complete the data-set
substituting missing observations with prices from the neighboring region,
Thie`s Nord. Correlation between the two regions’ logged prices is at 81%.
The regions share similar catch conditions due to the geographic proximity,
such that we consider this a sound solution. We use yearly consumer price in-
dex data from the World Development Indicator database (The World Bank,
2017) for deflation. Prices are used in units of 2010-level of the Senegalese
currency Franc de la Communaute´ Financie`re d’Afrique (FCFA) per kg.
Figure 2 depicts price seasonality across regions. In terms of the overall
price level, Sardinella aurita is cheapest in Thie`s Sud with prices around
70 FCFA/kg, while prices lie rather around 100 FCFA/kg in the other lo-
cations. We conclude that inter-regional arbitrage likely plays only a small
role. Seasonal variation is lowest in Thie`s Sud as well. For Fleuve and Thie`s
Nord, a depression in prices occurs during May/June, in the high productiv-
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Figure 2: Regional seasonality in Prices (based on data provided by the pro-
vided by the Centre of Oceanographic Research of Dakar-Thiaroye
(CRODT)).
ity season. Prices here are highest in February. Overall, the price variation
runs counter to the productivity variation, which points toward an own price
effect. By contrast, prices in Cap Vert seem to have little relationship with
catch per day at sea. This is the main area of agglomeration in Senegal with
around 23% of the total Senegalese population. Yearly data on population
density per administrative department is obtained from the National Agency
of Statistics and Demography (ANSD) in Senegal (Agence Nationale de la
Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2015b). 7. Mean density is highest for
Dakar, i.e. the Cap Vert region, with over 12,000 inhabitants/km2.
7We choose the department of Dakar for Cap Vert, St. Louis for Fleuve, Mbour for
Thie`s Sud and Thie`s for Thie`s Nord
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3.2 Estimation strategy
We estimate the simultaneous equations system of market demand and sup-
ply jointly via its reduced form, as specified in (6) and (7), adding error
terms. The reduced form can be estimated consistently using least squares
(Greene, 2003). The two equations impose restrictions on each other. The
log reduced form of the regression model with catchability qi(m,Wit) as given
by (2) and νB = ν(Bi y) as specified in (5), reads:
lnhi t =
1
νB + e
(
ln p¯i − ln ci −∆t ln(1 + τc i)
+ (1 + e) (ln qi(m,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τq i))
)
+ ǫht (12a)
ln pi t =
νB
νB + e
(
ln ci +∆t ln(1 + τc i) +
e
ν
ln p¯i
− (1 + e) (ln qi(m,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τq i))
)
+ ǫpt (12b)
Note that this estimation step does not achieve differentiation of ci and
qi9 and cannot identify the two different time trends τci and τqi. For this
identification, we could additionally use the CPUEit data and estimate (13).
But as discussed above, the effort measure is inaccurate. An endogeneity
problem could result from unobserved heterogeneity. We expect that catcha-
bilities are negatively correlated with the resources’ distance from shore. This
might be approximated by sea surface temperature SSTit: The true catch
per unit of effort is expected to be positively correlated to SSTit. However, in
the actually observed CPUEit measure this effect may be partially masked
by the inaccurate measure in terms of days at sea. If fishers choose shorter
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DAS when the resource resides farther inshore, the positive effect of SSTit
would for example be underestimated.
lnCPUEi t = ln qi(m,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τq i) + ǫct (13)
In equations (12a) and (12b), we would see zero effect, because actual catch
does not change. No DAS measurement is used or relied upon. We assume
that a longer day at sea leads to an increase in costs, just as additional hours
on a separate day would. The term qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y (1+τq i)
∆t only accounts for
exogenous effects on catch productivity. Thus, if we are interested in whether
environmental impacts change actual harvest and prices and unsure whether
the error in effort measurement correlates with environmental variables, we
should use these equations only.
To solve the identification problem, we estimate (12a) and (12b) with
a net time trend on reference baseline catchability in September qi9 and
competitiveness parameter gi that compounds cost baseline catchability. The
estimation equations in the first step read:
lnhi t =
1
ν + e
(ln p¯i + (1 + e) (ln gi + ln qi(m−9,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τni))) + ǫht
(14a)
ln pi t =
ν
ν + e
( e
ν
ln p¯i − (1 + e) (ln gi + ln qi(m−9,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τni))
)
+ ǫpt
(14b)
with qi(m−9,Wit) defined as the catchability excluding reference baseline
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catchability in September, catchability net cost defined as
ln gi = ln qi9 − 1
1 + e
ln ci
and
ln(1 + τni) = ln(1 + τqi)− 1
1 + e
ln(1 + τci)
The second step serves to identify the missing parameters. We use es-
timator I with fixed coefficient equal to 1 to correct observed CPUE. In
this step, we add the time trend τsi and estimate constant qi9. Note that τsi
can be consistently estimated, if effort endogeneity does not include a time
trend other than the net trend that we already control for. The second step
equation reads:
lnCPUEi t = ln qi 9 + I +∆t ln(1 + τsi)ǫct (14c)
with
I = ln qi(m−9,Wit) + χ ln xy +∆t ln(1 + τn i)
and
τsi = (1 + τci)
1
e+1 − 1
Results from this two-step model on seasonality, environmental impacts
and stock elasticity are exogenous, they can be used for robust prediction
beyond the currently observed environmental state. By contrast, the un-
corrected catchability as estimated when using effort data might no longer
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hold. We estimate by means of the two-step feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS) provided by Stata’s nlsur command. The first step uses ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the unknown covariance matrix
of disturbances. The second step estimates model coefficients by generalized
least squares, using the estimated covariance matrix. We iterate to improve
accuracy8
A model of relatively low complexity is preferable due to asymptotic char-
acteristic and because it lowers the data requirements. Several weather con-
trols were tested. We choose among these models using a significance level of
20% and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). In our preferred model,
SST and precipitation lagged by one month are included as weather controls.
We consider alternative specifications in section (A.3).
To account for potential heteroscedasticity, we use robust standard errors
in the first step. We do not use clustered standard errors, as four clus-
ters, corresponding to the four regions, would be very few compared to the
number of observations per cluster, and therefore suffer from over-rejection
(Cameron and Miller, 2015). Because I is a generated regressor, we employ
bootstrapped standard errors in the second step. Visual inspection and vari-
ance inflation factors did not point towards multi-collinearity issues in the
data.
8A seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) model could be asymptotically more efficient
than OLS, but this gain is only achieved if the regressor matrices are not identical and
they are not a subset of each other (Greene, 2003), such that we expect no efficiency gains
of SUR over OLS.
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4 Results and discussion
4.1 Estimation results: Seasonality and environmental
impacts
Table 1 shows regression results and statistics for the first and second step
estimation, and a separate estimation of the CPUE equation for comparison
(see section B.3 for a more detailed comparison of the full two step results
and results from the separate model). The effect of SST is marked by swt
and the precipitation effect by swp1. We can make use of 374 observations in
the first step and 423 observations in the second step. BIC (2,025 and 1,262)
and R2-values (0.37 and 0.38 for the first step and 0.41 for the second step)
are high enough to trust the explanatory power of the model.
The estimated stock-elasticity of catch, sometimes also referred to as
‘schooling’ parameter, χˆ of Sardinella aurita lies at 0.207 (p = .045). Catch-
ability is highest for Thie`s Sud. The second step estimation results (column
2) reveal that this ranking is primarily due to differences in the catchability
baseline parameter qˆi0. The other regions are quite similar. Their reference
scale parameters ln gˆi are insignificant (p = .0158, p = .164, p = .167, p = .476
in order of table appearance), however. In Fleuve, the catch technology seems
to differ from the rest of the sample. A high catchability is associated with a
higher cost scale parameter, leading to a similar catchability net cost gi as in
the other regions. The specific role of Thie`s Sud can be explained by differ-
ences in the fishing area with its proximity to one main spawning area and
lower prices. Bycatch may be responsible for the high uncertainty in Thie`s
Sud. Catchability underlies a positive and significant trend τi n in Fleuve
(1.5%, p < .001) and Thie`s Nord (0.5%, p = .053). Combined with the
results from the second estimation step, it is clear that both cost and catch-
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ability underlie separate positive trends, where the latter dominates. Likely,
larger and better equipped boats are one reason for this twofold change. Due
to this trend, the ranking in competitiveness changes during the study period,
and net cost in 2009 is highest in Fleuve. Seasonality is very pronounced,
as highlighted by the size of monthly dummies, of which ten are significant
(p ≤ .004). The minimum catchability occurs in autumn and one smaller dip
in February. The most productive months are June and December. In June,
catchability net cost more than doubles if compared to its February value,
and shows a five-fold increase if compared to its September value.
Result 1. The SST shock has a large positive and significant effect on catch-
ability.
A positive deviation of regional SST from the central long term mean by
half a standard deviation9 would lead to an increase in catchability by factor
1.34 (swt = 0.588 with p < .001). We interpret the sign as an indication of
the biomass’ distance from the coast. If the water warms early in the year,
they movement inshore during April to June starts early (Brochier et al.,
2018), which is favorable for the fishery. If weather phenomena are regionally
different, con- or divergence of productivity and short term changes in the
productivity ranking are possible. For example, SST shocks in spring are
usually positive in Thie`s Sud and negative in Fleuve. Lagged precipitation
is significant only at the 20% level (swpl = −0.132 with p = .185), and
its impact is smaller and negative. We attribute this to technical aspects
of catchability, namely a shear effect that impedes purse seine fishing, and
possible stronger currents that adversely affect maneuverability.
9During the study period, shocks lay between -0.78 – 0.82 standard deviations.
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Table 1: Estimation of (14b), (14a) and (14c) and CPUE separately (13)
First step Second step CPUE sep.
Param. Coeff./Robust and bootstrapped std. error
χ 0.207∗∗ (0.103) 0.195 (0.171)
δ1 1.007∗ ∗ ∗ (0.215) 0.992∗ ∗ ∗ (0.230)
δ2 0.708∗ ∗ ∗ (0.192) 0.574∗∗ (0.254)
δ3 0.944∗ ∗ ∗ (0.215) 0.779∗ ∗ ∗ (0.276)
δ4 1.215∗ ∗ ∗ (0.238) 1.099∗ ∗ ∗ (0.244)
δ5 1.415∗ ∗ ∗ (0.259) 1.139∗ ∗ ∗ (0.260)
δ6 1.626∗ ∗ ∗ (0.279) 1.458∗ ∗ ∗ (0.223)
δ7 0.726∗ ∗ ∗ (0.235) 0.528 (0.343)
δ8 0.575∗ ∗ ∗ (0.199) 0.543∗∗ (0.273)
δ10 0.216 (0.188) 0.064 (0.284)
δ11 1.068∗ ∗ ∗ (0.211) 1.035∗ ∗ ∗ (0.230)
δ12 1.357∗ ∗ ∗ (0.245) 1.442∗ ∗ ∗ (0.245)
swt 0.588∗ ∗ ∗ (0.167) 0.791∗ ∗ ∗ (0.202)
swp1 −0.132 (0.100) 0.049 (0.151)
ν0 −0.148 (0.183)
η −2.354∗ ∗ ∗ (0.505)
e 1.056∗ (0.555)
ln p¯FL 7.961∗ ∗ ∗ (0.462)
ln p¯TN 7.436∗ ∗ ∗ (0.394)
ln p¯CV 4.559∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091)
ln p¯TS 7.049∗ ∗ ∗ (0.439)
ln gFL −2.344 (1.659)
ln gTN −2.236 (1.607)
ln gCV −2.268 (1.640)
ln gTS −1.177 (1.650)
τnFL 0.015∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003)
τnTN 0.005∗ (0.003)
τnCV 0.004 (0.003)
τnTS 0.003 (0.002)
ln q0FL −3.608∗ ∗ ∗ (0.126) −3.303 (2.084)
ln q0TN −3.796∗ ∗ ∗ (0.202) −3.625∗ (2.049)
ln q0CV −3.959∗ ∗ ∗ (0.248) −3.768∗ (2.110)
ln q0TS −3.206∗ ∗ ∗ (0.175) −2.930 (2.092)
τqFL 0.026∗ ∗ ∗ (0.002)
τqTN 0.015∗ ∗ ∗ (0.004)
τqCV 0.008 (0.005)
τqTS 0.006∗∗ (0.003)
τsFL 0.011∗ ∗ ∗ (0.002)
τsTN 0.008∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003)
τsCV 0.001 (0.005)
τsTS 0.003 (0.003)
(FL=Fleuve, TN=Thie`s Nord, CV=Cap Vert, TS=Thie`s Sud)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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4.2 Estimation results: Markets
Result 2. Sector equilibrium cost is a non-linear function of harvest. The
cost elasticity eˆ + 1 is significantly higher than 1, it lies at 2.056. Revenues
decrease in harvest for three of four regions. The inverse price elasticity
0 ≤ νˆ ≤ 0.492 depends negatively on population density.
Our model estimates an approximately quadratic cost function (p = .057).
The convex cost structure limits effort levels. Fleuve’s cost function is steep-
est, followed by Thie`s Nord, Cap Vert and Thie`s Sud. This fits with the fact
that observed effort levels show the largest variability for Thie`s Sud, and
maximum monthly effort observed is far lower in Fleuve (2462 DAS) and
Thie`s Nord (2149 DAS) than in the other regions. On the other hand, effort
during the study period never fell below 991 DAS in Thie`s Sud, in particular
due to the outstanding productivity in this region. Aggregate monthly 2001
cost at mean effort levels, using naive re-transformation, lay at 96.2 million
FCFA in Fleuve compared to 90.5 million FCFA in Thie`s Sud. According to
our model, this constitutes actual income to labor and capital. Cost increases
for all regions over the study period.
The inverse price elasticity νˆ depends negatively on population density
(p < .001). For the study period, Cap Vert’s inverse price elasticity goes to
zero. Consumers can choose between many substitutes and are very sensi-
tive to price changes. By contrast, we estimate elasticities between 0.376 and
0.492 (Std. Dev.=0.028) for the other regions. Here, the price changes elas-
tically with harvest of Sardinella aurita. Figure 3 compares regional inverse
demand functions10 that would result from the estimated parameters under
the mean, maximum and minimum population density observed. Population
10Retransformation bias was ignored for this illustration. We expect prices shown here
to be slightly downward biased.
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Figure 3: Fitted regional demand functions
density increased continuously over the study period. The price response is
strongest in Fleuve, driven by a higher scale factor, ˆ¯pi (p < 0.001). Prices are
also highest in Fleuve in general. A relevant price change occurs over nearly
the whole observed catch range. Consumers willingness to pay is higher in
general, and Sardinella aurita is not easily substituted even at medium to
high levels. For Thie`s Nord and Thie`s Sud, the response is large for small
catch values, indicating that consumers bear consequences of fish scarcity
only if the supply is very low. Consumers are easily willing to substitute
other food for Sardinella aurita, if its supply is at high or medium levels.
However, once a certain low-availability-threshold is crossed, consumers will-
ingness to pay increases rapidly. We interpret this as a situation where food
affordability in general is good, but Sardinella aurita plays an important
role as a specific food source, such as for protein, micro-nutrients or as an
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important cultural ingredient. Thus, consumers are willing to reduce their
consumption strongly, but are unwilling to fully dispense with it. The verti-
cal lines mark mean, minimum and maximum harvest levels. It is interesting
to see that the mean harvest level in Thie`s Sud lies far to the right of this
point, whereas for Fleuve and especially Thie`s Nord, mean harvest levels are
closer to it. Open access harvest, all else equal, increases over time. This
translates into a negative (zero for Cap Vert) mean trend in the open access
price given by (9) of 0.6% in Thie`s, 0.8% in Cap Vert and 2% in Fleuve.
Result 3. Open access harvest is an increasing concave function of biomass.
Except for Cap Vert, the open access price is a decreasing convex function of
biomass.
This is due to
χ− ν
1− χ < e. For both producers and consumers, the
marginal benefit of a larger stock is decreasing. All else equal, a 1% in-
crease in stock size entails a mean increase in open access harvest of 0.314%
and a drop in prices of 0.125% (except in Cap Vert). A more elastic demand,
as in Cap Vert, means that harvest and aggregate surplus are more sensitive
to biomass fluctuations, and therefore less prone to over-fish.
5 The welfare effects of changing economic
and environmental conditions
5.1 Welfare effects on sector and regional level
Since we used a logarithmized model for estimation in section 3 and detected
a substantial re-transformation bias when using naive re-transformation, we
use smearing re-transformation to avoid re-transformation bias (e.g. Duan,
1983; Manning, 1998). Due to heteroscedasticity, smearing is done group-wise
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for each region, by predicting standard errors as a positive non-linear function
of the predictor11. A graphical comparison between predicted and observed
levels of harvest and prices illustrates that the re-transformation strategy
leads to convincing results (see the graphs provided in the supplementary
online material B.4).
Table 2: Regional yearly equilibrium harvest (tons per year) and mean equi-
librium fish prices (FCFA/kg) for different biomass levels under open
access
Harvest & price difference from mean (%)
Region TS FL CV TN Sen. TS FL CV TN Sen.
hoa,mean 66,648 46,221 27,227 22,639 162,736
hoa,min 51,643 37,560 20,360 17,455 127,018 -23 -19 -25 -23 -22
hoa,max 78,482 52,776 32,723 26,752 190,733 18 14 20 18 17
poa,mean 29 87 110 80
poa,min 31 97 110 89 10 12 0 12
poa,max 27 81 110 74 -6 -7 0 -7
TS: Thie`s Sud, FL: Fleuve, CV: Cap Vert, TN: Thie`s Nord, Sen.: Senegal.
Mean biomass: 199,000t, minimum: 116,000t, maximum: 282,000t. Numbers
are rounded to full thousands of FCFA.
Result 4. Over the study period, the artisanal purse seine fishery for Sar-
dinella aurita has generated an average yearly total rent of 10.6 billion FCFA.
This compares to 0.16% of the Senegalese GDP in 2010 and 6.56% of the
GDP generated by fisheries only, which contributes 2.5% to overall GDP
(Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2015a). The
11This heterogeneity likely stems from the fact that higher harvest levels entail a higher
heterogeneity in vessels. More detailed data on vessels is not available. Hence, we are not
successful to model this heteroscedasticity explicitly here.
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number also amounts to more than five times the yearly biomass rent earned
through the current EU-Senegal fishery agreement for 16,000 tons of tuna and
Southern hake per year (0.96 billion FCFA/year) (European Union, 2017).
For comparative statics, we use a baseline value for consumer and fishers’
surplus based on levels of population density, cost and productivity trends
from June 2005, i.e. the middle of the study period. We use mean biomass
(199,000 t) and climate variables at their long-term mean levels.
Table 2 compares mean equilibrium prices as well as total yearly equi-
librium harvest and rents. Prices are substantially lower and less prone to
biomass variation in Thie`s Sud than in the other regions. Fleuve is more
sparsely populated and likely lacking in substitutes. Prices are higher than
elsewhere, except in the capital region, where fish is most expensive. Total
mean consumer rents (4.3 billion FCFA) outperform fishers’ rents (4.2 billion
FCFA) (see the supplementary online material for a table on rents).
5.2 Welfare effects on individual level
To look at individual level fishers’ surplus (FS), we use data on the number of
purse seine canoes available from CRODT (Thiao et al., 2008), and multiply
it by 20 to account for the people working on each purse seine canoe (Ba et al.,
2017). The calculated number of fishers involved in the sector amounts to
2940 in Thie`s Sud, 2560 in Fleuve, 1420 in Cap Vert and 1180 in Thie`s Nord.
We use population data for 2008 to compare individual consumer surplus
(CS) and total rent (TR). This leaves us with an overall coastal population
of 2,431,298 people or 21% of the Senegalese total population. Note that this
is only a means of making the results more apprehensive. De facto benefits
will not be equally distributed.
Average Senegalese food expenditures lay at 176,249 FCFA in 2010 ac-
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Table 3: Regional prices for grain baskets (2010 level FCFA)
Region Thie`s Sud Fleuve Cap Vert Thie`s Nord Senegal
Price/5 kg basket 1,147 1,345 1,278 1,147 1,145
cording to the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie
(2016). No GDP or consumption data, nor prices for meat, are available
on regional level. To compare impacts between regions, we use the total
price (2010 level FCFA) for an agricultural basket that consists of one kg of
each of the five important grains in Senegal (Table 3)(Agence Nationale de
la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2010). Food price levels are elevated in
Fleuve, which puts the higher price estimated for this region into perspective.
We will now analyze individual level rents as presented in Table 4.
Result 5. Consumer surplus (total rents) per capita account for 1.79% (2.01%)
of per capita yearly food expenditures in 2010. Individual average fishers’
rent can cover between 132% (Thie`s Sud) and 614% (Cap Vert) of average
per capita food expenditures.
On average, each inhabitant in the studied regions, i.e. one fifth of Sene-
gal’s population, receives a mean rent of 3.27 baskets every year. Considering
that in Fleuve and Thie`s, more than 40% of the households still lived below
the poverty line in 2006 (Government of Senegal, 2006), this could well mean
that the poverty threshold is crossed. Even more important is its role for
consumers who depend more on the fish as food or at low levels of provision,
such as during the low season. The rent per unit of fish increases at low
provision levels, where the willingness to pay is very high and unit cost are
low. Comparing total individual rent, the fishery is about twice as important
35
Table 4: Regional yearly coastal per capita/ per fisher rents for different
biomass levels under open access (individual total rent given per
capita)
Rents in 1000 FCFA (grain baskets)
Region TS FL CV TN Sen.
CSoa,mean 2 (1.53) 9 (6.96) 0 (0.00) 2 (1.48) 2 (1.52)
CSoa,min 1 (1.30) 8 (6.30) 0 (0.00) 1 (1.26) 2 (1.34)
CSoa,max 2 (1.70) 10 (7.41) 0 (0.00) 2 (1.63) 2 (1.65)
FSoa,mean 233 (203) 556 (414) 1,082 (847) 515 (450) 525 (447)
FSoa,min 197 (172) 503 (375) 809 (633) 441 (385) 437 (372)
FSoa,max 258 (225) 593 (441) 1,301 (1,018) 569 (496) 592 (504)
TRoa,mean 3 (2.82) 15 (10.83) 1 (1.15) 3 (2.66) 4 (3.27)
TRoa,min 2 (1.78) 13 (9.69) 1 (0.86) 2 (1.65) 3 (3.02)
TRoa,max 3 (2.94) 16 (11.85) 2 (1.39) 3 (2.75) 4 (3.47)
TS: Thie`s Sud, FL: Fleuve, CV: Cap Vert, TN: Thie`s Nord, Sen.: Senegal.
Mean biomass: 199,000t, minimum: 116,000t, maximum: 282,000t. Numbers
are rounded to full thousands of FCFA, and to two decimals for grain basket
measures.
in the Thie`s regions than in Dakar, and 11 times more important in Fleuve.
It lets Fleuve consumer’s afford the equivalent of 35 kg of grain per person
and in a mean year.
Resource fluctuations change equilibrium harvest and prices. If biomass
drops from its mean to the minimum level, the total catch difference amounts
to 35,7180 t or 22% of total mean catch. Prices increase by 0 – 10 FCFA per
kg. The most substantial price response happens in Thie`s Nord and Fleuve.
Our data shows that on average, 17% of catches were made between August
and October. Monthly equilibrium harvest at minimum biomass levels in
Thie`s Nord during this period would result in an equilibrium price to the left
of the point of highest curvature of the inverse demand function (see Figure
3). It comes close to this point in Fleuve.
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Figure 4: Regional fisher and consumer rents at different biomass levels
Figure 4 shows the predicted aggregate rents for different levels of biomass.
Result 6. Biomass fluctuations exhibit the largest relative impact on harvest
in the well developed market region around Dakar. By contrast, in regions
with a large fishery far from the capital, food security is most sensitive to
biomass changes.
Fishers’ rent is most sensitive to biomass fluctuations in Cap Vert, owing
to the perfect price elasticity of consumers. Between the mean and maximum
biomass value, Cap Vert’s aggregate fishers’ rent sees an increase of nearly
0.32 billion FCFA or 20%. There, the yearly difference between maximum
and minimum biomass is as high as 385 baskets, compared to only 53 baskets
in Thie`s and 66 in Fleuve. This is linked to the strong fluctuation in annual
harvest (5496 t). By contrast, fishers’ rent increases by only 0.09 billion
FCFA or 7% in Fleuve, and consumer rent by 0.16 billion FCFA (7%). The
equilibrium harvest is more robust to biomass changes due to the response
in prices.
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For the aggregate Senegalese coastal population, a drop from the maxi-
mum to the minimum biomass would entail moderate consequences for food
security. The national total rent per capita would shrink by half a grain bas-
ket per year. However, the same number for Fleuve amounts to 2.16 baskets.
Each inhabitant could afford an additional 11 kg of grain per capita. For
regions that lie far from well developed markets, the artisanal fishery is of
particular importance for food security.
Result 7. The short term impact of SST shocks in June lies in the range of
0.5 to 1 grain basket per coastal inhabitant.
The difference of SST between plus/ minus 1.5➦Celsius (0.5 standard de-
viations) has a larger positive effect on short term food security than the
166,000 t drop of biomass discussed above. However, since this is a static
analysis, effects on future biomass levels are not comprised, meaning that
long term food security is still a different issue. See figure 10 in the supple-
mentary material for more insights.
6 Policy implications and conclusion
The empirical bio-economic model proposed in this paper is soundly based on
resource economic theory. By means of this model, we identified relationships
between a fishery’s productivity, supply and demand characteristics. These
cannot be estimated separately from each other. The underlying drivers are
changes in biomass and environmental variables, as well as market develop-
ment and factor markets. One contribution of the paper is to identify these
relationships. A second contribution is to propose a model that estimates
these effects from the reduced form open access market equilibrium. These
results still hold when changing environmental conditions induce changes
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in actual effort variability. The third contribution is the application of the
proposed empirical methods to the Senegalese purse seine fishery.
Our results underline that the fishery plays an important role for food
security. At the per capita level, consumer surplus (total rent) accounts
for 1.79% (2.01%) of food expenditures. The results can inform future re-
source management, for example concerning decisions upon the closing of
fishing contracts with foreign nations. Moreover, the estimation of welfare
impacts allows to compare stock elasticities of consumers and producers.
This can clarify the political feasibility of resource management options and
help towards a well informed debate between interest groups. Our analysis
of environmental impacts and fishery vulnerability provides a starting point
for precautionary policies. Our results show that regions differ substantially
in market characteristics. While the commodity is of no appreciable food
relevance in the capital region, more remote regions strongly depend on the
resource for food in general and as a protein supply. Climate change may
impact food security, in particular when the current equilibrium is close to
the curve point on the inverse demand line, such that consumers are sensi-
tive to the supply quantity. Since the underlying theory establishes causal
justifications, qualitative results also provide insights into similar artisanal
fisheries around the globe, where data is often unavailable.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Summary for economic and biological vari-
ables
Table 5: Summary statistics of variables over observations used in main esti-
mation
Mean Sd Min Max
Thie`s Sud (N = 95)
Monthly. Landings (tons) 5,281.37 4,149.52 16.71 18,457.11
CPUE (tons/DAS) 2.62 1.90 0.02 8.31
Fish price (FCFA/kg) 47.09 33.01 12.39 270.73
Population density ( 1000/km2) 0.31 0.03 0.28 0.35
Fleuve (N = 100)
Monthly. Landings (tons) 4,677.24 3,827.70 4.07 19,144.76
CPUE (tons/DAS) 4.92 3.47 0.09 15.36
Fish price (FCFA/kg) 96.36 66.30 21.55 416.85
Population density ( 1000/km2) 0.27 0.02 0.24 0.30
Cap Vert (N = 86)
Monthly. Landings (tons) 2,368.53 2,189.89 1.81 9,835.82
CPUE (tons/DAS) 1.49 1.19 0.00 4.18
Fish price (FCFA/kg) 155.70 262.01 17.29 1,931.39
Population density ( 1000/km2) 12.78 0.50 12.05 13.48
Thie`s Nord (N = 93)
Monthly. Landings (tons) 2,671.24 2,822.59 5.47 10,599.29
CPUE (tons/DAS) 2.63 2.27 0.01 9.41
Fish price (FCFA/kg) 90.26 57.08 21.55 416.85
Population density ( 1000/km2) 0.28 0.02 0.25 0.32
Aggregate Senegal
Biomass (tons) 199,000 56,310 116,000 282,000
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A.2 The Cost Function
Harvesting is described by
hit = qi(m,Wit)Eit x
χ
y , (15)
Effort is assumed to be produced by means of labor l and capital k using
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale:
Eit = l
ϕ
it k
1−ϕ
it (16)
with ϕ ∈ (0, 1). The supply functions of both inputs are assumed to be iso-
elastic. Both production factors cannot be transferred between fisheries of
different species, which makes sense if the fisheries are very different and/or
the fishing seasons vary. Supply of both input factors is thus defined as:
wit(lit) = ωi l
ζ
it, (17)
rit(kit) = κi k
ψ
it, (18)
where ζ (ψ) denote the inverse supply elasticity of labor (capital) and wit (rit)
is the wage rate (capital rental rate). When supply of labor is perfectly elastic
the wage rate equals the ”global” wage rate ωi (κi for capital, respectively).
Fishers minimize their costs to determine their optimal harvest quantity
in each period. They have to take local factor markets into account when
they decide on their harvest strategy.
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Solving the representative firm’s cost minimization problem
min
lit,kit
witlit + ritkit
s.t. Eqs (1), (16)
leads to the factor demand functions
lit =
h
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
rit
wit
)1−ϕ
, (19)
kit =
h
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
wit
rit
)ϕ
, (20)
as well as the cost function that is linear in harvest, and thus entails equal
average and marginal cost:
Cit(hit, wit, rit; xy) =
wϕit r
1−ϕ
it
ϕϕ (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
hit
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
. (21)
In labor and capital market equilibrium, the equilibrium wage and capital
rental rate is (using (19) in (17), (20) in (18) respectively):
wit = ωi l
ζ
it = ωi
(
hit
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
)ζ (
ϕ
1− ϕ
rit
wit
)ζ (1−ϕ)
, (22)
rit = κi k
ψ
it = κi
(
hit
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
)ψ (
1− ϕ
ϕ
wit
rit
)ψ ϕ
. (23)
Using (22) and (23) in (21), the market equilibrium cost function becomes
cit(hit, xy) = ci
(
hit
qi(m,Wit) x
χ
y
)e+1
,
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with
ci =
(
ωi
ϕ
) ϕ (1+ψ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
(
κi
1− ϕ
) (1−ϕ) (1+ζ)
1+ψ ϕ+ζ (1−ϕ)
> 0. (24)
and
e = ζ
ϕ (1 + ψ)
1 + ψ ϕ+ ζ (1− ϕ) + ψ
(1− ϕ) (1 + ζ)
1 + ψ ϕ+ ζ (1− ϕ) ≥ 0. (25)
A.3 Robustness Checks
Results on alternative models are listed in tables 6 and 7. Regional differ-
ences depend to a large extent on elasticities. We let e depend on species
importance, using the regional share of Sardinella catch in total catch to
account for closer work opportunities related to fishing. Monthly data on
total catch per species is available from the Directorate of Maritime Fish-
eries (DPM) (Direction des peˆches maritimes, 2001-2008).It is available for
Dakar, Fleuve and aggregate Thie`s. We weigh the Thie`s data to differentiate
Thie`s Nord and Thie`s Sud using yearly CRODT data (Thiao et al., 2008).
We change the model in the following equation:
e(Si t) = exp(e0 + ζ Si t) (26)
where Si t is defined as Sardinella aurita catch over total catch. Column 1
shows the expected negative and significant ζˆ. If the market is more concen-
trated on Sardinella aurita, alternative employment opportunities in fishing
are few and therefore, eˆ is lower. The mean size of eˆ (0.943 – 1.359) and νˆ
(0 – 0.483) doesn’t change much. Thus, while this model may give a better
explanation on the causes of a higher or lower elasticity, it does not invali-
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date the results from our main estimation. With R2 between 37 and 41 for
the three equations, the small benefit with respect to model fit seems not to
outweigh the disadvantage of dropping 24 observations due to missing data.
We run the original model excluding Cap Vert to analyze the importance
of the capital region for estimation results (column 2). The sharp increase
in R2 for the price equation is not surprising: It seems that with regard to
market mechanisms, the three other regions are quite alike in contrast to
the capital region around Dakar. Stock elasticity χˆ is slightly higher, and
baseline catchability slightly lower. The effect of lagged precipitation shocks
is now larger and significant at the 5% level. By contrast, it becomes very
small and insignificant in the model excluding Thie`s Sud (column 3). We
use the latter to test whether the insignificant estimation result on gˆi for the
region has distorted other results. We conclude that the precipitation effect
is strongest in this region. This makes sense considering the proximity of
the Saloum Delta, that serves as fishing ground for the fishers from Thie`s
Sud. In the latter model, χˆ is a little higher and insignificant. The most
pronounced change concerns the cost elasticity. Cost elasticity parameter eˆ
is substantially higher but insignificant.
We also tested additional models with respect to climate controls (see
columns 4-5). The runner-ups with respect to BIC values were the following
two:
Non-linear SST shock: f(Wit) = swt SSTsh,i + swt2 SST
2
sh,i (27)
Including wind: f(Wt) = swwWINDSPEEDsh (28)
Squared SST has a negative coefficient (-0.220), but is insignificant. To-
gether with SST’s coefficient at 0.556, this shows that the relationship be-
tween catchability and SST shocks could be concave. Wind-speed has a
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negative impact (-0.177). It is significant at the 10% level only if SST is
unaccounted for. It is likely that wind-speed affects technical harvesting
conditions. Cost elasticity parameter e is slightly higher in the non-linear
SST shock model, and slightly lower in the model with wind-speed.
Important for our model is to find a fitting specification for catchability.
The specification in the main model restricts the seasonal profile to equal
peaks and lows throughout the year across regions, and to an amplitude that
increases in qi9. We test these assumptions using the following alternative
specification for seasonality in step 1 (column 6):
qi(m,Wit) = (1 + qi1sin (tt+ qi2)) exp(f(Wit)) ≥ 0
with tt =
pim
3
. This restricts the pattern to two equally sized regular
peaks and low’s per year, but is more liberal regarding cross-regional re-
strictions. Using a mathematical and graphical analysis, we confirm that
peaks and lows happen indeed in the same month for all regions. Amplitude
increases in baseline catchability. While differences in baseline catchability
are larger between Fleuve, Thie`s Nord and Cap Vert, the overall order is
preserved as in the original model.
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Table 6: Robustness results: Harvest productivity
Param. Sard. aurita share w/o Cap Vert w/o Thie`s Sud Nonlin. SST Incl. wind Sinus q
χ 0.199∗ (0.105) 0.281∗∗ (0.112) 0.266 (0.163) 0.232∗∗ (0.105) 0.271∗ ∗ ∗ (0.102) 0.193∗ (0.104)
δ1 0.928∗ ∗ ∗ (0.193) 0.922∗ ∗ ∗ (0.225) 1.512∗ ∗ ∗ (0.516) 1.036∗ ∗ ∗ (0.229) 1.060∗ ∗ ∗ (0.233)
δ2 0.598∗ ∗ ∗ (0.170) 0.629∗ ∗ ∗ (0.185) 1.145∗ ∗ ∗ (0.428) 0.736∗ ∗ ∗ (0.212) 0.713∗ ∗ ∗ (0.202)
δ3 0.849∗ ∗ ∗ (0.195) 0.913∗ ∗ ∗ (0.206) 1.379∗ ∗ ∗ (0.490) 0.970∗ ∗ ∗ (0.231) 0.904∗ ∗ ∗ (0.227)
δ4 1.058∗ ∗ ∗ (0.210) 1.240∗ ∗ ∗ (0.215) 1.633∗ ∗ ∗ (0.542) 1.247∗ ∗ ∗ (0.249) 1.146∗ ∗ ∗ (0.237)
δ5 1.270∗ ∗ ∗ (0.239) 1.382∗ ∗ ∗ (0.239) 1.769∗ ∗ ∗ (0.599) 1.450∗ ∗ ∗ (0.275) 1.337∗ ∗ ∗ (0.265)
δ6 1.435∗ ∗ ∗ (0.245) 1.713∗ ∗ ∗ (0.261) 1.895∗ ∗ ∗ (0.637) 1.664∗ ∗ ∗ (0.297) 1.511∗ ∗ ∗ (0.271)
δ7 0.546∗ ∗ ∗ (0.204) 0.885∗ ∗ ∗ (0.178) 0.616 (0.406) 0.731∗ ∗ ∗ (0.245) 0.668∗ ∗ ∗ (0.240)
δ8 0.435∗∗ (0.178) 0.585∗ ∗ ∗ (0.184) 0.416 (0.324) 0.584∗ ∗ ∗ (0.204) 0.562∗ ∗ ∗ (0.198)
δ10 0.140 (0.171) 0.315∗ (0.167) 0.067 (0.298) 0.229 (0.195) 0.196 (0.182)
δ11 0.964∗ ∗ ∗ (0.184) 1.091∗ ∗ ∗ (0.214) 1.289∗ ∗ ∗ (0.445) 1.092∗ ∗ ∗ (0.222) 1.085∗ ∗ ∗ (0.221)
δ12 1.187∗ ∗ ∗ (0.211) 1.215∗ ∗ ∗ (0.205) 1.828∗ ∗ ∗ (0.598) 1.394∗ ∗ ∗ (0.261) 1.329∗ ∗ ∗ (0.249)
swt 0.510∗ ∗ ∗ (0.162) 0.597∗ ∗ ∗ (0.165) 0.642∗ (0.336) 0.556∗ ∗ ∗ (0.163) 0.343∗∗ (0.139)
swp1 −0.198∗∗ (0.094) −0.222∗∗ (0.107) −0.076 (0.169) 0.001 (0.102)
swt2 −0.220 (0.312)
sww −0.177∗ (0.107)
τsFL 0.012∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.012∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.006 (0.005) 0.011∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.011∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.013∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001)
τsTN 0.008∗∗ (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.005∗∗ (0.002) 0.008∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.009∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.010∗∗ (0.004)
τsCV 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.008) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003)
τsTS 0.005∗∗ (0.002) 0.004∗∗ (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) 0.004∗ ∗ ∗ (0.001) 0.004∗ (0.003)
ln q0FL −3.410∗ ∗ ∗ (0.070) −4.517∗ ∗ ∗ (0.096) −4.589∗ ∗ ∗ (0.148) −3.901∗ ∗ ∗ (0.021) −4.316∗ ∗ ∗ (0.059) −2.408∗ ∗ ∗ (0.134)
ln q0TN −3.592∗ ∗ ∗ (0.132) −4.714∗ ∗ ∗ (0.316) −4.751∗ ∗ ∗ (0.130) −4.090∗ ∗ ∗ (0.185) −4.542∗ ∗ ∗ (0.078) −2.626∗ ∗ ∗ (0.101)
ln q0CV −3.755∗ ∗ ∗ (0.120) −4.915∗ ∗ ∗ (0.187) −4.259∗ ∗ ∗ (0.417) −4.710∗ ∗ ∗ (0.017) −2.839∗ ∗ ∗ (0.560)
ln q0TS −2.993∗ ∗ ∗ (0.082) −4.126∗ ∗ ∗ (0.014) −3.490∗ ∗ ∗ (0.387) −3.922∗ ∗ ∗ (0.079) −1.992∗ ∗ ∗ (0.023)
q1TN −0.376∗ ∗ ∗ (0.095)
q1TS −0.438∗ ∗ ∗ (0.089)
q1CV −0.230∗∗ (0.112)
q1FL −0.415∗ ∗ ∗ (0.083)
q2TN −1.068∗ ∗ ∗ (0.265)
q2TS −1.283∗ ∗ ∗ (0.154)
q2CV −1.459∗ ∗ ∗ (0.451)
q2FL −1.349∗ ∗ ∗ (0.182)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust std. errors in parentheses. (FL=Fleuve, TN=Thie`s Nord, TS=Thie`s Sud, CV=Cap Vert)
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Table 7: Robustness results: Markets and statistics
Param. Sard. aurita share w/o Cap Vert w/o Thie`s Sud Nonlin. SST Incl. wind Sinus q
ν0 −0.053 (0.203) 0.075 (0.190) −0.355 (0.300) −0.172 (0.185) −0.200 (0.187) −0.137 (0.203)
η −2.834∗ ∗ ∗ (0.587) −2.627∗ ∗ ∗ (0.554) −3.034∗ ∗ ∗ (0.908) −2.360∗ ∗ ∗ (0.512) −2.340∗ ∗ ∗ (0.524) −2.358∗ ∗ ∗ (0.524)
e 0.308 (0.547) 1.044 (0.732) 2.041 (2.642) 1.145∗ (0.619) 0.933∗ (0.495) 0.605 (0.427)
ζ −0.366∗ ∗ ∗ (0.108)
ln p¯FL 7.839∗ ∗ ∗ (0.457) 8.533∗ ∗ ∗ (0.564) 6.802∗ ∗ ∗ (0.357) 7.872∗ ∗ ∗ (0.456) 7.791∗ ∗ ∗ (0.449) 7.995∗ ∗ ∗ (0.587)
ln p¯TN 7.318∗ ∗ ∗ (0.381) 7.929∗ ∗ ∗ (0.482) 6.420∗ ∗ ∗ (0.302) 7.358∗ ∗ ∗ (0.389) 7.289∗ ∗ ∗ (0.381) 7.466∗ ∗ ∗ (0.511)
ln p¯CV 4.558∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091) 4.559∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091) 4.559∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091) 4.559∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091) 4.559∗ ∗ ∗ (0.091)
ln p¯TS 6.919∗ ∗ ∗ (0.430) 7.592∗ ∗ ∗ (0.542) 6.965∗ ∗ ∗ (0.434) 6.892∗ ∗ ∗ (0.426) 7.082∗ ∗ ∗ (0.565)
ln gFL −1.886 (1.684) −3.217 (2.243) −1.665 (2.662) −2.411 (1.682) −3.422∗∗ (1.546) −2.683 (1.927)
ln gTN −1.909 (1.637) −3.305 (2.127) −1.560 (2.583) −2.300 (1.636) −3.317∗∗ (1.487) −2.539 (1.829)
ln gCV −1.675 (1.691) −1.458 (2.665) −2.346 (1.673) −3.369∗∗ (1.510) −2.695 (1.918)
ln gTS −0.423 (1.704) −2.105 (2.208) −1.229 (1.677) −2.245 (1.534) −1.524 (1.902)
τnFL 0.014∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003) 0.014∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003) 0.021∗ ∗ ∗ (0.007) 0.015∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003) 0.014∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003) 0.011∗ ∗ ∗ (0.003)
τnTN 0.006∗∗ (0.003) 0.008∗∗ (0.003) 0.009∗ (0.005) 0.005∗ (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
τnCV 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.002)
τnTS 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
N step 1 350 264 267 374 374 374
N step 2 423 321 315 423 423 423
R2p 0.37 0.53 0.15 0.36 0.35 0.32
R2c 0.40 0.36 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.35
R2h 0.41 0.35 0.46 0.38 0.37 0.28
No. var.p 30 26 26 29 28 26
No. var.c 8 6 6 8 8 8
No. var.h 30 26 26 29 28 26
BIC step 1 1883 1316 1499 2027 2036 2090
BIC step 2 1222 880 908 1217 1232 1260
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, Robust std. errors in parentheses. (FL=Fleuve, TN=Thie`s Nord, TS=Thie`s Sud, CV=Cap Vert)
47
References
Adeogun, O., Abohweyere, P., Ogunbadejo, H., Jim-Saiki, L., 2009. Eco-
nomic viability of small-scale marine capture fisheries in the Bonny area,
Rivers state, Nigeria. Marine Resource Economics 24, 195–203.
Andrew, N.L., Be´ne´, C., Hall, S.J., Allison, E.H., Heck, S., Ratner, B.D.,
2007. Diagnosis and management of small scale fisheries in developing
countries. Fish and Fisheries 8, 227–240. doi:10.1111/j.1467-2679.
2007.00252.x.
Angrist, J.D., Graddy, K., Imbens, G.W., 2000. The interpretation of in-
strumental variables estimators in simultaneous equations models with an
application to the demand for fish. The Review of Economic Studies 67,
499–527. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00141.
Arnason, R., Sandal, L.K., Steinshamn, S.I., Vestergaard, N., 2004. Optimal
feedback controls: comparative evaluation of the cod fisheries in Denmark,
Iceland, and Norway. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86,
531–542.
Asche, F., Salvanes, K.G., Steen, F., 1997. Market delineation and demand
structure. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, 139–150.
Ba, A., Schmidt, J., De`me, M., Lancker, K., Chaboud, C., Cury, P., Thiao,
D., Diouf, M., Brehmer, P., 2017. Profitability and economic drivers of
small pelagic fisheries in West Africa: A twenty year perspective. Marine
Policy 76, 152–158.
Banerjee, A.V., Duflo, E., 2010. Giving credit where it is due. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 24, 61–80. doi:10.1257/jep.24.3.61.
48
Belhabib, D., Sumaila, U.R., Pauly, D., 2015. Feeding the poor: Contribu-
tion of West African fisheries to employment and food security. Ocean
& Coastal Management 111, 72 – 81. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ocecoaman.2015.04.010.
Be´ne´, C., Hersoug, B., Allison, E., 2010. Not by rent alone: Analysing the
pro-poor functions of small-scale fisheries in developing countries. Devel-
opment Policy Review 28, 325–358.
Brochier, T., Auger, P.A., Pecquerie, L., Machu, E., Capet, X., Thiaw, M.,
Mbaye, B.C., Braham, C.B., Ettahiri, O., Charouki, N., SA˜¨ne, O.N.,
Werner, F., Brehmer, P., 2018. Complex small pelagic fish population
patterns arising from individual behavioral responses to their environment.
Progress in Oceanography 164, 12 – 27. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.pocean.2018.03.011.
Cameron, C.A., Miller, D.L., 2015. A practitioner’s
guide to cluster-robust inference. Journal of Hu-
man Resources 50, 317–372. doi:10.3368/jhr.50.2.317,
arXiv:http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/50/2/317.full.pdf+html.
Cheilari, A., Guillen, J., Damalas, D., Barbas, T., 2013. Effects of the fuel
price crisis on the energy efficiency and the economic performance of the
European Union fishing fleets. Marine Policy 40, 18 – 24. doi:https:
//doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.12.006.
Cisse´, A., Doyen, L., Blanchard, F., Be´ne´, C., Pe´reau, J.C., 2015. Ecovia-
bility for small-scale fisheries in the context of food security constraints.
Ecological Economics 119, 39 – 52. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2015.02.005.
49
Clark, C.W., 1990. Mathematical Bioeconomics. 2 ed., Wiley, New York.
Clark, C.W., Munro, G.R., Sumaila, U.R., 2005. Subsidies, buybacks, and
sustainable fisheries. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment 50, 47 – 58. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2004.11.002.
Comitini, S., Huang, D.S., 1967. A study of production and factor shares in
the Halibut fishing industry. Journal of Political Economy 75.
Costello, C., Ovando, D., Clavelle, T., Strauss, C.K., Hilborn, R., Melny-
chuk, M.C., Branch, T.A., Gaines, S.D., Szuwalski, C.S., Cabral, R.B.,
Rader, D.N., Leland, A., 2016. Global fishery prospects under contrasting
management regimes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
doi:10.1073/pnas.1520420113.
Daure`s, F., Trenkel, V.M., Guyader, O., 2013. Modelling the fishing costs of
french commercial vessels in the bay of biscay. Fisheries Research 146, 74
– 85. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2013.03.022.
De`me, M., Thiao, D., Fambaye, N., Sarre, A., Diadhiou, H., 2012. Dy-
namique des Populations de Sardinelles en Afrique du Nord-Ouest: Con-
traintes Environnementales, Biologiques et Socio Economiques. Final
project report. USAID/COMFISH project. University of Rhode Island,
Senegal, Narragansett, RI.
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2010. Bulletin
mensuel des statistiques economiques de janvier 2010. Technical Report.
ANSD.
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2015a. Situa-
tion e´conomique et sociale re´gionale, Saint-Louis 2010. Technical Report.
ANSD.
50
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2015b.
Social-economic indicators of Senegal 2015. Data retrieved from on-
line database, 04.12.2017, http://senegal.opendataforafrica.org/
SNSEI2015/social-economic-indicators-of-senegal-2015.
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la De´mographie, 2016. Con-
sommation finale par groupe de produits. Data retrieved from on-
line database, 05.04.2018, http://senegal.opendataforafrica.org/
fsrvlqe/consommation-finale-par-groupe-de-produits.
Diankha, O., Ba, A., Brehmer, P., Brochier, T., Sow, B.A., Thiaw, M.,
Gaye, A.T., Ngom, F., Demarcq, H., 2018. Contrasted optimal environ-
mental windows for both sardinella species in Senegalese waters. Fisheries
Oceanography , 1–15doi:10.1111/fog.12257.
Diankha, O., Demarcq, H., Fall, M., Thiao, D., Thiaw, M., Sow, B., Gaye,
A., Brehmer, P., 2017. Studying the contribution of different fishing gears
to the Sardinella small-scale fishery in Senegalese waters. Aquatic Living
Resources 30, Art. 27 [8 p.]. doi:10.1051/alr/2017027.
Diankha, O., Thiaw, M., Sow, B., Brochier, T., Gaye, A., Brehmer, P., 2015.
Round sardinella (Sardinella aurita) and anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus)
abundance as related to temperature in the senegalese waters. Thalassas
31, 9–17.
Duan, N., 1983. Smearing estimate: A nonparametric retransformation
method. Journal of the American Statistical Association 78, 605–610.
ECMWF, 2012. ERA-interim project, monthly means. Accessed 21.12.2017,
https://doi.org/10.5065/D68050NT.
51
Eide, A., Skjold, F., Olsen, F., Flaaten, O., 2003. Harvest functions: The
norwegian bottom trawl cod fisheries. Marine Resource Economics 18,
81–93.
European Union, 2017. EU Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements.
Technical report. European Union. doi:10.2771/917103.
Failler, P., 2014. Climate variability and food security in Africa: The case
of small pelagic fish in West Africa. Journal of Fisheries & Livestock
Production 2, 1–11. doi:10.4172/2332-2608.1000122.
FAO, 2005. Increasing the contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty
alleviation and food security. Technical report 10. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations. Rome.
FAO, 2008. Report of the FAO Working Group on the Assessmant of Small
Pelagic Fish off Northwest Africa FIMF/R882 (Bi). Technical Report.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
FAO, 2011a. Report of the FAO Working Group on the Assessmant of Small
Pelagic Fish off Northwest Africa FIRF/R965 (Bi). Technical Report. Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Rome.
FAO, 2011b. Report of the FAO Working Group on the Assessmant of Small
Pelagic Fish off Northwest Africa FIRF/R975 (Bi). Technical Report. Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Rome.
Gallet, C.A., 2009. The demand for fish: A meta-analysis
of the own-price elasticity. Aquaculture Economics & Man-
agement 13, 235–245. doi:10.1080/13657300903123985,
arXiv:https://doi.org/10.1080/13657300903123985.
52
Ghosh, R., Siddique, M., 1998. The Labour Market in the Maldives: The
case for institutional reforms. Economics Discussion / Working Papers
98-13. The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
Government of Senegal, 2006. Incidence of poverty and contribution of Sene-
gal, 2006. Data retrieved from online database, 05.04.2018.
Greene, W.H., 2003. Econometric analysis. Pearson Education India.
Guyader, O., Berthou, P., Koutsikopoulos, C., Alban, F., Demane`che, S.,
Gaspar, M., Eschbaum, R., Fahy, E., Tully, O., Reynal, L., Curtil, O.,
Frangoudes, K., Maynou, F., 2013. Small scale fisheries in Europe: A com-
parative analysis based on a selection of case studies. Fisheries Research
140, 1 – 13. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2012.11.008.
Hardy, P.Y., Be´ne´, C., Doyen, L., Mills, D., 2017. Strengthening the resilience
of small-scale fisheries: A modeling approach to explore the use of in-shore
pelagic resources in Melanesia. Environmental Modelling & Software 96,
291 – 304. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2017.06.001.
Kawarazuka, N., Be´ne´, C., 2010. Linking small-scale fisheries and aqua-
culture to household nutritional security: an overview. Food Security 2,
343–357. doi:10.1007/s12571-010-0079-y.
Krakstad, J.O., Olsen, M., Sarre, A., Mbye, E.M., 2006. Survey of the pelagic
fish resources off North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine
Research. Bergen.
Krakstad, J.O., Sarre, A., Mbye, E.M., Olsen, M., 2003. Survey of the pelagic
fish resources off North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine
Research. Bergen.
53
Krakstad, J.O., Sylla, S., Jallow, J., Olsen, M., 2004. Survey of the pelagic
fish resources off North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine
Research. Bergen.
Krakstad, J.O., Sylla, S., Jallow, J., Olsen, M., 2005. Survey of the pelagic
fish resources off North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine
Research. Bergen.
Kronbak, L.G., 2004. The dynamics of an open-access fishery: Baltic sea
cod. Marine Resource Economics 19, 459–479.
Lam, V., Cheung, W., Swartz, W., Sumaila, U., 2012. Cli-
mate change impacts on fisheries in West Africa: implications
for economic, food and nutritional security. African Journal of
Marine Science 34, 103–117. doi:10.2989/1814232X.2012.673294,
arXiv:https://doi.org/10.2989/1814232X.2012.673294.
Manning, W.G., 1998. The logged dependent variable, heteroscedasticity,
and the retransformation problem. Journal of Health Economics 17, 283 –
295. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6296(98)00025-3.
Direction des peˆches maritimes, 2001-2008. Re´sultats ge´ne´raux des peˆches
maritimes. Annual report. Direction des peˆches maritimes, Ministe`re de
l’e´conomie maritime, Re´publique du Senegal.
Pech, N., Samba, A., Drapeau, L., Sabatier, R., Laloe¨, F., 2001. Fitting
a model of flexible multifleet–multispecies fisheries to senegalese artisanal
fishery data. Aquatic Living Resources 14, 81–98.
Quaas, M.F., Stoeven, M.T., Klauer, B., Petersen, T., Schiller, J., 2017.
Windows of opportunity for sustainable fisheries management: The case
54
of eastern baltic cod. Environmental and Resource Economics , online
firstdoi:10.1007/s10640-017-0122-y.
Riekhof, M.C., 2016. The Insurance Premium in the Interest Rates of Inter-
linked Loans in a Small-Scale Fishery. Working Paper 2016-16/264. Center
of Economic Research at ETH Zurich.
Schuhbauer, A., Sumaila, U.R., 2016. Economic viability and small-scale
fisheries - A review. Ecological Economics 124, 69 – 75. doi:https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.01.018.
Squires, D., 1987. Fishing effort: Its testing, specification, and internal struc-
ture in fisheries economics and management. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 14, 268–282.
The World Bank, 2017. Consumer price index. Online data-
bank. Data retrieved from World Development Indicators, ac-
cessed 30.11.2017, https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Thiao, D., 2009. Un syste`me d’indicateurs de durabilite´ des peˆcheries coˆtie`res
comme outil de gestion inte´gre´e des ressources halieutiques se´ne´galaises.
Ph.D. thesis. Universite´ de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines Ecole Doc-
torale SOFT (Socie´te´ du Futur).
Thiao, D., Barry, M.D., Thiam, M., 2008. Pre´sentation du syste`me
d’information national sur la peˆche et statistiques de la peˆche mar-
itime se´ne´galaise de 1997 a` 2008. Annual report. Centre de recherches
oceanographiques de Dakar-Thiaroye, Institut se´ne´galais de recherches
agricoles.
55
Thiaw, M., Auger, P.A., Ngom, F., Brochier, T., Faye, S., Diankha, O.,
Brehmer, P., 2017. Effect of environmental conditions on the seasonal and
inter-annual variability of small pelagic fish abundance off North-West
Africa: The case of both Senegalese sardinella. Fisheries Oceanography
26, 583–601. doi:10.1111/fog.12218.
Tiedemann, M., Fock, H.O., Brehmer, P., Do¨ring, J., Mo¨llmann, C., 2017.
Does upwelling intensity determine larval fish habitats in upwelling ecosys-
tems? The case of Senegal and Mauritania. Fisheries Oceanography 26,
655–667. doi:10.1111/fog.12224.
Toresen, R., Sarre, A., Olsen, M., 2001. Survey of the pelagic fish resources off
North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine Research. Bergen.
Toresen, R., Sarre, A., Olsen, M., 2002. Survey of the pelagic fish resources off
North West Africa. Annual report. Institute of Marine Research. Bergen.
Tsoa, E., Schrank, W.E., Roy, N., 1982. U.S. demand for selected groundfish
products, 1967-80. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64, 483–
489.
del Valle, I., Astorkiza, I., Astorkiza, K., 2001. Is the current regulation of
the viii division European anchovy optimal? Environmental and Resource
Economics 19, 53–72. doi:10.1023/A:1011127610739.
Willmann, R., Kelleher, K., 2009. The sunken billions : the economic jus-
tification for fisheries reform (English). Technical Report. World Bank,
Washington DC.
World Bank, 2007. Changing the Face of the Waters: The Promise and
Challenge of Sustainable Aquaculture. Agriculture and Rural Development
Series, World Bank Publications.
56
World Bank, 2008. Small-scale capture fisheries : a global overview with em-
phasis on developing countries (English). Technical Report. World Bank,
Washington DC.
Zeeberg, J., Corten, A., Tjoe-Awie, P., Coca, J., Hamady, B., 2008. Climate
modulates the effects of Sardinella aurita fisheries off Northwest Africa.
Fisheries Research 89, 65–75.
57
B Supplementary online material
B.1 Data Summary for weather variables
We extract data relevant to Senegalese waters from the available grid of
0.75➦longitude x 0.75➦latitude. For wind, SST and salinity, we use regional
boxes that only contain sea or coastal areas. For precipitation, we use a
larger, aggregate coordinate box that also includes inland coordinates to in-
clude potential river-runoff effects. Within each coordinate box, data is aver-
aged. We create for each variable a shock term varsh = (var− varltm)/varsd
with varsd representing the regional standard deviation of the monthly long-
term mean. We define varltm as the 30-year long term monthly mean value
from 1981-2010 on average for the whole (coastal) region, such that for SST
and wind variables, shocks can also capture regular deviations between re-
gions. Coordinates as well as a data summary are provided in 8. Data
contains no missings. It is provided, as in the main part, by the European
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts.
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Table 8: Summary statistics of the weather used for robustness
Mean Sd Min Max
Thie`s Sud (17.25W − 18.75W & 13.50N − 15.00N)
SST (➦ Celsius) 24.5101 3.0069 18.5728 28.5381
Wind speed (m/s) 5.2665 1.2621 3.0604 8.0403
Zonal windstress ( N./m2) -0.0028 0.0237 -0.0727 0.0302
Meridional windstress ( N./m2) -0.0349 0.0279 -0.0950 0.0094
Fleuve (17.25W − 18.75W & 15.00N − 16.50N)
SST (➦ Celsius) 23.9887 3.0636 18.7395 28.6313
Wind speed (m/s) 5.9958 1.2922 3.2699 8.4265
Zonal windstress ( N./m2) -0.0087 0.0268 -0.0831 0.0330
Meridional windstress ( N./m2) -0.0485 0.0286 -0.1016 -0.0011
Cap Vert (17.25W − 18.75W & 14.25N − 15.75N)
SST (➦ Celsius) 23.3461 2.7444 18.5298 28.3813
Wind speed (m/s) 5.9536 1.1481 3.3267 8.2508
Zonal windstress ( N./m2) -0.0100 0.0273 -0.0794 0.0328
Meridional windstress ( N./m2) -0.0489 0.0257 -0.1003 -0.0034
Thie`s Nord (17.25W − 18.75W & 14.25N − 15.75N)
SST (➦ Celsius) 24.0571 3.0009 18.5298 28.3813
Wind speed (m/s) 5.6409 1.2841 3.0984 8.2508
Zonal windstress ( N./m2) -0.0070 0.0259 -0.0794 0.0328
Meridional windstress ( N./m2) -0.0428 0.0280 -0.1003 0.0049
Aggregate Senegal (15.75W − 18.75W & 13.50N − 16.50N)
Aggregate precipitation (mm/d) 0.5081 0.8955 0.0000 4.0833
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B.2 Estimation graphs
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B.3 Comparison of two-step model and separate CPUE
estimation
In section 3, we argued that the estimation of environmental effect using the
CPUE-equation could be subject an endogeneity bias. Here, we compare
results from the two step estimation to results from a separate estimation of
the CPUE function.
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Figure 7: Catchability estimates for the joint and separate model
We use the same 374 observations as in the first step of the full model.
The R2 value is higher than in the second step regression by 2 percentage
points. Both models vary only slightly with respect to model fit.
Small differences occur concerning the estimated coefficients (see column
3 in table 1). Figure 7 compares estimated log catchability. Baseline catch-
ability in the period between March and July is similar for the two models,
whereas catchability is slightly lower in the two-step model during the rest of
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the year. This can be viewed as an upwards correction for spring and early
summer. We conclude that fishing days are associated with less actual effort
in spring months compared to the rest of the year. Fish are close to shore
during these months.
The effect of SST shocks on catchability is corrected downwards, but
this difference is not significant at the 95% level. If a model accounts for
variability in actual effort, the impact of SST shocks appears weaker. The
opposite is true for lagged precipitation. Its coefficient is negative in the
two-step model, but insignificant. A negative coefficient could be explained
by reduced visibility. The schooling parameter χˆ is positive and slightly
lower at 0.195 in the separate model, but insignificant. The weak difference
in the size of χˆ shows that the effort parameter does not vary a lot with
biomass. However, once environmental coefficients are indeed exogenous,
the importance of biomass changes are more explicit and significant. Other
parameter do not exhibit noticeable differences.
Our correction leads to differences in parameter estimation, advocating
that a bias exist, but it is merely small. In this particular case, using in-
accurate effort data does not lead to a substantial bias. A more detailed
measurement would not substantially improve estimation results.
B.4 Estimation graphs: Fit after retransformation
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Figure 8: Comparison between observed and predicted values for Sardinella
aurita catch within the study period
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Figure 9: Comparison between observed and predicted values for Sardinella
aurita prices within the study period
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B.5 Aggregate rents for different biomass levels
Table 9: Regional yearly fishers’ and consumers’ rents (1000 FCFA) for differ-
ent biomass levels under open access
Rents difference from mean (%)
Region TS FL CV TN Sen. TS FL CV TN Sen.
CSoa,mean 971,344 2,390,750 0 981,591 4,343,684
CSoa,min 824,501 2,163,658 0 841,270 3,829,430 -15 -9 -25 -14 -12
CSoa,max 1,078,919 2,547,810 0 1,083,827 4,710,556 11 7 20 10 8
FSoa,mean 683,762 1,423,947 1,536,775 607,823 4,252,307
FSoa,min 580,394 1,288,690 1,149,174 520,934 3,539,192 -15 -9 -25 -14 -17
FSoa,max 759,487 1,517,494 1,846,972 671,131 4,795,084 11 7 20 10 13
TRoa,mean 1,655,106 3,814,697 1,536,775 1,589,414 8,595,991
TRoa,min 1,404,895 3,452,348 1,149,174 1,362,204 7,368,622 -15 -9 -25 -14 -14
TRoa,max 1,838,406 4,065,304 1,846,972 1,754,958 9,505,640 11 7 20 10 11
TS: Thie`s Sud, FL: Fleuve, CV: Cap Vert, TN: Thie`s Nord, Sen.: Senegal.
Mean biomass: 199,000t, minimum: 116,000t, maximum: 282,000t.
B.6 Rents as a function of SST
Figure 10 shows the distribution of rents over the year by means of four
exemplary months, as well as the impact of SST shocks on the aggregate
rent in grain baskets per capita. The length of the lines shows the extent to
which SST shocks vary for each of the four months shown. SST shocks in
June alone may vary food security for a certain year by 0.5 – 1 grain basket
per coastal inhabitant.
65
Figure 10: Dependence of regional fisher and consumer rents on SST shocks
(1 standard deviation ≈ an SST shock of 3➦Celsius, depending on
the region.)
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economic model for the Senegalese artisanal purse seine fishery and compare
the simulated fisheries’ development using different climate projections. We
find that economic adaptation processes may amplify effects of climate vari-
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1 Introduction
Predicting climate change effects on oceans and fisheries has drawn intense
scientific attention over the past decade (Arnason, 2008; Be´ne´ et al., 2010;
Pauly et al., 2013; Hughes et al., 2003). Changes in wind regime and sea sur-
face temperature (SST) are expected to affect the Atlantic habitat. Upwelling-
favorable winds are expected to increase in the north, decrease in the south
(Cropper et al., 2014; Marcello et al., 2011) and thus change primary pro-
ductivity. Pauly et al. (2013) reported an increase in global mean water
temperature at time of catch of 0.19➦Celsius per decade, due to fish stock re-
distribution. The economic effects may be strong in particular for artisanal
fishing communities, where the dependence on fish as a protein source and
on fishing income is high (Belhabib et al., 2015; Be´ne´ et al., 2010; Ding et al.,
2017).
For 14 Northwest African countries, Lam et al. (2012) projected an av-
erage climate change induced decrease in landed fish of 25.9% between 2000
and 2050, associated with the loss of 50% of available jobs in the fishery.
Other countries could benefit due to an enhanced catch potential (Arna-
son, 2008; Cheung et al., 2010). Due to the complexity and global nature
of the studies, they rely on simplifying assumptions such as constant per
capita consumption and landings according to biological catch potential or
economic growth (Arnason, 2008; Pauly et al., 2013; Failler, 2014; Lam et al.,
2012). However, changes may be dampened or intensified, when economic
actors, in this case fishers and consumers, adapt. In open-access artisanal
fisheries, where local market feedbacks are typically strong, such adaptation
processes are important. For example, fishers may adapt by changing the
used amounts of fuel, capital and labor to fish. As a result, over-fishing may
increase or decrease with rising harvest potential. Non-linear changes in equi-
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librium harvest and fish prices arise (see the first paper in this dissertation).
While this is scarcely analyzed in fisheries models (Belhabib et al., 2016a),
Osborne et al. (2013) explicitly modeled adaptation into a crop model, which
turned negative impacts into positive crop yield gains. Both uncertainty in
climate projection, as well as these economic changes and their uncertainties
are important for policy makers to take into account. Therefore, this paper
aims to simulate the impact of climatic changes on an artisanal open access
fishery under endogenous economic adaptation. High uncertainty exists with
respect to climate change projections, in particular concerning the amplitude
of climate change and the extent of climate variability. Hence, for a robust
understanding of climate change adaptation, it is necessary to compare how
the fishery develops under different projections and to explore which climate
scenario traits are important determinants.
Jewell et al. (2018) recently spotlighted the link between climate change
and fuel subsidies. The price for fossil fuels also shapes the adaptation pro-
cess in fisheries. The importance of fuel for fishing has been underlined in
the literature (e.g Daure`s et al., 2013; Suuronen et al., 2012; Willmann and
Kelleher, 2009). One third of the global output value is taken up by fuel costs
(Willmann and Kelleher, 2009). Higher fuel prices, all else equal, decrease
harvest. This reduces over-fishing, such that the equilibrium stock level is
higher and more stable. Fuel cost also affect the distance fishers are willing
to travel for catch (Prellezo et al., 2009). Thus, it is a potentially important
determinant for how severe climate change effects are felt, how uncertain they
are and how (much) adaptation takes place. At the same time, fuel subsidies
constitute one of the most widely used policy instruments: Sumaila et al.
(2016) estimate that an annual 7.7 billion US Dollar of fuel subsidies were
paid to fisheries globally. Several authors have found a detrimental impact on
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fish stocks (Harper et al., 2012; Sumaila et al., 2008). Fishing fleets benefit
from a subsidy decrease if the stock effect is large enough (Da-Rocha et al.,
2017). On the other hand, it has been argued in World Trade Organization
(WTO) discussions that developing countries’ fisheries may need subsidies
to help maintain food security and alleviate poverty (Yu and Fonseca-Marti,
2005). Against this background, this paper evaluates how climate change
outcomes for the fishery can be positively shaped if fuel subsidies are abol-
ished.
We develop an empirical bio-economic model for the Sardinella aurita
fishery by artisanal purse seines in Senegal, that takes into account climate
effects on reproduction of the fish stock, productivity of harvesting, feedbacks
on local input and output markets, and fuel subsidies. Climate has a dynamic
effect on yearly stock growth through changes in upwelling intensity, but
also an effect on catchability, and thus fishing pressure, through fish stock
distribution. We simulate the development of biomass, harvest and prices and
compare outcomes concerning the fisheries contribution to food and income
security. Results of different climate model projections and different fuel
subsidy policies are compared. Our results are informative for policy makers,
as they shed light on the effect of such a policy under the joint consideration of
endogenous adaptation of actors and climatic changes. In addition, they show
how small climate scenario differences may be amplified to larger economic
differences, compare the relevance of different model traits and reveal how
strongly outcomes depend on the policy regime.
The next section describes the data and methods used in the biological
and economic model parts, as well as the simulation strategy and climate
scenarios. Results are presented and discussed in Section 3.
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2 Methods and materials
2.1 Biology and climate impacts on stock growth of
Senegalese Sardinella aurita
Sardinella aurita is a migratory small pelagic schooling species. The species
occurs along the continental shelf between Morocco and Guinea Bissau (Brehmer
et al., 2007). Recent findings support the separability of the stock into sub-
populations (Bacha et al., 2016; Braham et al., 2014; Brochier et al., 2018;
Corten et al., 2013; Durand et al., 2013), with one group along Senegal and
Southern Mauritania. Spawning in Senegal peaks in fall and spring (Thiaw
et al., 2017).
To estimate climate impacts on biomass growth, we use stock assessment
data for Sardinella aurita by the FAO working group on the assessment
of small pelagic fish off Northwest Africa. In the years 1995–2006, fishery
independent surveys were carried out in the fourth quarter of each year by
the research vessel R/V Dr FRIDTJOF NANSEN (Toresen et al., 2001, 2002;
Krakstad et al., 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). National surveys provide estimates
for 2007–2009 (FAO, 2008, 2011a,b)2. Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows
yearly abundance estimates. The development over time shows substantial
variability, which has been attributed to upwelling variability and associated
variations in primary productivity (Diankha et al., 2015; Corten et al., 2013;
Thiaw et al., 2017).
The habitat is characterized by high productivity due to its upwelling sys-
tem (Lathuiliere et al., 2008). Alongshore wind stress brings cool, nutrient-
rich water to the surface (Cropper et al., 2014). In such upwelling systems,
2The working group used regression models to account for occasional regional gaps.
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small pelagic reproduction has been found to depend mainly on two factors:
retention of larvae and primary productivity. Both are influenced by wind
conditions (Bacha et al., 2017; Binet, 1997; Brochier et al., 2009, 2018; Cury
and Roy, 1989; Tiedemann et al., 2017; Zeeberg et al., 2008). According to
Thiaw et al. (2017), the lagged spring and autumn upwelling indices have a
significant positive effect on Sardinella aurita abundance, because they spur
primary productivity. On the other hand, wind stress can influence reten-
tion negatively, because larvae drift off to areas where they can not survive
(Bakun, 1996; Cury and Roy, 1989). Due to the broad continental shelf in
the main spawning area, retention is high in general (Brochier et al., 2009).
We make use of monthly reanalysis data using the ERA-Interim product,
available from by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Fore-
casts (ECMWF, 2012) to calculate a seasonal coastal upwelling index (CUI)
from wind stress using standard procedures (Cropper et al., 2014) (see B.1 in
the supplementary material). We average over the area between 13.5 – 16➦N
and 17.25 – 18➦W. Our index shows the regionally typical pattern: Upwelling
is strongest in winter, and relents between June and October.
We estimate the effect of upwelling on yearly stock growth (surplus pro-
duction of the stock), defined as the biomass difference between consecutive
years plus catches. Data on annual Senegalese and Gambian catches for the
period 1995–2013 is taken from the FAO assessment report (FAO, 2013). We
add reported catches by legal foreign trawlers from the ‘Sea around us’ data-
base (Belhabib et al., 2014, 2016b). The Senegalese purse seine fleet share
in total harvest fluctuates around 90%. This is because the stocks’ main
habitat is the Senegalese exclusive economic zone, where other fleets have
limited access. A summary of the data-set used in estimation is provided in
A.2.
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We assume a standard logistic growth model, with spawning stock biomass
(SSB) lagged by one year, xy−1, where y denotes the year in which biomass
growth is observed. The intrinsic growth rate r + f(UPy) depends on up-
welling intensity UPy, and we use K to denote the (constant) carrying ca-
pacity for the fish stock. Adding a normally distributed shock εsy, net growth
gy of the fish stock in year y is thus given by
gy = (r + f(UPy)) xy−1
(
1− xy−1
K
)
+ εsy (1)
The error term εsy is approximately normally distributed with an esti-
mated standard deviation of 80.29 kt per year. The function f(UPy) denotes
a linear sum of upwelling impacts, where various structures were tested. We
considered alternative specifications with respect to lag structure, seasons,
SST, an alternative upwelling index based on SST, and with respect to the
size of the biomass or biomass growth of the Mauritanian stock group to
check for migration flows. We also tested alternatives with weather impacts
on the carrying capacity, but models with environmental effects on the natu-
ral growth rate generally performed better than models with environmental
effects on carrying capacity K, or on the quadratic term in general. The
model was chosen based on the Bayesian information criterion and adjusted
R2. In the chosen model, the one year lagged fall (October-December) and
winter (January-March) CUI have a linear influence on the natural growth
rate:
r + f(UPy) = r + rCwCUIwinter,y−1 + rCfCUIfall,y−1 (2)
The model features an adjusted R2 of 92%, which is non-surprising con-
sidering that only 14 observations (1996–2009) are available and upwelling
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has been established as main driver by previous research. The inclusion of
upwelling explains 28% of the variation compared to the model without cli-
mate impacts. Tests for serial correlation, heterogeneity and skewness did
not detect any issues at the 5% level. In the following, we present results
and marginal effects shortly. Section A.3 includes technical details as well as
alternative specifications.
The carrying capacity is estimated at 302 kt, and significant at the 1%
level (p < .001). The positive impact from fall upwelling (p = .016), is partly
canceled out by a negative impact from winter upwelling (p = .001). The
latter could be linked to lower retention, colder water temperatures unfavor-
able for the autumn larvae and may as well delay spring spawning. Thiaw
et al. (2017) also report a negative sign for winter upwelling, which however
was insignificant. As the mean SSB xy−1 (199.5 kt) lies above the maxi-
mum sustainable yield, the marginal effect at means of an increasing SSB
on stock growth is negative at -1.21 kt. An increase in the upwelling indi-
cators by 1 m
3
s
per 100m coastline leads to a growth reduction of 18.49 kt
concerning winter upwelling, and an increase of 20.61 kt for fall upwelling.
Figure 1 shows the stock growth effect of varying one environmental vari-
able between its minimum and maximum observed level for fall and winter
upwelling respectively, where the respective other upwelling variable is held
constant at its mean3. The graph shows that stock growth varies slightly
more with winter upwelling than with fall upwelling. Predicted growth at
maximum sustainable yield SSB ranges between 100 and 430 kt (66–285% of
SSB) within the study period, based only on upwelling variation.
We use available harvest and climate data for 2010 – 2014 to simulate
3Observed values lay between 0.2509 and 0.4103m
3
s per m coastline for winter upwelling
and 0.1243–0.2418m
3
s per m coastline for fall upwelling.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of biomass growth to a simultaneous variation of spawn-
ing stock biomass (xy−1) and upwelling. Dashed lines mark the 95%
confidence interval variation.
the development of the stock for 2010 – 2014. The model provides plausible
results (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). These predictions are used in the
economic part.
2.2 Economy and climate impacts on harvesting costs
Fishers harvesting decisions are affected by climatic conditions, prices for fish,
fuel and labor, technological progress and the stock level. We use a similar
economic data-set as previous studies (Diankha et al., 2017; Thiao, 2009).
We model purse seines targeting Sardinella aurita in four Senegalese regions,
namely Thie`s Sud, Thie`s Nord, Fleuve and the Dakar peninsula called Cap
Vert, and aggregate results afterwards. We use monthly regional data on
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purse seine4 catches (tons), prices (FCFA/kg) and effort (days at sea, DAS)
for 2001–2013, provided by the Centre of Oceanographic Research of Dakar-
Thiaroye (CRODT). All prices are given in units of 2010-level FCFA, which
is the abbreviation for the Senegalese currency Franc de la Communaute´
Financie`re d’Afrique (FCFA), after deflation with yearly World Bank Con-
sumer Price Index data (The World Bank, 2017). We use regional Sardinella
aurita prices, but fill in gaps with prices from the neighboring region or al-
ternatively the price for Sardinella maderensis, the closest substitute (4% of
observations). We prolong the time series of annual biomass data (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1) by use of our own stock predictions for 2010 – 2013 (see Figure A.1).
This allows us to make use of 187 additional data-points, which is desirable
in particular for a more robust estimation of time trends. It is also important
when looking at fuel impacts, as fuel prices typically are more variable over
the long term5. Monthly local fuel price data is obtained from the annual
reports of the Directorate of Maritime Fisheries (Direction des peˆches mar-
itimes, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011). Prices
are given in units of FCFA/liter. Local fuel prices and global prices for the
internationally traded crude oil “Brent” are highly correlated. A strong up-
ward trend can be observed until 2008. After 2008, fuel prices fell to the
level of 2005, followed again by a gradual increase. For climate impacts, we
again make use of the ERA Interim Reanalysis product at a monthly time
scale. We average over regional coordinate boxes between 13.5–16.5➦N and
17.25-18.75➦W. The data-set is summarized in A.2.
4Purse seines exhibited an annual catch share of more than 80% for 2001–2013 in all
regions but Thie`s Sud (57%).
5The estimation results for the time period 2001–2009, including only observed biomass
levels, and further alternative specifications are provided as supplementary material in
section B.2
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Supply and demand are simultaneously estimated via the reduced form
using robust standard errors. We estimate 32 parameters in three equations
from 5616 observations. A Bayesian information criterion 4056 and an R2 of
32–34% indicate a good model fit. Appendices A.4 and A.5 provide technical
details on the model and estimation.
We assume an iso-elastic inverse demand function for fresh Sardinella au-
rita. Our estimates show that inverse demand is decreasing and convex in
harvest. This means that consumers are willing to pay a higher price if the
fish supply is scarce, and the marginal effect decreases with the quantity sup-
plied. This aligns with the literature finding that fish is sold mainly on local
markets (Ba et al., 2017; De`me et al., 2012; Failler, 2014). Sardinella aurita
is an important consumption good for these local markets, and consumers
respond to quantity changes. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand is
found to depend negatively on population density (p = .003). This is sensi-
ble, as population density can be taken as a proxy for the size of the market.
Larger markets, in turn, spur the supply of various different products at af-
fordable prices, and reduce the consumers dependence on this particular fish.
We assume that a linear time trend affects prices. Our empirical estimates
show that prices are subject to a monthly positive linear time trend of 0.2%
(p = .076).
The harvesting technology is modeled as a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-
Douglas function from a capital-labor-composite and fuel. This means that
fishers can substitute between fuel, capital and labor: If one of these inputs
becomes more expensive, the fisher is able to partly replace it by other in-
6These are monthly regional observations between 2009-2013 with few, unsystematic
gaps.
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puts7. Harvest production is assumed to depend positively on biomass. At
larger biomass values, catches easier, as fish are easier located. The “catch-
ability” parameter is used for scaling. A linear time trend on catchability
reflects unobserved changes over time. Monthly dummies8 are introduced
to represent regular harvest seasonality, for example due to biomass growth,
northwards stock migration in summer and cultural events that impact fish-
ing (Corten et al., 2013; Thiaw et al., 2017; Zeeberg et al., 2008). Moreover,
harvest success depends on climate variables, which we assume to enter as an
exponential function, where the exponent is made up of linear and quadratic
terms of climate variables.
We infer the following results from estimation: The output elasticity of
the capital-labor composite is 0.815 (p < .001). The resulting output elas-
ticity of 0.185 for fuel means that fuel expenses make up for 18.5% of total
fishing cost. Harvest production also depends on biomass at an estimated
elasticity of 0.222 (p = .002): Harvest increases in biomass, but the elasticity
is rather small, as should be expected for a schooling fishery. Fish are easier
located at a larger biomass, but as fish form schools, this effect is compar-
atively weak: Once a school is located, a large catch can be made without
searching further. We estimate a positive linear time trend on catchability
at a monthly rate of 0.9% (p < .001), which we interpret to reflect technical
7Several estimation studies agree that substitution possibilities exist in fisheries, such
as Bjørndal (1989); Campbell (1991); Comitini and Huang (1967); Squires (1987); Valle
et al. (2003). We choose a substitution elasticity of one to keep the model simple and
tractable.
8One dummy variable is used per month, that equals one if the observation has occurred
in the respective month, and zero otherwise. Its coefficient thus measures the impact on
the outcome variable that stems from the time in the year when the observation occurs.
For example, if a certain cultural event takes place each December that keeps fishers
from harvesting, the use of monthly dummies would show a negative coefficient for the
December dummy.
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progress. Furthermore, we estimate monthly dummies and find that catch
productivity is highest in spring and winter, and lowest in late summer.
Monthly dummies are all significant at least at the 10% level (p ≤ .064).
To estimate the influence of climate variables on the catchability, we
tested several specifications including sea surface temperature (SST), wind
speed and direction, as well as precipitation. We refer the reader to the sup-
plementary material for robustness checks (B.2). An important determinant
of catchability is the SST. We find a non-linear dependence with a peak at
25.4➦Celsius, a threshold which is usually crossed between May and June,
with swt = 1.276 (p = .002) and swt2 = −0.025 (p = .005) respectively. This
is in line with the literature that finds a nonlinear dependence and optimal
catch temperatures between 21 and 27➦Celsius (Bacha et al., 2017; Diankha
et al., 2015; Zeeberg et al., 2008). The stock shifts inshore in spring, when
upwelling recedes and the temperature rises. The earlier this occurs, the ear-
lier will fish be within easy catching distance (Brochier et al., 2018). When
the temperature becomes too high, Sardinella aurita migrates northwards
and out of immediate reach (Thiaw et al., 2017). Other climate impacts
were not found to be significant.
According to model assumptions, fishers minimize costs subject to the
prices for capital, labor and fuel. Capital and labor are supplied on local
markets and are not perfectly malleable following Quaas et al. (2017) and
our findings in the previous dissertation chapter. Hence, we assume increas-
ing and convex iso-elastic inverse supply functions: In equilibrium, wages
and the cost of capital increase with the amount of capital and labor used
by the fishery. Fuel supply is perfectly elastic, prices are determined on
the world market. We specify the resulting equilibrium cost function to be
quadratic, following Arnason et al. (2004) and our findings in the previous
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chapter of this dissertation (see the supplementary material, section B.2, for
robustness). Fuel prices already explain a large part of the strong cost trend
found in previous literature (Ba et al., 2017). A linear cost time trend is
added to include remaining unobserved trends in factor prices and the size
of factor units. The trend parameter is estimated to be positive at the 1%
level (p = .010). Net linear time trends in total, ceteris paribus, lead to an
increase in fishing pressure of a monthly 0.8–1.0%, a result which however is
pitted against rising fuel prices, market development and changing climate
conditions. With continued market development, equilibrium harvest be-
comes more sensitive to input changes, particularly biomass. As consumers
become less dependent on the fish supply, prices remain stable across large
ranges of biomass. The cost reduction effect of a larger biomass becomes
more important in relative terms. For the subsequent simulation, we need
to model how population density as well as fuel prices develop in the future.
Data on population density as described above and date on Brent oil prices,
available from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2018), are
used to estimate linear trends into the future. Afterwards, the trend pa-
rameters are assumed to decline linearly over a period of twenty years, as is
standard for economic models, e.g. DICE (Nordhaus, 1993). For population
density, we observe lower growth rates for more dense regions, as is in line
with the decreasing UN population projections (United Nations, 2017). We
also observe a lower productivity trend rate for the longer time horizon (see
B.2) and a decreasing trend in energy prices worldwide.
Important model dynamics, as by our empirical results, can be summa-
rized as follows:
Climate enters the economic model in two ways: It affects the growth of
the stock and changes the amount of fish that can be harvested sustainably.
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Higher stock levels decrease harvesting costs. Secondly, SST has a nonlinear,
convex impact on harvesting costs, as it affects the spatial distribution of the
stock. An increase in SST can thus increase the propensity to over-fish.
A higher fuel price leads to a steeper equilibrium cost curve and thus
lower fishing pressure. In contrast to capital interest and wages, fuel prices
are independent from the fuel quantity used by the fishery. This leaves the
fishery particularly sensitive to fuel price changes. An increasing fuel price
pushes downwards the curve that defines harvest as a function of the stock
and thus reduces over-fishing. For a varying stock growth curve, this means
that high growth years are allowed to cushion against following low growth
years. Under low fuel prices, the fishers would immediately catch more,
thus swiftly lowering the biomass. Varying both climate models and fuel
price trend sheds light on the interaction between the two, as adaptation
takes place. The system is less susceptible to climate impacts under high
fuel prices, as they have a relative dampening impact on biomass and SST
induced changes in the cost function. In summary, we expect to find that
abolishing fuel subsidies will prove beneficial for the sector.
2.3 Climate projections
High uncertainty exists with respect to reanalysis products and bio-geochemistry
effects of coastal warming (Barton et al., 2013; Cropper et al., 2014; Ndoye
et al., 2014; Sydeman et al., 2014). For example, while climate models gener-
ally agree that sea surface temperatures will rise throughout the 21st century,
the extent of this rise varies among them. To take this model uncertainty
into account, we use the output of two different Earth System models with
two different formulations each to investigate the consequences the model
spread has for artisanal fisheries. This comparison also allows us to ana-
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lyze the importance of certain traits and differences for the fishery. The use
and comparison of different climate models can improve the overall under-
standing of climate impacts and the variability of outcomes, as weaknesses
are partly compensated for and greater reliability is achieved (Fraedrich and
Leslie, 1987; Fritsch et al., 2000). Two of our projections (ECE-o and ECE-
bc) are descended from the EC Earth model. The two others (NESM-o and
NESM-bc) are based upon the Norwegian Earth System Model (NorESM).
ECE-o and NESM-o are the original model versions, whereas ECE-bc and
NESM-bc have been bias corrected9. All models use the representative con-
centration pathway (RCP) 8.5 as basis for radiative forcing, i.e. a business
as usual continued forcing.
All four projections show a systematic bias to observed values of SST and
wind-stress partly attributable to initialization in the 19th century. We use
a standard oﬄine nudging approach (e.g. Hawkins et al., 2013; Huntingford
et al., 2005; Staffell and Pfenninger, 2016) for each climate scenario and apply
constant monthly factors directly on the data. The coefficients are estimated
through a regression model to fit the ERA reanalysis data used to estimate
the biological and economic parts. The proportional approach outperforms
an approach of adding a constant in our case. The fit is better for SST than
for wind stress, as the SST development is far more systematic.
In table A.6 in the appendix, we compare the four projections concerning
mean, trend, standard deviation and cyclical behavior of key weather im-
pacts. On average, both winter and fall upwelling show a slight decrease over
time for all four models, and are predicted to be stronger under NESM-o and
9For ECE-bc, bias correction was achieved through adaptation of the ocean mixing
parameter in the ocean model part. For NESM-bc, bias correction was applied by replacing
SST from the ocean model part with anomalies before running the athmospheric model,
and vice versa with wind stress. The estimated bias was projected into the future.
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NESM-bc, than under ECE-o and ECE-bc. All mean values for winter up-
welling for the period 2014–2079 lie below the average observed value during
the estimation period (2001–2013). The upper level of the 95% confidence
interval falls below the maximum observed value. For fall upwelling, only
NESM-o and NESM-bc averages lie above the estimation period mean. For
these two, the 95% confidence interval falls fully within the span of observed
values.
A strong upward trend in SST is evident in all four projections (Figure
2). Scenarios ECE-o and ECE-bc feature a higher average temperature than
NESM-o and NESM-bc in particular after 2030. They also show a higher
variability in yearly means. The difference between warm and cold years is
more pronounced. In addition, the seasonal cycle amplitude as well as the
pertaining standard deviation are larger under ECE-o and ECE-bc.
2.4 Simulation strategy
We run the simulation from the year 2014 until the year 2079 or alterna-
tively until the fishery collapses. To account for catches from other, mostly
artisanal, fleets, we multiply the modeled Senegalese purse seine catches by
a factor of 1.083, estimated from historical averages. We use a monthly time
step, linearly interpolating fish population growth (which is estimated based
on yearly data), including the stochastic term.
To evaluate policy alternatives, we consider two scenarios. The devel-
opment of the mean annual fuel price over time for each of the scenarios is
shown in Figure 3. The first is the business as usual case (BAU). A pro-
portionate subsidy of 30.7% (Seck and Sy, 2008) in form of tax exemptions
forms the most important part of subsidies (Ba et al., 2017; Sumaila et al.,
2008) since the 1960s. The second scenario considers the case where the
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Figure 2: Mean yearly SST over time for different climate models
de-tax rate is linearly decreased over fifteen years until subsidies are fully
eliminated (“melt-down”, md), which thus allows for a gradual transition for
fishers and consumers. The price reaches its plateau in 2034, but its level is
about 600 FCFA higher under the the reform scenario than under BAU.
Below, we first take a closer look at changes in stock growth and the
results from spatial stock distribution on catchability. Afterwards, we analyze
the model behavior at mean growth and harvest pressure, and take a closer
look at how the equilibrium between the two changes over the decades. This
allows us to compare the effects of climate projections on the fishery for a
situation with a stable climate i.e. disregarding short-term variability. We
proceed to analyze the dynamic system and focus first on the sustainability
of the fishery and the propensity for stock collapse. We then turn to the
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analysis of welfare effects. Subsequently, we explore the effects of abolishing
fuel subsidies on sustainability and welfare.
2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074
year
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
m
e
a
n
 a
n
n
u
a
l f
ue
l p
ric
e 
(F
CF
A/
l)
BAU melt down
fuel subsidy
Figure 3: Mean annual fuel price development under different fuel price sce-
narios
3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Biological processes and catchability under differ-
ent climate models
In section 2.3, we discussed that both winter and fall upwelling show a slight
decrease over time for all four models, and are predicted to be stronger under
NESM-o and NESM-bc than under ECE-o and ECE-bc. The decrease in
winter upwelling is beneficial for stock growth, while a decline in fall upwelling
is harmful. The overall resulting natural growth rate development is shown
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Figure 4: Annual climate affected natural growth rate r+f(UPy) for different
climate projections
in Figure 4. Clearly, its variability is higher under ECE-o and ECE-bc for
both seasons, which is in line with the higher upwelling variability. Average
system productivity is highest under ECE-o. It is lowest under NESM-bc,
in particular due to the second half of the time horizon. We see an upward
trend for ECE-o and ECE-bc. In the other two projections, the natural
growth rate shows no detectable trend, however, a distinct dip is visible in
the medium term between 2036-2057 under ECE-bc.
SST and monthly dummies enter the harvest function in a jointly multi-
plicative term. Hence, the SST effect on harvest pressure is strongest dur-
ing the high season between February and May. These months, especially
April and May, have a particularly high catchability also due to biological
processes uncontrolled by SST. Figure A.3 in the appendix shows the devel-
opment of harvest pressure over time for four exemplary months. During the
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high season, the fishery becomes cheaper over time, as the SST approaches
the optimum temperature. The fish remain in the close-to-shore area for a
longer period than before, where they are easily caught. Between June and
December, the temperature increase leads to a decrease in catchability from
2040 on-wards under all climate projections. Fish leave the close-to shore
area slightly earlier than before. However, these months are generally less
important for the fishery anyway. For both periods, the impact is stronger
for ECE-o and ECE-bc, as is the variability. Overall, we see a severe increase
in catchability induced by the SST trend. Towards the end of the time hori-
zon, this trend is either approximately stable (ECE-bc, NESM-o, NESM-bc)
or reversed (ECE-o), when SST lies above the optimum point already during
spring. Then, the Senegalese waters finally become too warm for the species,
that would permanently relocate northwards. These results are summarized
as follows.
Result 1. The impact of upwelling on stock growth is projected to remain
largely unchanged compared to historical values. A slight increase is antic-
ipated under ECE-o and ECE-bc. The most important climate impact over
time is exerted by SST, that drives fishing costs downwards during spring.
NESM-bc features a comparatively high total harvest pressure over the
whole time horizon. At the beginning of the time horizon, yearly harvest
pressure is also high under ECE-o, and in the medium term, ECE-bc shows
the highest harvest pressure. Under NESM-o, harvest pressure is consistently
low.
Our model includes additional factors that impact the harvest curves.
Market development provides increasing substitution possibilities for con-
sumers. As a consequence, equilibrium harvest becomes more sensitive to
the stock level, leading to a steeper harvest function early in the time hori-
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zon and a lower equilibrium stock value. In addition, an positive trends
in fuel prices and technological development combine to a net low positive
trend, that strengthens the upward shift in harvest functions until 2033. By
our assumptions, these trends dwindle to zero until 2033.
Result 2. In addition to climate impacts, the propensity to over-fish is in-
creased by technological development. Market development leads to a lower
equilibrium stock. Increasing fuel prices only insufficiently offset the other
impacts.
3.2 Bioeconomic equilibrium analysis
We analyze the model behavior at mean growth and harvest pressure, and
take a closer look at how the equilibrium between the two changes over the
decades. This allows us to compare the effects of climate projections on
the fishery for a situation with a stable climate i.e. disregarding short-term
variability.
Figure 5 shows yearly total harvest as a function of biomass, as well as
biomass growth, for exemplary years under ECE-o and BAU. We choose
growth with a year lead on harvest, because we modeled growth in year y to
depend on spawning stock biomass one year before that. The interpretation
of the graph is as follows: If the growth function lies above harvest, the stock
grows net. In a non-variable, deterministic model, the rightmost interception
of the two would mark the dynamically stable positive equilibrium (see Figure
5) where harvest is exactly offset, such that fishers in the next year would
be able to benefit from a stock exactly as large as in the year before. For
harvest years 2013 and 2078, such a point exists. For 2047, though, the
harvest curve lies far above the growth curve. The only stable equilibrium in
such a graph would be a biomass of zero. If this were the case for longer than
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Figure 5: Annual harvest and biomass growth as a function of (spawning
stock) biomass for exemplary years under ECE-o.
a few periods, biomass would collapse in the deterministic case. Note that
these are only singular, exemplary years though. Due to climate variability,
they can not be taken as a reference for whole periods.
In Figure 6, we show how this equilibrium changes over time for all four
climate projections and under the two fuel price scenarios considered. Con-
sider first the black crosses that indicate the BAU case where fuel subsidies
are maintained. A downward trend in equilibrium biomass is recognizable
under all four climate projections. The number of years where fishing is un-
sustainable, marked with an equilibrium value of zero, also increases. Under
ECE-o, few such years alternate with relatively favorable years and equilib-
rium biomass around 200 kt. For NESM-bc, after 2028, the fishery sees only
very few sustainable years. After roughly 2030, a dangerous period arises
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Figure 6: Development of the stable equilibrium over time under different cli-
mate projections and fuel subsidy scenarios (business as usual, BAU
and melt-down, md).
under NESM-o and ECE-bc, where over-fishing and extinction is likely. This
development only ends late in the time horizon, when the SST is too high
throughout the year and harvest decreases again. In the long term, unsus-
tainable harvesting years prevail for NESM-o, NESM-bc and ECE-bc.
Result 3. The catch potential increases through higher growth and lowered
costs through the SST impact. Reduced costs increase future over-fishing. Its
impact outruns the incipiently favorable climate change effects in three of
four projections under BAU fuel subsidies. The fishery remains sustainable
under the ECE-o climate projection.
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If fuel subsidies are (gradually) abolished, harvest pressure is lower, such
that a higher equilibrium biomass results (see Figure 6). Unsustainable years
occur less often, in particular under NESM-o. Ensuring the survival under
ECE-bc and NESM-bc will prove very difficult in the medium term, when
productivity is still relatively low and harvest pressure high, and even under
the melt-down scenario, numerous unsustainable years arise.
3.3 Stochastic futures: sustainability under business
as usual fuel subsidies
The deterministic, average results are subject to additional pressure from
climate variability. One particular consequence of variability is a greater
propensity to collapse. More variable climate conditions, such as under
ECE-o and ECE-bc, may lead more often to situations where stock survival
is threatened. This depends in particular on the bio-economic equilibrium
biomass around which the actual stock fluctuates driven by the variable cli-
mate. If this equilibrium stock size is large, it works as a strong buffer against
climatically unfavorable years.
To analyze the systems sustainability, we compute the mean time of sur-
vival. This standard measure in population viability analysis evaluates stock
persistence facing perturbations (e.g Lande, 1993; Leigh, 1981; Palamara
et al., 2013). For each combination of climate projection (4) and fuel subsidy
scenario (2), we run the model 1000 times, over which we compute means to
capture that the fishery is unequally variable.
Figure 7 shows one scatter plot for eight different models – the combina-
tion of four climate projections and two policy scenarios. The mean time of
survival is indicated on the y-axis. To compare welfare across climate pro-
jections, we use the mean net present value (NPV), indicated on the x-axis.
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Figure 7: Mean survival horizon and value of the fishery under different cli-
mate models and policy scenarios. Colors represent climate projec-
tions, shapes represent fuel subsidy scenarios.
The welfare impact will be discussed in the next subsection, 3.4.
Colors indicate the underlying climate projection. Shapes indicate the
fuel price scenario. Consider the squares that show how the fishery performs
under different climate scenarios in the business as usual case, where fuel sub-
sidies are maintained. As expected, variability under ECE-o is so high that
the fishery turns out to under-perform. The fishery can not reap the whole
benefits of its favorable climate prediction. Short periods of high biomass
alternate with long periods of slow replenishment. This dampens mean sur-
vival relative to the underlying high productivity. NESM-o becomes steadily
more unsustainable in the medium term, leading to extinction around 2035.
Under ECE-bc, this effect also plays a role, in particular in the early years.
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Variability is high, which contributes to a comparatively low sustainability
even before 2030. During the early 2030s, the fishery is particularly vulnera-
ble due to its low productivity and high harvest pressure. During this time,
variability in almost all runs eventually leads to extinction. Mean survival
under NESM-o is in line with the deterministic equilibrium. Variability is too
low to have a substantial impact here. Between NESM-o and ECE-o, vari-
ability is a game changer: NESM-o now outperforms ECE-o, even though
the latter showed a superior equilibrium sustainability. NESM-bc provides
the least favorable climate prediction. Nearly from the start, the low pro-
ductivity is unable to counter the steadily increasing harvest pressure, and
the species goes extinct early on. Therefore, variability is of little relevance.
Result 4. The BAU scenario is not dynamically sustainable under any of
the four climate projections. The fishery on average survives only until 2030–
2035. To ensure greater sustainability, resource managers ought to consider
policy actions. Variability can be a game changer concerning the relative
performance under different climate projections.
We can now also measure climate uncertainty, which we define as the
spread in outcomes due to different climate projections. Between NESM-o
and NESM-bc, climate uncertainty amounts to 4.5 years of mean survival
times, i.e. 26% of NESM-bc’s value. The two bias-corrected projections,
that were specifically adapted to better reproduce the observed climate, are
the two with the lowest mean survival time. This indicates that if a study
relies only on original models, outcomes may be upward biased.
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3.4 Stochastic futures: welfare impacts under business
as usual fuel subsidies
Total sector benefits include the fisheries role as a safety net, i.e. income
provision (producer surplus or “fisher surplus”, FS), and its direct contri-
bution to food security (“consumer surplus”, CS). Consumer surplus is the
excess willingness to pay for fish above the monthly equilibrium price. For
our downward sloping demand curve in a digram with price on the y-axis
and quantity demanded on the x-axis, it is the area below the curve and
above the horizontal line drawn at the equilibrium price (see B.3). Fishers
earn rents because of their role in providing capital and labor to produce
harvest. Fishers surplus can be calculated by summing the areas below the
equilibrium price and above the inverse supply curve for capital and labor,
respectively. Adding up fisher surplus and consumer surplus gives a welfare
measure for food security, that takes into account the availability of substi-
tutes, and thus changes in the fishers and consumers’ dependence on fresh
Sardinella aurita.
To compare welfare across climate projections, we use the mean net
present value (NPV)10 of total rents in 201411 generated in the fishery at
an assumed discount rate of 3%. For the scenarios with reduced subsidy, we
add the savings of tax revenue. We again compute means over 1000 runs.
We calculate an average fisher surplus of 8.77 billion FCFA in 2014 and
a consumer surplus of 5.47 billion FCFA. At a typical price of 1,145 FCFA
for a 5kg-basket of local grains (see the previous dissertation chapter), this
10This standard economic measure computes the sum of all future benefits in mone-
tary units and weighs future benefits by a discount factor to capture that money that is
immediately available is worth more than money available later in the future.
11All rents are reported in terms of 2014-based FCFA.
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amounts to a yearly 946 baskets for each of the roughly 8100 fishers involved,
and 1.96 baskets per inhabitant of the coastal region studied (2.4 million,
about 21% of the total Senegalese population). These baskets constitute an
additional gain for the fishers (consumers), compared to a situation where
the resource would not be available to them and they would have to work in
different sectors (consume different products). Using observed harvest and
prices, we calculate a mean yearly total rent value of 14.97 billion FCFA
for 2004-2013. These compare well with the summed benefits from 2014,
i.e. 14.24 billion FCFA. We conclude that our simulation produces plausible
results.
In Figure 7, the mean NPV is indicated on the x-axis. Again, we first
concentrate on the squares, i.e. the business as usual case. High variability
under ECE-o also has a dampening effect on rents. Firstly, this is a direct
consequence of shorter survival times. Secondly, ECE-o’s survival year profile
is right-tailed: Extinction is most likely at the beginning of the time horizon,
when harvest curves are flattest. The biomass usually goes extinct early-on,
and the relatively high sustainability is a consequence of few runs with very
long survival. Due to discounting, the extra rents per occasional additional
survival year contribute only a small amount to the NPV. In particular, the
yield is lower than under NESM-o, which is less productive, but very sta-
ble. Yields are very low under ECE-bc and NESM-bc, i.e. the two bias
corrected models. The low productivity in NESM-bc leads to a lower poten-
tial NPV. Over-fishing and low sustainability in both ECE-bc and NESM-bc
also translate to low expected rents.
Using the range of total rents as a metric, climate uncertainty amounts
to 57 billion FCFA, which constitutes 24% of the lowest NPV of total rents.
Fishers’ rent difference accounts for 64% of this gap. We conclude that
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the effect of climate uncertainty is moderate. This is a direct consequence
of low sustainability: Short survival times mean that differences in climate
projections in the medium-term rarely affect rents, because in most cases, the
resource by then has gone extinct. Figure 8 shows the distribution of benefits
between fishers and consumers for the eight models considered. The effect on
income security is larger than on food security. This results mostly because
the model predicts that markets develop and consumers’ dependence on fresh
Sardinella aurita declines. In relative terms, consumers mean surplus share is
highest under ECE-bc, but the difference across models is exceedingly small.
Result 5. The sectors contribution to food security under BAU as measured
by the mean NPV of fishers producer and consumer surplus amounts to 232–
291 billion FCFA. One third of this can be attributed to a direct contribution
from consumer surplus, and two thirds to an indirect contribution via the
sectors’ function as an income safety-net. The spread between climate pro-
jections is moderate at 57 billion FCFA. This is a direct consequence of low
sustainability.
To separately analyze changes in annual rents under climate change and
to complement literature findings, we also compare un-discounted rents in
different decades for each model (see also Table 7 in the supplementary ma-
terial). Climate change is costly under projections ECE-bc and NESM-bc,
as well as for the NESM-o BAU scenario due to actors’ adaptation. For the
whole Senegalese artisanal fishery, Lam et al. (2012) suggested a loss of 13% in
jobs until 2050. Comparing between 2014-2023 rents and 2034–2043 rents, we
see changes between -97% and 52% under BAU. Mean losses lie at 27% when
fuel subsidies continue. This result only holds due to the (small but positive)
possibility of very large benefits under ECE-o. On average, the resource will
have gone extinct by 2050 in all eight model-scenario-combinations consid-
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Figure 8: NPV of total rents per model (Bars represent rents under BAU.
Shapes represent fuel subsidy scenarios: Crosses: BAU, circles:
melt-down.)
ered, such that the potential mean yield for 2054-2063 equals zero under all
projections but ECE-o. The risk is substantial.
Result 6. Under three of four climate projections, the sectors yield potential
is reduced in the medium- and long-term. Until 2043, mean rents are reduced
by more than a quarter.
3.5 Welfare impacts if fuel subsidies are abolished
In Figure 7, the circles mark the melt-down subsidy reform case. This is the
outcome if fuel subsidies were gradually decreased and finally fully abolished
in 2030. In the most extreme case, NESM-o, this increase reaches 5.4 years
mean survival time increase or 62 billion NPV of total rents. It can increase
the BAU value by 21%. Between 11.7 and 17.0 billion FCFA of public funds
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(around 4.5% of total rent NPV) are additionally generated in this scenario.
Thus, not only are fuel subsidies expensive for tax payers, they also re-
duce welfare in total. If fuel subsidies are abolished, climate change may on
average even turn out slightly beneficial concerning un-discounted rents, i.e.
the sectors current value yields (see Table 7 in the Appendix). While they
may achieve a redistribution of rents from fishers to consumers, this effect is
small and dearly bought with an overall lower consumer rent, as visible in
Figure 8. The difference to the x-axis-values in Figure 7 amounts to the dis-
counted public funds that are additionally generated through the tax. The
WTO discussion argument that fuel subsidies could help alleviate poverty
and maintain food security does not hold for the studied fishery.
Result 7. If fuel subsidies are abolished, the NPV of total rents increases
regardless of the climate projection. Abolishing fuel subsidies also largely
maintains the current distribution of rents between consumers and fishers.
The beneficial effect of removing fuel subsidies is not equally large across
climate projections. Gains due to increased survival time are large for all
scenarios, but largest under NESM-o. Under NESM-o, the abolition of fuel
subsidies suffices for the resource to survive for a substantially longer amount
of time. For NESM-bc and ECE-bc, policy gains are positive, but the im-
pact is not large enough to survive the projected short run increase in harvest
pressure. Rent gains are mostly driven by increased survival time. Under
ECE-o, the mean survival year profile, compared to the case with fuel subsi-
dies, is more right skewed than before. Therefore, rent gains per additional
survival year are low. In summary, if the climate projection is associated
with substantial extinction risks, abolishing fuel subsidies will not turn the
tide. If however the extinction risk only results from a relatively short unsus-
tainable period of over-harvesting or from moderate variability, fuel subsidies
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abolition can help to bridge these periods.
The rent difference between policy scenarios varies between 33 and 62 bil-
lion FCFA, that is, 12-21% of the BAU rent value. Even larger, however, is
the uncertainty stemming from the different climate projections, in particular
since outcome uncertainty is increased through fuel subsidy reform. Differ-
ences in climate models now translate into larger differences in ensuing rents,
i.e. up to 84 billion FCFA between the melt-down case under NESM-bc and
NESM-o. This constitutes 31% of the lower total NPV. Climate character-
istics, in particular the variability and the lower end of the variation, govern
the responsiveness of the system to an abolition of fuel subsidies. The in-
crease in uncertainty mostly stems from larger differences in survival times,
and longer survival in general. The longer the time of survival, the more
climate change comes into effect, leading to greater uncertainty. The coun-
teracting force, namely the dampening effect of larger fuel prices on climate
impacts, is weak.
Result 8. Differences in climate projections lead to a spread in the welfare
outcome that amounts to more than double the spread between fuel scenarios.
The main effect of climate change concerns the spatial stock distribution:
Biomass becomes more vulnerable to Senegalese purse seines over a certain
time horizon, because the fish spend more time in the close-to-shore area.
Abolishing fuel subsidies could buy time to bridge this transition period. The
effectiveness of this measure depends on the climate development. It would
be particular effective under low variability and a weak SST trend. If either
variability or the SST trend proves too strong, this measure is insufficient. A
proper resource management system that goes beyond the mere abolishment
of subsidies, such as a binding limit on annual harvest, would be needed to
ensure sustainability in the long term. Still, there is good news: Productivity
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is still high under all projections but NESM-bc, such that rents and yields
remain high if a proper management is installed. However, if the spatial
stock redistribution effect crosses national boundaries, such a management
would require multinational cooperation.
Result 9. Abolishing fuel subsidies can buy time to counter a dangerous
decrease in harvesting costs associated with increased over-fishing. A proper
resource management system is needed to ensure sustainability in the long
term.
4 Conclusion
Our results can inform policy making, as they shed light on the effect of
climate change and counteracting measures while incorporating endogenous
adaptation of actors. Seemingly beneficial climate impacts, such as a cost
reduction due to climate-induced movement of the fish stock, may turn out
negative as they increase the propensity to over-fish. Future market and fac-
tor price development is part of our analysis. This offers insights into possible
policy responses. It also reveals the role of major drivers of climate change
adaptation and shows that adaptation can also dampen climate change im-
pacts on the fishery, such as through a downward sloping inverse demand
curve combined with market development. Moreover, our findings reveal a
large uncertainty of outcomes with respect to the different climate projec-
tions, even when qualitative patterns of the climate trajectories are preserved
and the differences seem small in the original climate data. In addition, we
explicitly show the dramatic extent to which the range of outcomes under
different climate projections is affected by the policy choice.
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A Appendix
A.1 Development of Sardinella aurita abundance in Senegalese
waters
Figure A.1 shows abundance of Sardinella aurita in Senegalese and Gambian
waters in the fourth quarter of each year, as used in FAO working group
stock assessments (Toresen et al., 2001, 2002; Krakstad et al., 2003, 2004,
2005, 2006). National surveys provide estimates for 2007-2009 (FAO, 2008,
2011a,b). Data points for 2010-2013 are own predictions as detailed in 2.1.
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Figure A.1: Sardinella aurita abundance estimated by Nansen surveys and
national surveys for the Senegalese and Gambian waters and own
predictions
A.2 Summary of the estimation data-set
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the data-set used for estimation
Mean Sd Min Max
Growth estimation (yearly, 1996–2009)
Spawning stock biomass (kt) 199.50 129.79 49.00 573.00
Total harvest (kt) 181.85 51.57 121.85 272.58
Biomass growth (kt) 179.99 218.89 -402.15 562.19
Windstress CUI (winter) (m
3
s
per m coastline) 0.32 0.04 0.25 0.41
Windstress CUI (fall) (m
3
s
per m coastline) 0.19 0.03 0.12 0.24
Economic estimation (monthly, 2001–2013)
Regional Landings (t) 3,768.30 3,583.12 0.90 19,144.76
CPUE (t/DAS) 2.90 2.56 0.00 15.36
Fish price (2010-level FCFA/kg) 131.71 160.41 16.58 2,556.85
Fuel price (2010-level FCFA/l) 485.38 112.26 208.18 731.36
Population density (# of people/1000 ∗ km2) 3.34 5.46 0.24 14.02
SST (➦ Celsius) 24.08 3.00 18.53 28.63
A.3 Biomass growth estimation: Details and robustness
We estimate the effect of environmental variables on yearly stock growth for
Sardinella aurita found within the Senegalese and Gambian exclusive eco-
nomic zones, xy. We use annual biomass growth gy defined as the sum of the
biomass difference between consecutive years and harvest Hy, as dependent
variable. Biomass growth is positive except in year 2000. We interpret the
negative value in 2000 as an overshooting of biomass over its carrying capac-
ity under optimal conditions, which is remedied in the following year. Over-
shooting of carrying capacity can happen in populations of small pelagic fish
with short life span and high recruitment. For species as affected by chang-
ing environmental conditions, this is to be expected. We model reproduction
using the standard logistic growth model with spawning stock biomass (SSB)
xy−1, carrying capacity K and natural reproduction rate r.
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The growth function is estimated as:
gy = xy − xy−1 +Hy = (r + f(UPy)) xy−1
(
1− xy−1
K
)
+ εs (3)
where εs denotes the error term with normal distribution and standard
deviation 80.29 kt. In the simulation, this will enter as a stochastic term.
f(UPy) denotes a linear sum of impacts, where various structures were tested.
We considered alternative specifications with respect to lag structure, sea-
sons, SST, an alternative upwelling index based on SST, and with respect to
the size of the biomass or biomass growth of the Mauritanian stock group to
check for migration flows. We also tested alternatives with weather impacts
on the carrying capacity, but models with environmental effects on the natu-
ral growth rate generally performed better than models with environmental
effects on carrying capacity K, or on the quadratic term in general.
Results are reported in table Table 2. As a robustness check, we present
results for the model without climate impacts (column 1), as well as for the
model that provided the best fit with respect to adjusted R2 and Bayesian
information criterion (BIC). The final chosen model is presented in the right-
most column. We include it here for easier comparison. The lower section
includes marginal effects at means.
Both models presented below estimate a linear environmental impact on
r. Note that in case the biomass overshoots the carrying capacity, this also
means that environmental stressors increase mortality12. We interpret this as
a situation where the favorable climate conditions also favor the predators’
development. The inclusion of environmental variables increases model fit
12We explored to what extent estimation results are driven by the negative observation
of biomass growth in 2000. Results when this data-point is left out differ only slightly.
Upwelling coefficients and carrying capacity become slightly larger.
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by 28–30 percentage points in adjusted R2.
The result for the intrinsic growth rate in the pure model r = 2.22 is con-
sistent with (Pech et al., 2001)’s results, who estimate r = 2, and K = 117kt.
However, the estimated carrying capacity K = 419kt is > 3 times the size
estimated by them. Figure A.2 shows that the pure model underestimates
growth at lower stock sizes and overestimates growth at larger stock sizes.
It also fails to explain the substantial variation around the basic quadratic
function.
In model 2, lagged spring wind-stress CUI and summer SST CUI13 have
a positive and significant impact on biomass growth. We interpret this as a
positive impact on both fall and spring spawning cohorts, as primary pro-
ductivity is higher. The baseline r is negative: If no upwelling occurs in
spring and summer, natural mortality exceeds recruitment. A short simula-
tion to test model performance (see Table 3.) reveals that biomass overshoots
the carrying capacity early. Negative growth alone, even when disregarding
harvest, then immediately outruns biomass and the stock goes extinct. We
conclude that model 2 is not a good estimate for biomass growth.
Some studies discuss the influence of SST on recruitment success (Brochier
et al., 2009; Diankha et al., 2015; Mbaye et al., 2015; Zeeberg et al., 2008).
However, we do not find a particular impact. The influence of SST likely
acts primarily through fish re-location (Diankha et al., 2018). The Mau-
ritanian stock has a positive and significant influence on the pure growth
function (model 1). Once climate is controlled for, this influence vanishes.
Mauritanian biomass growth doesn’t significantly impact the growth of the
Senegalese stock group.
13Note that the definition of the SST CUI index leads to a negative sign if upwelling is
positive and vice versa.
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Table 2: Estimation results biological part (standard errors in parentheses)
Parameter model 1 model 2 Chosen model
K 418.75∗ ∗ ∗ 290.99∗ ∗ ∗ 302.13∗ ∗ ∗
(24.15) (13.29) (18.22)
r 2.22∗ ∗ ∗ −4.06∗∗ 6.77∗
(0.42) (1.51) (3.50)
CUIWspring,y−1 48.11∗ ∗ ∗
(7.01)
CUISSTsummer,y−1 −5.05∗ ∗ ∗
(1.24)
CUIWwinter,y−1 −27.29∗ ∗ ∗
(6.08)
CUIWfall,y−1 30.41∗∗
(10.55)
N 14 14 14
adjustedR2 0.64 0.92 0.92
AIC 185 165 166
BIC 186 167 168
Variable (mean) Marginal effects at mean+
xy−1 (199.5kt) 0.10. −1.39. −1.21.
CUIWspring,y−1 (4.0 m
3
s 100m
) .. 30.17. ..
CUISSTsummer,y−1 (−11.56➦ C10) .. −31.68. ..
CUIWwinter,y−1 (32.3 m
3
s 100m
) .. .. −18.49.
CUIWfall,y−1 (19.0 m
3
s 100m
) .. .. 20.61.
+One unit change in variable leads to absolute change in growth of ... 1000 t.
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Table 3: Predictions of Sardinella aurita biomass development for observed
harvest levels
model 1 model 2 model 3
year Hy gˆy xˆy gˆy xˆy gˆy xˆy
2010 195.10 229.55 267.45 355.70 393.60 21.28 59.18
2011 224.68 214.62 257.40 -913.07 -744.15 265.21 99.72
2012 211.49 220.28 266.18 -11383.12 -12338.77 258.22 146.45
2013 144.62 215.39 336.95 -2.88E+06 -2.89E+06 243.64 245.46
2014 240.60 146.18 242.55 -6.79E+10 -6.79E+10 196.11 200.98
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Figure A.2: Growth curves for the Senegambian Sardinella aurita stock group,
models 1 and 3
A.4 Economic model: Technical details
Our economic study period runs from January 2001 to December 2013. In
addition to yearly biomass data for 2001 – 2009, we also use our own stock
assessment from section 2.1 for the years 2010 – 2013. The general time
period t is one month. Part of the data is only available per year, denoted by
subscript y. We use subscript m to denote a dependence on one particular
month and subscript i to denote the region.
Harvest is produced from capital kit, labor lit and fuel fit by the following
nested Cobb-Douglas function:
Hit = qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f 1−ϕit (4)
with γ, ϕ ǫ(0, 1). The technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Fish-
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ers can substitute between fuel, capital and labor14. The stock elasticity of
biomass (Clark, 1990) χ > 0 is expected to be positive and close to zero,
since we model a schooling fishery.
Catchability qi(m,Wit) of the fish species depends on the month m and
on environmental factors Wit. This defines the variability of the species vul-
nerability to purse seines, as well as the changes in the vertical and horizontal
distribution of the fish. Monthly dummies, denoted by δm, represent regular
harvest seasonality. We assume that monthly dummies do not vary across
regions in order to reasonably limit the number of parameters. For simplic-
ity, we assume that all influences have a direct effect on catchability. In
reality, some effects may exert their influence rather on factor cost directly.
Catchability is assumed to be of the following form:
qi(m,Wit) = qi0 exp
(
12∑
m=1,m 6=9
(δmDm) + swt SST + swt2 SST
2
)
≥ 0 , (5)
where qi0 is the reference baseline catchability in September. According
to our estimation, SST has a non-linear, concave influence on catchability, as
swt2 is estimated negative and small enough. Other weather influences, such
as upwelling, precipitation, wind speed and wind stress, were not found not
be significant.
Since data on fuel input is only available for the whole fishing sector,
not for the purse seine fishery in particular, we use a dual approach with fuel
prices instead. Fishers use the optimal amount of fuel by equalizing marginal
14Several estimation studies agree that substitution possibilities exist in fisheries, such
as Bjørndal (1989); Campbell (1991); Comitini and Huang (1967); Squires (1987); Valle
et al. (2003). We choose a substitution elasticity of one to keep the model simple and
tractable.
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cost, i.e. the cost for one unit of fuel Φit, and marginal revenue, subject to
optimally chosen capital and labor amounts.
∂pitHi
∂fit
= (1− ϕ) pitqi(m,Wit)xχy
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f−ϕit
!
= Φit (6)
⇔ fit =
(
Φit
(1−ϕ)pitqi(m,Wit)
)− 1
ϕ
x
χ
ϕ
y l
γ
itk
1−γ
it (7)
Reinserting this into the harvest production function, and dividing by the
capital labor composite lγitk
1−γ
it , we can define productivity by the following
catch per unit of capital-labor composite (CPUbit) function:
hit =
(
(1− ϕ)1−ϕ qi(m,Wit)
(
pit
Φit
)1−ϕ
xχy
) 1
ϕ
lγitk
1−γ
it (8)
⇔ CPUbit =
(
(1− ϕ)1−ϕ qi(m,Wit)
(
pit
Φit
)1−ϕ
xχy
) 1
ϕ
(9)
This expression will be used for estimation. However, in order to estimate
the full system, we additionally need two equations concerning harvest and
prices. To derive these, we start with the derivation of the cost function.
Fishers minimize total cost. They are price takers with respect to factor
prices. The Lagrangian optimization problem and the first order conditions
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for this minimization problem read:
L = witlit + ritkit + Φitfit − ρ
(
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f 1−ϕ − H¯
)
(10)
Φit = ρqi(m,Wit)x
χ
y (1− ϕ)
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f−ϕ (11)
wit = ρqi(m,Wit)x
χ
yϕγ
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f 1−ϕ
1
lit
(12)
rit = ρqi(m,Wit)x
χ
yϕ (1− γ)
(
lγitk
1−γ
it
)ϕ
f 1−ϕ
1
kit
(13)
We derive the following factor demand expressions for fuel, capital and
labor from the first order conditions:
kDit =
hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
rit
(1− γ)
)ϕ(1−γ)−1(
wit
γ
)ϕγ (
Φit
(ϕ)
1− ϕ
)1−ϕ
(14)
lDit = γ
ritkit
wit (1− γ) =
hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
rit
(1− γ)
)ϕ(1−γ)(
wit
γ
)ϕγ−1(
Φit
(ϕ)
1− ϕ
)1−ϕ
(15)
fDit =
hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
rit
(1− γ)
)−ϕ(γ−1)(
wit
γ
)ϕγ (
(ϕ)
1− ϕ
)−ϕ
Φ−ϕit (16)
Inserting factor demand into C = witlit + ritkit + Φitfit leads to a cost
function that is linear in harvest and decreases in biomass:
C =
hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
(
rit
(1− γ)
)ϕ(1−γ)(
wit
γ
)ϕγ (
Φit
(ϕ)
1− ϕ
)1−ϕ
1
ϕ
(17)
Thus, marginal cost equals average cost in terms of the fishers’ supply
decision. Capital and labor inverse supply functions are assumed to be up-
ward sloping (see Quaas et al. (2017) and our model in the previous chapter
of this dissertation). This reflects the localized nature of markets for these
two factors, as well as the imperfect malleability of both inputs. Workers
obtain a particular skill set to work in the fishery. Capital is invested into a
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particular type of boat and gear. These two processes are not easily reversed,
such that at low demand, supply prices will be low. On the other hand, they
may become increasingly steep, as factor demand increases. Then, the sup-
ply prices for capital and labor form an increasing and convex function of the
respective factor demand. We assume the following iso-elastic inverse supply
functions for labor and capital, respectively:
wit(lit) = λi l
ψ
it, (18)
rit(kit) = κi k
ζ
it, (19)
Fuel supply, on the other hand, is perfectly inelastic at price Φit. The
reason is that fuel prices are exogenous to the regional Senegalese market,
they follow world market prices for crude oil. We derive symmetric equilib-
rium factor prices for labor and capital, using factor demands from (14)–(16)
in (18) and in (19):
wit =
((
κi (1− γ)ζ
)ϕ(1−γ)ψ ( hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
MΦ1−ϕit
)ψ(ζ+1) (
λiγ
ψ
)1+ζ−ζϕ(1−γ))T
(20)
rit =
((
κi (1− γ)ζ
)1+ψ−ψϕγ ( hit
qi(m,Wit)x
χ
y
MΦ1−ϕit
)ζ(1+ψ) (
λiγ
ψ
)γϕζ)T
(21)
with
M :=
(
1
(1− γ)
)ϕ(1−γ)(
1
γ
)ϕγ (
(ϕ)
1− ϕ
)1−ϕ
(22)
T =
1
(1 + ψ) (ζ + 1− ζϕ (1− γ))− ψϕγ (ζ + 1) (23)
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Inserting equilibrium factor prices into the cost function leads to the
equilibrium cost function, which is non-linear in equilibrium harvest:
C = ci
(
hit
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕ xχy
Φ1−ϕit
)e+1
With cost elasticity parameter e and region-specific scaling parameter
ci > 0:
e =
(1− γ) ζϕ+ (ζ + γ)ϕψ
(1 + ψ) (ζ + 1− ζϕ (1− γ))− ψϕγ (ζ + 1)
ci =
((
1
ϕ
)1+γζ+(1−γ)ψ (
κi
1− γ
)(1−γ)(1+ψ)(
λi
γ
)γ(ζ+1)) ϕ(1+ψ)(ζ+1−ζϕ(1−γ))−ψϕγ(ζ+1)
We fix cost elasticity parameter e = 1, thus specifying a quadratic cost
function, following Arnason et al. (2004) and our own findings in the previous
chapter of this dissertation.
Inverse demand is an iso-elastic, decreasing function of harvest. Our es-
timation results show that the inverse price elasticity ν depends negatively
on regional population density Bi y, which we interpret a proxy for the avail-
ability of substitutes15. With that, inverse demand is given by:
pit = p¯ih
−ν(Bi y)
it = p¯ih
−exp(ν0+η Bi y)
it (24)
with inverse price elasticity 0 ≤ ν(Bi y) < 1.
15We use density instead of total population in order to account for the differences in
market area size.
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A.5 Estimation model and estimation results
To estimate supply and demand simultaneously, we derive the reduced form
equations. The fishery operates under open-access, such that profits are zero
in equilibrium. We set unit equilibrium cost equal to the equilibrium price.
The equilibrium harvest level then reads:
hit =
(
p¯i
ci
(
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕ xχyΦ−(1−ϕ)it
)e+1) 1(ν+e)
(25)
Harvest pressure M , as referenced in 2.3, is defined as the factor in front
of biomass in (25), summed over all four regions:
M :=
4∑
i=1
[(
p¯i
ci
(
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕΦ−(1−ϕ)it
)e+1) 1(ν+e)]
(26)
Inserting (25) back into (24) leads to the following reduced form expres-
sion for the equilibrium price:
pit = p¯i
e
(ν+e) c
ν
ν+e
i
(
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕ xχyΦ−(1−ϕ)it
)− ν(e+1)
ν+e
(27)
To achieve full identification, we will also use harvest productivity in our
estimation. The fish price in (9) is substituted by its reduced form function,
such that:
CPUbit = (p¯i
ecνi )
1−ϕ
ϕ(e+ν)
(
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕ)xχyΦ−(1−ϕ)it
) e(1−ν)+νϕ(1+e)
ϕ(e+ν)
(28)
We introduce a linear time trend τq to capture technical progress in the
fishery that is unobserved, since we lack data on boat and motor size and
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other technical characteristics. We add a linear time trend on ci to include
unobserved trends in factor prices and size of factor units. A time trend on
p¯i was found to be significant for the long term estimation. All time trends
are assumed to be equal across regions. Equal trends would be expected
at least in the long term, as regions interact and converge. Our estimation
showed that this is adequate, and that a linear trend is superior to a convex
trend in the long term. Taking logs, including trends and adding an error
terms provides the full system of three reduced form equations to be jointly
estimated:
ln pit =
ν
(ν + e)( e
ν
(ln p¯i + ln(1 + τp(t− t0))) + ln ci + ln(1 + τc(t− t0))− (e+ 1)HR
)
+ ǫht
(29)
lnhit =
1
(ν + e)
(ln p¯i + ln(1 + τp(t− t0))− ln ci − ln(1 + τc(t− t0)) + (e+ 1)HR) + ǫht
(30)
lnCPUbit =
1− ϕ
ϕ(e+ ν)
(e (ln p¯i + ln(1 + τp(t− t0)) + ν (ln c ln(1 + τc(t− t0))) + e(1− ν) + νϕ(1 + e)
ϕ(e+ ν)
HR + ǫct
(31)
with
HR := ln qi(m,Wit)+(1−ϕ) ln(1−ϕ)+χ ln xy+ln(1+τq(t−t0))−(1−ϕ)Φit
(32)
The model is estimated using iterated feasible generalized least squares.
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Table 4: Main estimation results economy
Coeff./std. error
χ 0.222∗ ∗ ∗ (0.073)
ϕ 0.815∗ ∗ ∗ (0.051)
lnQ0FL −17.246∗ ∗ ∗ (4.537)
lnQ0TN −18.102∗ ∗ ∗ (4.528)
lnQ0CV −18.620∗ ∗ ∗ (4.549)
lnQ0TS −17.582∗ ∗ ∗ (4.532)
δ1 1.179∗ ∗ ∗ (0.348)
δ2 1.175∗ ∗ ∗ (0.370)
δ3 1.397∗ ∗ ∗ (0.366)
δ4 1.508∗ ∗ ∗ (0.361)
δ5 1.567∗ ∗ ∗ (0.345)
δ6 1.305∗ ∗ ∗ (0.280)
δ7 0.529∗∗ (0.235)
δ8 0.428∗∗ (0.212)
δ10 0.370∗ (0.200)
δ11 0.856∗ ∗ ∗ (0.203)
δ12 1.263∗ ∗ ∗ (0.278)
swt 1.276∗ ∗ ∗ (0.405)
swt2 −0.025∗ ∗ ∗ (0.009)
τq 0.009∗ ∗ ∗ (0.002)
ν0 −0.640∗ ∗ ∗ (0.216)
η −1.862∗ ∗ ∗ (0.618)
ln p¯FL 6.968∗ ∗ ∗ (0.356)
ln p¯TN 6.570∗ ∗ ∗ (0.311)
ln p¯CV 4.702∗ ∗ ∗ (0.113)
ln p¯TS 6.276∗ ∗ ∗ (0.351)
τp 0.002∗ (0.001)
ln cFL −3.127∗ ∗ ∗ (0.544)
ln cTN −4.018∗ ∗ ∗ (0.399)
ln cCV −5.003∗ ∗ ∗ (0.375)
ln cTS −5.138∗ ∗ ∗ (0.389)
τc 0.010∗ ∗ ∗ (0.004)
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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Results are reported in Table 4 and diagnostic statistics listed in Table 516.
We choose between models including different weather impacts by means of
the Akaike and Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC, respectively)
and model fit. This leads to a specification where only SST influences catch-
ability, which is included as the non-linear specification swtSST +swt2SST
2.
We employ robust standard errors, since heteroscedasticity is present in the
harvest equation. The inverse demand price elasticity depends negatively on
population density. For Thie`s Sud, Thie`s Nord and Fleuve, it lies between
0.252 and 0.339. For Cap Vert, νˆ goes to zero, prices are independent of
quantities.
Table 5: Statistics for main estimation results economy
Stat. Value
N 561
No. variables 32
R2 eq. price .34
R2 eq. harvest .32
R2 eq. CPUE .32
AIC 3917
BIC 4056
A.6 Climate model characteristics
The following table shows statistics that characterize SST and wind stress
development for the four climate projections. Figure 2 shows the development
of annual mean SST.
16Note that for simplicity, the reported lnQ0i is a composite term, where Q0i :=
q0i (1− ϕ)1−ϕ
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Table 6: Climate model statistics
ECE-o ECE-bc NESM-o NESM-bc
SST (➦Celsius)
Mean (2014-2079) 25.778 25.680 25.246 25.334
Mean (2014-2023) 24.750 24.482 24.346 24.473
Mean (2070-2079) 27.141 26.700 26.224 26.331
Standard deviation 3.374 3.333 3.100 3.056
95% confidence interval, upper 32.391 32.222 31.322 31.324
95% confidence interval, lower 19.165 19.156 19.170 19.344
Mean seasonal amplitude 9.339 9.269 8.125 8.004
Std. deviation seasonal amplitude 0.937 0.714 0.282 0.251
CUIwinter(
m3
s
per m coastline)
Mean (2014-2079) 0.232 0.255 0.311 0.319
Mean (2014-2023) 0.257 0.288 0.327 0.323
Mean (2070-2079) 0.206 0.240 0.299 0.306
Standard deviation 0.032 0.053 0.020 0.013
95% confidence interval, upper 0.295 0.359 0.350 0.344
95% confidence interval, lower 0.169 0.151 0.272 0.294
CUIfall(
m3
s
per m coastline)
Mean (2014-2079) 0.165 0.163 0.213 0.205
Mean (2014-2023) 0.172 0.165 0.218 0.216
Mean (2070-2079) 0.150 0.163 0.208 0.201
Standard deviation 0.0274 0.026 0.011 0.014
95% confidence interval, upper 0.219 0.214 0.235 0.232
95% confidence interval, lower 0.111 0.112 0.191 0.178
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A.7 Harvest pressure over time
We call harvest pressure M the multiplier in front of biomass in equilibrium
harvest (A.5). It depends on SST, fuel prices, monthly dummies, population
growth and trends. Figure A.3 shows the development over time for four ex-
emplary months. We chose May, June, December and January here because
they constitute the transition months with temperatures often around the
optimum temperature, 25.4➦Celsius.
A.8 Undiscounted rents over time (table 7)
Model 2014–2023 2034–2043 2054–2063
BAU melt-down BAU melt-down BAU melt-down
ECE-o 192 188 292 242 288 286
ECE-bc 182 179 113 131 0 0
NESM-o 191 187 147 285 0 305
NESM-bc 192 189 5 92 0 0
Table 7: Development of undiscounted rents (in billion 2014-based FCFA)
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Figure A.3: Harvest pressure over time for different climate models
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B.1 Use of climate data and calculation of coastal upwelling indi-
cators
For climate impacts, we again make use of the ERA Interim Reanalysis prod-
uct at the monthly time scale. Same as in the main part, the data is provided
by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. We average
SST over one 1.5x1.5➦coordinate box between 13.5–16.5➦N for each of the
catch areas for Thie`s Sud, Cap Vert/ Thie`s Nord and Fleuve, holding the
longitudinal component constant over regions (17.25-18.75➦W).
Coastal upwelling indicator: We calculate Ekman transport EK
using wind stress (WS) data from quadrants closest to shore but not over-
lapping with land. We average over the coordinate box between 13.5 – 16➦N
and 17.25 – 18➦W. Subscript u denotes the the zonal (west–east) component
and v the meridional component v:
EKu =
WSv
1025 kg
m3
2 ∗ sin(lat) ∗ 7.292x10−51
s
(33)
EKv = − WSu
1025 kg
m3
2 ∗ sin(lat) ∗ 7.292x10−51
s
(34)
Then we calculate the coastal upwelling indicator (in m
3
s
per meter of
coastline) as:
CUIW = − sin
(
ϕ− π
2
)
EKu + cos
(
ϕ− π
2
)
EKv (35)
with ϕ defining the mean angle between the shoreline and the equator
(90➦).
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SST upwelling indicator: The SST upwelling index (in ➦Celsius) is de-
fined as the difference between the coastal SST (17.25W) and the SST five
degrees further towards the open ocean for each latitudinal point (22.5W):
CUIS = SSTcoast − SSTocean (36)
B.2 Estimation of the economic part: Robustness checks
This section provides evidence of the robustness of our economic estimation
results with respect to the cost elasticity, the use of our own stock assessment
biomass estimates as well as the use of North sea crude oil prices as an
instrument for fuel prices. Results are reported in Table 8 and Table 9, with
regions denoted by TS for Thie`s Sud, FL for Fleuve, CV for Cap Vert and
TN for Thie`s Nord.
The cost function was assumed to be largely quadratic in section A.4. The
first two columns show that results remain robust for lower and higher values
of the cost elasticity. The first alternative,e+1 = 1.8, performs slightly worse
with respect to the Bayesian criterion. Stock elasticity χˆ and boat production
elasticity ϕˆ are lower. For e + 1 = 2.2, results are very similar to the main
estimation, except for a slightly higher χˆ. Cost parameters start slightly
lower, with a monthly trend of 1.3% . Consequently, the mean positive net
trend on equilibrium harvest is reduced to 0.7–0.9% here.
Column 3 in Table 8 shows that most results remain robust if only the
biomass estimates from the original data-set are used, i.e. 2001 – 2009.
Stock elasticity χˆ is now slightly lower at 0.186. Catchability still depends on
SST, but the effect is no longer significantly non-linear. This combines with
relatively higher baseline catchabilities and a stronger trend on catchability.
The ensuing mean νˆ is still close to zero for Cap Vert and between 0.385–
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0.436 for the other regions. The net trend in equilibrium harvest increases to
3.21–4.57%. We conclude that the stock assessment results are plausible and
compare well with the results gained only from the original biomass data. Not
surprisingly, trends are sensitive to a shortening of the time period analyzed,
likely because they are not perfectly constant and depend on technological
breakthroughs and economic cycles.
To look at robustness with regard to fuel prices, we instrument them
using North sea crude oil prices for the Brent type (columns 4 and 5). For
the short time period, results are similar to those obtained with the regional
fuel prices. For the time horizon that additionally includes years 2010–2013
however, the results are not plausible, in particular, ϕˆ > 1. However, there
is also a noticeable decoupling of the two price time series: While correlation
of logarithmized prices for regional fuel and Brent is at 84% for 2001–2009,
it only shows a correlation of 49% for 2010–2013. We believe that the fact
that regional price movements are apparently important should still not be
regarded as a problem for endogeneity: It is clear that at a yearly mean
fuel use of only 50,322,000 l for the whole artisanal fishery, the purse-seine
sub-sector is too small to have a notable influence on fuel prices. Indeed,
if it is indeed the regional fuel price that is relevant, we would not expect
robust results for a time period where Brent and regional fuel prices develop
in opposite directions.
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B.3 Rents in the fishery
FSi t =
e
1 + e
ci (1 + τc∆ t)
(
hoa i t
qi(m,Wit) (1− ϕ)1−ϕ xχy (1 + τq∆ t)Φ
1−ϕ
it
)e+1
(37)
CSi t =
ν(Bi y)
1− ν(Bi y) p¯i h
1−ν(Bi y)
oa i t (38)
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Over-capitalization in fisheries with
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1 Introduction
Depletion of fish stocks is a severe issue for sustainability, food and in-
come security (Pauly et al., 2002). Predatory fish stocks have been strongly
reduced to about 10% of pre-industrial fish stocks (Myers and Worm, 2003).
One major cause is over-capitalization of modern fisheries, i.e. the employ-
ment of capital at a level above the optimal level (Clark and Munro, 2017;
Myers and Worm, 2003; Ward et al., 2004; Weber, 1995). A better under-
standing of the theoretical implications of capital as an input is necessary
to improve management and to prevent the detrimental impact of instant
over-capitalization for newly developing fisheries, such as meso-pelagic fish
species (Irigoien et al., 2014).
“Irreversible investment” means that disinvestment is infeasible or costly
(Clark et al., 1979; Eisenack et al., 2006; Rust et al., 2016). Investment in
fishing capital is typically irreversible, as capital in fisheries is often specific to
the area, species, fishing method, and local regulations. Fishing capital is also
not useful in other branches of the economy (Nøstbakken et al., 2011; Ward
and Sutinen, 1994). Slow depreciation leads to a situation where capital,
once invested, stays in the fishery for decades (Daure`s et al., 2006). Over-
investment occurs when an un-managed fishery happens to be at a biomass
level above its long-term steady state. Investment incentives under open
access do not take into account the stock externality. When capital is not
fully malleable, the transition to the optimal long-term equilibrium stock
is gradual and costly even under optimal management, and more so under
open access (Boyce, 1995; Clark et al., 1979; McKelvey, 1985). The classic
linear dynamic optimization problem under irreversible investment has been
extensively studied (Clark et al., 2005; Hannesson, 1987; Jørgensen and Kort,
1997; Kennedy, 1989; Sandal et al., 2007). It includes two stock variables –
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biomass and invested capital – and harvest production by effort and capital
under perfect complements. The problem of over-capitalization and gradual
transition paths persists when non-linearities, for example concerning the
price for capital, are introduced (Eisenack et al., 2006; Sandal et al., 2007;
Poudel et al., 2013).
Biomass and capital are standardly modeled as substitutable produc-
tion inputs even in the linear case (Scha¨fer, 1957). However, the literature
rarely addresses the case where capital can be partly substituted by a flexibly
adaptable input, such as labor or fuel. This article studies qualitative and
quantitative implications when irreversibly invested capital can be substi-
tuted by flexibly adaptable inputs, following a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) harvest production function, while maintaining the assumption
that biomass can substitute for the other production inputs. The continuous
time optimal control approach under optimal management optimizes over
two stocks: Invested capital and biomass. I provide an analytical compari-
son of the model’s qualitative behavior for varying levels of complementarity
and highlight qualitative differences. Secondly, the article proceeds to nu-
merically compare investment incentives under open access and investment
optimal management.
I show that both the factor input ratio between capital and malleable
inputs, as well as the marginal cross-product between capital and biomass
change over the transition path, if factor substitution is possible. Capi-
tal will always be fully used and transition paths are smooth. The pos-
sibility of substitution can attenuate over-capitalization. In our example,
over-capitalization at any level of starting biomass above the long-term equi-
librium is lower, the better the substitution possibilities. This results from
lower investment incentives: Fishers perceive that the system remains for
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long in a lower profitability state, and invest less. Furthermore if the op-
timal steady state lies below the maximum sustainable yield the minimum
biomass attained during transition is lower under open access for all levels
of complementarity, and the system remains over-capitalized for most of the
transition path.
This article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on
irreversible investment in fisheries and presents empirical evidence on substi-
tution possibilities. Section 3 introduces the model and analyzes the effect of
substitutability on investment incentives under open access. An analysis of
the framework under optimal management is presented in section 4. Section
5 analyses the extent of over-capitalization by comparing the findings from
the two previous sections. The article finishes with a short conclusion.
2 Literature review
2.1 Irreversible investment: Theoretical literature
The seminal papers on irreversible capital investments in fisheries are
Clark et al. (1979), looking at optimal management, and McKelvey (1985),
who focuses on the open-access case. In their main version, both assume a
Scha¨fer harvest production function (Scha¨fer, 1957) that is linear in biomass1.
Capital and effort are perfect complements. Once invested, capital can not
be disinvested again and is available at zero further use cost. Capital cost
are sunk and capital practically becomes a cost-less factor of production. If
1During model setup and instrument analysis, McKelvey (1985) allows for convex fish-
ing cost, convex inverse demand and concave harvest. However, transition analysis is
restricted to the linear formulation, due to tractability.
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capital is defined to be “non-malleable”, it does not depreciate such that
any invested amount of capital is available into eternity. The term “quasi-
malleable”, by contrast, refers to capital that depreciates over time (Clark
et al., 1979).
In an open access environment, a long-term steady state exists where
total profit is zero (McKelvey, 1985)2. Fishers’ will exactly invest the depre-
ciated amount in each period, and irreversible investment is not an issue. By
contrast, if biomass at the start lies above this level, capital jumps up above
the steady state capital level. Fishers will continue to use all capital already
invested, as long as operating profit is non-negative. Biomass is gradually
reduced. If capital is quasi-malleable, biomass finally converges back to its
long-term equilibrium level, once capital has depreciated enough. A similar
trajectory occurs under optimal management (Clark et al., 1979). However,
the stock externality is taken into account. The steady state is determined
by the Golden rule, such that the own rate of interest of the stock, including
marginal growth and the stock effect, equals the social discount rate. Under
open access and starting at a trajectory at or above the long term steady
state, the fishery is over-capitalized, investment is higher than optimal (McK-
elvey, 1985). This can be corrected by regulating harvest and capital input
separately (McKelvey, 1985)3.
2Fishers are assumed to have perfect foresight with respect to future profits. See
Bjørndal and Conrad (1987); Rust et al. (2016) for analyses using myopic foresight or
projection bias.
3The authors also highlight that, whenever there is a binding constraint on investment
or harvest for all future periods, using a single instrument, namely a tax on harvest, is
sufficient for optimal management. Two instruments are required whenever it is optimal
to invest but use less than the full capital at the same time.
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Apart from these two models, the focus on a perfect complements case
with stock elasticity equal to unity is also found in most of the remaining
literature on imperfectly malleable capital (Botsford and Wainwright, 1985;
Charles and Munro, 1985; Clark et al., 2005; Hannesson, 1987; Jørgensen and
Kort, 1997; Kennedy, 1989; Rust et al., 2016; Sandal et al., 2007). An early
attempt to non-linearize the Clark-model was presented by Boyce (1995).
However, harvest and cost are assumed to be independent of biomass. Sandal
et al. (2007) model non-malleability as an asymmetric convex cost-function
of investment, leading to a more conservative exploitation approach. The
more recent literature has gradually included non-linearities also with respect
to the biomass effect on operating profit. Poudel et al. (2013) allow for
a downward sloping inverse demand curve. Eisenack et al. (2006) use a
generalized form of non-linear harvesting costs that are decreasing in biomass,
such that capital and biomass are non-linear substitutes. They reproduce the
result of initial over-capitalization. The same is true for Singh et al. (2006),
who allow for non-linear revenues and non-linear, stock-dependent harvesting
costs.
As a conclusion, non-linearities have increasingly been introduced and
have been shown to change dynamics. However, non-linear harvest functions
have rarely been analyzed. In particular, studies do not examine the situation
where the triple substitution between biomass, capital and malleable factors
of production is possible.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Empirically, some evidence exists that capital is not perfectly malleable.
Ward and Sutinen (1994) showed that fishing firms easily enter the fishery
when profits increase, but are less likely to leave the sector upon declining
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profits. Clark and Lamberson (1982) were able to show that a model in-
cluding irreversible investment based on Clark et al. (1979) could adequately
reproduce the investment cycle in pelagic whaling. Eytho´rsson (1996) proved
that with the advent of an ITQ management system in Iceland, capital rose
suddenly as banks accepted the ITQs as loan security. They did not accept
physical capital, which points toward irreversibility of this form of invest-
ment (Nøstbakken et al., 2011). Malleability of capital is also a function of
opportunity costs, in particular concerning close-by alternative fishing op-
portunities (Campbell et al., 2000; Grafton, 1996; Pascoe and Revill, 2004;
Pradhan and Leung, 2004). Using a hedonic approach, Daure`s et al. (2006)
estimate that capital in French fisheries depreciates at a rate of around 4%.
Table 1 summarizes available empirical evidence of substitution possibil-
ities between capital and variable inputs. Comitini and Huang (1967) find
effort production to be representable by a Cobb-Douglas function including
labor and capital inputs. Squires (1987) estimates a translog effort produc-
tion function. According to Campbell (1991), the Tasmanian lobster harvest
production can adequately be represented as a CES function. The estimated
elasticity of substitution is 0.75. Valle et al. (2003) find an Allen elasticity of
substitution of 0.09 between tonnage and boat days and 0.4 between horse-
power and boat days. It is concluded from this brief review that substitution
between capital and other effort input factors in harvesting is possible in
many fisheries. They are, however, likely to be gross complements rather
than gross substitutes.
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Table 1: Estimations on substitution elasticities and distribution factors
Reference Effort prod.
function
input factors (capital first) Substitution
elasticity
Distribution
factor (capital)
Fishery
Comitini
and Huang
(1967)
CES extent of vessel utilization,
crew-days-fished
1 0.25 North Pa-
cific halibut
Squires
(1987)
translog ton-days-absent (K),
crew-days-fished (L),
energy consumption (F)
0.726 (L,K),
2.125 (F,K),
1.946 (L,F)
0.321 New Eng-
land otter
trawl
Bjørndal
(1989)
translog fixed factor composite
of vessel characteristics,
boatdays/ trips
1 0.68− 0.814 North Sea
herring
Campbell
(1991)
CES number of pots, variable
factors
0.75 0.37 Tasmanian
lobster
Valle et al.
(2003)
translog tonnage/ horsepower,
boat days
0.09 / 0.4 0.19− 0.2 European
Anchovy
3 A model of an open access fishery with fac-
tor substitution under irreversible invest-
ment
3.1 Theoretical model
A fishery sector uses two factors of production, effort Et and capital Kt,
where t denotes the point in (continuous) time. Effort is to be interpreted
as a composite of all freely adjustable fisheries inputs, such as labor and
fuel. It is flexibly adaptable. Capital, on the other hand, is non- or quasi-
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malleable. It can for example be measured by means of insurance value,
vessel characteristics such as size and tonnage or vessel replacement costs (e.g
Brandt, 2007; Jensen, 1998; Nøstbakken, 2012)5. Following the literature,
the model allows for upward jumps in investment, but disinvestment is not
possible, so investment It is bounded from below by zero, 0 ≤ It ≤ ∞.
Investment has constant unit cost θ. Capital St depreciates at rate 0 ≤ δ < 1.
The amount Kt of capital actually used in the fishery cannot exceed the
amount of capital available, so Kt ≤ St = S0 e−δ t.
Biomass Bt enters the production function linearly. Catchability q scales
harvest productivity per input. While all these assumptions closely follow
the literature, the extension considered here is that the harvesting technology
is given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function:
Ht = Gt(Bt, Kt, Et) = q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α) E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1
(1)
Capital and effort are assumed to be gross complements, i.e. 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
Under full flexibility of inputs, this entails positive and decreasing marginal
products for capital GKt(Bt, Kt, Et) > 0, GKt,Kt(Bt, Kt, Et) < 0 and ef-
fort GEt(Bt, Kt, Et) > 0, GEt,Et(Bt, Kt, Et) < 0, as well as a positive cross-
derivative between effort and capital GEt,Kt(Bt, Kt, Et) > 0. The specifica-
tion (1) includes the case of perfect complements considered in the previous
literature for the limit σ → 0 and the Cobb-Douglas case for the limit σ → 1.
Using effort costs a constant unit price c. The price for a unit of the
harvested resource is denoted by p and assumed constant. Let us first focus
on the effort decision6. Fishers choose effort input Et subject to optimal
5A substantial part of the literature discusses this issue, with particular focus on mea-
suring in-homogenous characteristics of vessels, such as technological advance (Nøstbakken
et al., 2011).
6Optimal effort input can be derived in conjunction with the general Hamiltonian
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capital input Kt ≤ St, using constrained operating profit maximization:
max
Et
{
p q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1 − cEt
}
(2)
Profit-maximizing effort is a linear function of optimal capital input:
Et =
(
α
1− α
) σ
σ−1
((
c
pqBt
)σ−1
(1− α)−σ − 1
) σ
1−σ
Kt (3)
Optimal effort is positive if and only if
Bt >
c
p q
(1− α) σ1−σ = B∗ (4)
with
∂ B∗
∂ σ
< 0 since 0 < α < 1. Effort is proportional to Kt and in contrast
to the perfect complements case, the proportionality factor is an increasing
and convex function of Bt within the domain Bt > B∗. After inserting (3)
into (1), one arrives at an expression for harvest subject to biomass and linear
in optimal capital input:
Ht(Bt, Kt) = q Bt
(
1−
(
c
pqBt
)1−σ
(1− α)σ
) σ
1−σ
α
σ
σ−1Kt (5)
Effort is a necessary input, such that harvest is zero if (4) does not hold.
After the short-term decision on effort is accounted for, capital and biomass
remain imperfect substitutes. Their marginal rate of technical substitution
under 0 < σ < 1 depends positively on biomass. For all levels of capital and
biomass, it is strictly larger than under perfect complements. This means
that at higher biomass levels, an increase in biomass needs to be larger to off-
set the decrease in harvest due to depreciating capital than at lower biomass
values. Operating profit pit is defined as:
optimization explained below. However, for the sake of explanation, we will first focus on
the derivation of effort input here, and proceed to the investment decision afterwards.
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pit(Bt, Kt, Et) = pHt(Bt, Kt)− cEt(Bt, Kt) (6)
= c
(
α
1− α
) σ
σ−1
(
(1− α)−σ
(
c
pqBt
)σ−1
− 1
) 1
1−σ
Kt
Furthermore, I follow the literature and assume that biomass growth
g(Bt) follows the logistic function (Scha¨fer, 1957) with natural growth rate
z > 0 and carrying capacity CC > 0:
g(Bt) = zBt
(
1− Bt
CC
)
(7)
Fishers maximize inter-temporal total profit, taking into account capital
dynamics and the non-negativity constraint on investment It. Whenever
harvest is positiveSt = Kt follows from the fact that operating profit and
harvest is linear in capitalKt. They take future biomass development as given
in their investment choice, but they disregard the stock externality, which
sets this problem apart from the problem of a sole owner, a “race to fish”
occurs. The interaction between fishers then leads to an equilibrium pattern
of investment and harvesting, which will be characterized in the following. A
current value Hamiltonian approach is used to derive an expression for the
switching curve and the steady state. the fishers current-value Hamiltonian
function reads:
H =pit(Bt, Kt)− θ It + µt (It − δ Kt) + νt It (8)
Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 denote the fishers’ discount rate. Industrial fishing can be
expected to exhibit discount rates close to the market interest rate, disregard-
ing risk mark-ups. The shadow value of capital is denoted by µt, and νt is the
shadow price of disinvestment, i.e. the slack variable of the non-negativity
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constraint. The following Kuhn-Tucker-condition and two dynamic differen-
tial equations follow from the Hamiltonian first order conditions:
θ =µt + νt with νt ≥ 0, It ≥ 0, νt (It − 0) != 0 (9)
K˙t =It − δ Kt (10)
µ˙t =(ρ+ δ) µt − pit
Kt
(11)
The first equation states that the shadow price of capital must be smaller
or equal to the unit price of capital θ, where the equality is strict whenever
investment is positive. The second equation simply details capital dynamics,
consisting of investment and depreciation (10). Equation (11) describes the
change in the shadow price of capital, i.e. the current value of one more unit
of invested capital. Furthermore, biomass increases with biomass growth,
but is reduced by harvest. Thus, stock dynamics are given by the additional
third dynamic differential equation:
B˙t =g(Bt)−Ht(Bt, Et, Kt) (12)
I proceed with an analysis of the steady state, before turning to transition
paths. In steady state, biomass growth equals harvest. Fishers invest exactly
the amount of capital that depreciates in the same period. The shadow value
of capital µt equals the unit price for capital, and operating profit is zero.
The corresponding steady state biomass level is:
B∗ =
1
p q
(
((ρ+ δ) θ)1−σ ασ + c1−σ (1− α)σ ) 11−σ (13)
By (10), investment is positive in steady state and replaces exactly the
capital that depreciates. At any point in time τ when investment is positive,
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the shadow value of capital equals the marginal cost of investment, µt = θ.
Integrating (11), this condition can be written as:
µτ =
∫ ∞
τ
pit
Kt
e−(ρ+δ)( t−τ) dt != θ (14)
In line with the term used in previous literature, we term the curve in
biomass-capital-state-space, that is defined by this equation, “investment
switching curve”.
I will now turn to an analysis of transition paths for starting points at
Bt > B
∗, and capital given by a value below the investment switching curve.
Starting at Bt > B
∗, fishers will invest such that a jump up to the investment
switching curve occurs. Since operating profit increases monotonously in
biomass, it is clear that no investment would take place until B∗ is reached
again. For Bt > B∗, all available capital is used, Kt = St. If Bt is below that
level, optimal effort is zero, and thus harvest as well as operating profit are
zero. Effort is a necessary input, such that output falls to zero at this point,
and capital is no longer used.
Consider the case where capital is non-malleable, i.e. it does not depre-
ciate. If a trajectory in biomass-capital state space, with biomass on the
x-axis, starts on the investment switching curve, it will continue horizontally
to the left. At some point, the capital invested will be insufficient to continue
to decrease the biomass: Growth will be equal to harvest. Because capital
does not depreciate, this point constitutes a long-term steady state in this
setting. Under δ = 0, the curve that connects all combinations of biomass
and capital that constitute these steady states is called “trap curve” in the
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previous literature. We use B˙t = 0 to derive this trap curve:
KTL(Bt) =
z
q
(
1− Bt
CC
)(
1−
(
c
pqBt
)1−σ
(1− α)σ
)− σ
1−σ
α
σ
1−σ (15)
The trap curve is downward sloping and for 0 < σ convex in biomass.
For quasi-malleable capital (Clark et al., 1979), δ > 0, the trap line can be
reached exactly vertically, as B˙t goes to zero and S˙t is strictly negative
7. In a
diagram with biomass on the x-axis and capital on the y-axis, it constitutes
the “turning point” of the trajectory, where biomass stops decreasing and
starts growing again.
It is the aim to compare the importance and extent of the over-capitalization-
problem across different realizations of σ. For such a comparison to be mean-
ingful across different substitution elasticities, the distribution parameter α
should be adapted such that the model yields the same marginal rate of
technical substitution at a specific factor input ratio (Klump and Grandville,
2000; Klump and Saam, 2008). The transition dynamics towards a long-term
steady state dynamics are characterized by a market failure that stems from
the joint problem of a common pool resource and irreversible investment.
Once the system is in its long-term equilibrium, this problem ceases to be
relevant, as investment under quasi-malleable capital is always positive from
that point on-wards. However, the factor returns that the system generates
in its long-term equilibrium still shape the market failure, as long as capital
invested at the beginning of the time horizon has not fully depreciated at the
instant where the long-term equilibrium is reached.
Hence, the system is normalized such that the return on invested capital
in the long-term steady state is equal across 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 (see Section A.1 in
the Appendix for a Hamiltonian derivation of perfect complements results).
7A necessary condition is that δ is large enough such that
d S˙t
B˙t
dt
goes to infinity
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Equal steady state capital levels are achieved by setting the distribution
parameter α to satisfy:
∂ K∗
∂ σ
= 0⇐⇒ c
1− α =
(ρ+ δ) θ
α
(16)
This normalization ensures equal capital intensity and equal harvest per
unit of capital at steady state. Then, the model returns the perfect com-
plements long-term steady state level of biomass regardless the level of σ.
The steady state coincides with the tangential point of the family of harvest
functions defined by varying σ. For any level of σ, long-term steady state
biomass levels then coincide without varying catchability. This condition
preserves income shares at the long-term equilibrium levels across different
levels of substitutability. The behavior of the fishery, once in steady state,
will be the same across 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. However, the behavior for transition
paths differs.
The example from Clark and Lamberson (1982) is used to compare our
CES specification with the perfect complements case most often covered in
the literature. The example features Antarctic pelagic whaling in the 20th
century and is used also as the example for irreversible investment in the
textbook by Clark (1990). The parametrization is presented in the Appendix
(see A.2). In the standard parametrization, α = 1
3
.
3.2 Qualitative Comparison
The paper’s main interest concerns the transition dynamics for trajecto-
ries starting at B0 ≥ B∗ and initial capital below the switching curve. This
section analyzes the numerical outcome for different levels of 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
Plotting transition paths emanating from the switching curve at B0 > B
∗
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for a strictly positive substitution elasticity, in this example σ = 0.6, results
in the B-K-state-space-diagram shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the cor-
responding transition paths for the perfect complements case. These results
replicate those of McKelvey (1985). Figures showing time paths of capital
shadow value µt are provided in Section A.5.
Figure 1: Stock-capital-transition paths, σ=0.6.
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Capital first jumps up to the switching curve, such that total expected
profit per unit of capital equals the unit cost of capital. This cost stems from
both discounting and depreciation. As capital is at first above steady state
level, biomass decreases, then increases again when capital has depreciated
enough. Once the steady state is reached, a second pulse investment leads
to the employment of capital at K∗ (not shown). In all future periods,
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Figure 2: Stock-capital-transition paths, σ=0
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depreciated capital is exactly substituted by new investment, such that non-
malleability no longer has efficiency effects. Due to the normalization given
above, long term equilibria coincide for all levels of σ. In this example,
B∗ = 0.21CC, i.e smaller than the maximum sustainable yield, such that
growth to the left of B∗ is a concave increasing function of biomass.
Two main differences result from varying σ. The first is that effort and
capital are now substitutable, to a limited degree. This is of particular im-
portance when capital is abundant at the beginning of the time horizon, and
when capital is scarce at the end of the time horizon. The second is that
the cross production elasticity between biomass and capital, HBt,Kt changes
with changing biomass over time. It is constant under perfect complements,
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but depends on biomass for σ > 08.
Figure 3 compares harvest levels over biomass levels. Capital for each
harvest function is set equal to K∗ i.e. the respective capital that would
lead to B˙t = 0 under perfect complements at B∗ =
c
pq
. At a given level of
biomass Bt, the higher σ, the larger is harvest if Bt > B
∗, and the smaller
is harvest if B∗ < Bt < B∗. The reason is that harvest is convex in biomass
for 0 < σ. Thus, if a path starts to the right of the long-term steady state,
after initial investment at the same point (B0, I0), biomass would be faster
reduced under high levels of σ.
Figure 3: Harvest over biomass for different levels of σ at K∗
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8The condition for this dependence to be positive is Bt > B∗
(
σ
1− σ
) 1
σ−1
. A sufficient
condition for this is σ > 0.5. This means that there are cases for which HBt,Bt > 0.
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The biomass level at which operating profit goes to zero, B∗, decreases
in σ. For a Cobb-Douglas harvest production function, B∗ → 0. It follows
from the previous analysis that the level of capital per biomass along the trap
curve increases in σ. Trap curves across all considered levels of σ are tangent
at B∗. Due to the non-linearity of harvest in biomass, trap curves for σ > 0
are decreasing and convex in stock size. For the normalization given above,
∂KTL
∂σ
> 0 for Bt < B
∗: the trap curve becomes steeper for a higher σ.
Proposition 1. If the system is normalized to equal steady states for 0 ≤
σ ≤ 1, the trap curve is decreasing and convex in biomass and increases in σ.
For 0 < σ, the curve is strictly convex. The biomass level at which operating
profit goes to zero is given by B∗ = cp q (1 − α)
σ
1−σ . B∗ decreases in σ. For
the turning point of the trajectory to be situated at an equal biomass, the
corresponding capital stock has to be higher, the higher σ.
Factor substitution leads to another qualitative difference in model dy-
namics. For biomass approaching B∗ from above, the bracket in (15) goes to
zero, such that KTL goes to infinity. The trap line therefore never crosses the
vertical line above B∗ for finite levels of capital. As long as depreciation is
strictly positive, a trajectory starting at the switching curve has to cross this
line exactly vertically, since the line connects all combinations of biomass
and capital for which B˙t = 0. By consequence, a fishery with 0 < σ ≤ 1,
δ > 0 and where initial capital investment is bounded from above (due to the
fact that biomass is bounded from above) never reaches B∗ and operating
profit for this fishery must always be strictly positive. There is no instance
where capital, once invested, is unused. The trajectory stays to the right of
the trap curve until the turning point, where biomass starts to rise again.
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During this time, harvest is highly capital intensive. 9
On the other hand, under perfect complements, trajectories may strike
B∗, which for Kt > K∗ lies to the right of the trap line, when the trajectory
is not fully vertical. The trap line crosses B∗ at K∗. Once biomass falls below
this level, harvesting falls to zero until biomass has grown back to profitable
levels. Here, harvest equals biomass growth until Kt has depreciated to K∗,
the transition moves along the vertical line. Both capital and effort are
employed at very low levels. Operating profit equals zero. Then, the path
leaves B∗ and grows again until it reaches B∗. Note that between B∗ and B∗,
the paths are all identical, leading to an identical minimum capital at the
end of the transition path. This minimum capital level is therefore defined
by K∗ and the time of transition between B∗ to B∗. This is in contrast to the
cases with substitutability, where the remaining capital continues to depend
on B0.
Proposition 2. For 0 < σ, the trap curve approaches B∗ from the right. It
has no interception with the vertical line above B∗. For σ = 0, the trap line
intercepts this vertical line at K∗ =
z
q
(
1− B∗
CC
)
.
These features need to be taken into account when numerically computing
the trajectories. A perfect complements production function requires a multi-
point solution procedure with a two case distinction. If trajectories fall short
of B∗, a straightforward single region solution suffices. However, the case
where trajectories reach B∗ requires the distinction of three regions, where
the transitions occur upon reaching B∗, upon reaching (vertically) the point
9Minimum effort per unit capital along the trajectory does not coincide with the turning
point though: While turning, ψ˙t < 0, since biomass is momentarily stable and capital
decreases. Thus, at this point, effort per unit capital increases.
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where the trajectories leave B∗ again as well as B∗ as the end point (see
Section A.4). All three time horizons need to be determined separately, and
the system requires nine boundary conditions. This is costly in terms of both
accuracy of the numerical solution and computation time. By contrast, cases
with a substitution elasticity above zero allow for a single region solution,
where only one time horizon needs to be determined.
Proposition 3. The better substitution possibilities are, the larger becomes
the imbalance between high operating profit per unit capital at high biomass
levels, and low operating profit per unit capital at low biomass levels.
The instantaneous net rate of return on capital is increasing and convex
in biomass, and increases in σ for all values of biomass, except at B∗, where
it is independent of σ (see Figure 12 in the Appendix). This means that
for trajectories starting at (Bt > B
∗, Kt > K∗), early harvest and operating
profit are substantially larger at high values of σ. Income shares between
labor and capital change over time for 0 < σ, because the capital labor ratio
changes. While operating profit increases in σ for all values of biomass larger
than B∗, the income share of capital decreases in σ whenever B∗ > Bt and
vice versa. If the system remains for long in the low profitability state at a
low biomass, investment incentives will be low.
3.3 Numerical results
To compare initial investment incentives while varying σ, switching curves
are compared, i.e. the initial investment level as a function of initial biomass
(see Figure 4). Higher levels of σ entail a lower switching curve. Curves
with lower substitution possibilities are also steeper. This is accompanied
by a higher minimum biomass under better substitution possibilities, as long
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Figure 4: Open access investment switching curve for different realizations
of σ as a function of initial biomass
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as B0 is not too large (see Figure 5). Once B0 becomes very large, fishing
technologies with low values of σ are stalled in their downward dynamics
by B∗ under perfect complements and by a close to vertical trap line for all
other realizations of the CES function. Interestingly, this stalling does not
change the sign of relative investment incentives. When trajectories under
perfect complements reach BPC∗ , the switching curve becomes even steeper
relative to the other curves. The same happens for low but positive values
of σ, although stalling is a more gradual phenomenon here.
Time to equilibrium is slightly longer for low values of σ, in particular
for medium levels of B0. Thus, while minimum biomass may be far lower for
example under Cobb-Douglas-technology than under perfect complements,
the biomass also recovers faster due to the initially lower investment.
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Figure 5: Open access minimum biomass for different realizations of σ as a
function of initial biomass
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Initital biomass B 0 (1000 BWU)
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Bi
om
as
s 
at
 tu
rn
in
g 
po
in
t B
m
in
 
(10
00
 B
W
U)
=0
=0.2
=0.4
=0.6
=0.8
=1
To understand the underlying dynamics better, let us now turn to a
comparison of specific trajectories and their pertaining operating profit time
paths. Figure 6 compares the paths that run tangent to the perfect com-
plements biomass level B∗ =
c
pq
. These paths show the minimum initial
biomass level necessary to induce investment large enough that paths with
0 < σ reach or undercut B∗. For any higher initial biomass, minimum en-
suing biomass will necessarily be smaller under 0 < σ than under perfect
complements. Under any lower initial biomass will substitution be favorable
for biological sustainability (cf. Figure 5).
Figure 7 shows the associated operating profit per unit of invested capital
for the time between initial investment and reaching B∗. Time paths with a
high substitution elasticity start out with initially very high capital earnings,
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and end up with slightly higher profit per unit of capital. By contrast, in the
medium term, the shadow value gain is higher for lower realizations of σ. In
our case, the necessary additional capital under higher substitution elastic-
ities to fish the biomass down to the identical level will only be invested if
initial profits are high enough, i.e. if initial biomass is higher. This example
shows how the relative position of switching curves is driven by the distri-
bution of profit over time. The conclusion is that when trajectories start
at the same initial biomass, the possibility to substitute leads to a substan-
tially lower profit per unit capital in the medium term that, for our example,
dominate higher initial and long term earnings.
Figure 6: Paths through BPC∗ =
c
pq
over different values of σ
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Figure 7: Current operating profit per unit of invested capital for paths
through BPC∗ over different values of σ
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time t
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
O
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 p
ro
fi
t 
p
e
r 
u
n
it
 o
f 
c
a
p
it
a
l 
s
to
c
k
(1
0
0
0
 $
)
=0
=0.2
=0.4
=0.6
=0.8
=1
4 A model of an optimally managed fishery
with factor substitution under irreversible
investment
4.1 Theoretical model
In this section, optimal investment and the optimal transition paths for
0 < σ ≤ 1 are derived. Consider the model with harvest production, biomass
growth and prices as presented in 3.1. A tilde above the variable distinguishes
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variables for the optimal case from variables for the open access case where
necessary. Kuhn-Tucker-conditions with multiplier ν˜t are used to account
explicitly for non-negativity of investment. The capital stock St and used
capital Kt are now explicitly distinguished. The Kuhn-Tucker-multiplier φt
accounts for the inequality St −Kt ≥ 0. Capital dynamics are described by
S˙t = It − δ St and enter with multiplier µ˜t. The current-value welfare maxi-
mizing Hamiltonian function reads (see Section A.9 for technical details):
H = pit−θ It+µ˜t (It − δ St)+φt (St −Kt)+ν˜t It+ψ (g(Bt)−G(Bt, Kt, Et))
= p q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1−cEt−θ It+µ˜t (It − δ St)+φt (St −Kt)+ν˜t It
+ ψt
(
g(Bt)− q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1
)
(17)
Optimal effort now results from a dynamic optimization process. It de-
pends on the stock level, optimal capital used Kt and the stock shadow price
ψt:
Et(Bt, Kt, ψt) =
(
α
1− α
) σ
σ−1
((
c
(p− ψt) q Bt
)σ−1
(1− α)−σ − 1
) σ
1−σ
Kt
!≥ 0
(18)
Note that in contrast to effort input under open access (3) effort is reduced
by the stock shadow price. Inserting (18) back into the first order equations,
leads to the following harvest function:
Ht(Bt, Kt, ψt) = q Btα
σ
σ−1
(
1−
(
c
(p− ψt)qBt
)1−σ
(1− α)σ
) σ
1−σ
Kt (19)
Effort and harvest depend positively on used capital Kt and biomass Bt
and negatively on the stock shadow price ψt. Either, φt > 0 and Et > 0 or
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Kt = Ht = φt = 0. Since capital cost are sunk once investment has taken
place, the first case entails Kt = St. The following condition separates the
two cases, and by that describes the “stock switching curve”:
ψt
!
= p− c
qBt
(1− α) σ1−σ (20)
If the left hand side exceeds the right hand side, harvest is zero. If the
right hand side exceeds the left hand side, harvest is strictly positive. Thus,
if a trajectory started at ψt > p − c
qBt
(1 − α) σ1−σ , biomass would grow and
harvest would commence only upon reaching this curve, and be positive
with Kt = St afterwards. Condition (20) holds with equality at a stock
level strictly above the open access lower stock level B∗. Below this stock
size, zero harvest is optimal. We will focus on the case for which harvest is
positive, which leads to the following system of differential and Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (see A.6 in the Appendix for conditions in the second case, i.e.
Ht = 0):
θ = µ˜t + ν˜t with ν˜t ≥ 0, It ≥ 0, ν˜t (It − 0) != 0 (21)
˙˜µt = (ρ+ δ) µ˜t (22)
− (p− ψt)Ht(Bt, Kt, ψt)
Kt
(
1−
(
c
(p− ψt)qBt
)1−σ
(1− α)σ
)
ψ˙t = ψt (ρ− g′(Bt))− (p− ψt)Ht(Bt, Kt, ψt)
Bt
(23)
S˙t = It − δ St (24)
B˙t = g(Bt)−Ht(Bt, Kt, ψt) (25)
In the optimal steady state with positive harvest, depreciated capital is
exactly replaced, such that ν˜t = 0 and the shadow value of capital equals the
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buying price of capital θ. Stock growth equals harvest. Fishing is optimal
if the own rate of interest of the stock, including marginal growth and the
stock effect, equals the social discount rate. The corresponding steady state
biomass level is defined by the Golden rule:
g′(B˜∗)+
g(B˜∗)
B˜∗
(
((ρ+ δ) θ)1−σ ασ + c1−σ (1− α)σ)− 1σ−1
p q Bt −
(
((ρ+ δ) θ)1−σ ασ + c1−σ (1− α)σ)− 1σ−1 = ρ (26)
The corresponding steady-state capital stock is given by:
K˜∗ =
g(B˜∗)
q B˜∗
α
σ
1−σ
(
1−
(
c
(p− ψ˜∗)qB˜∗
)1−σ
(1− α)σ
) σ
σ−1
(27)
with
ψ˜∗ = p− 1
qB˜∗
(
((ρ+ δ) θ)1−σασ + c1−σ(1− α)σ) 11−σ (28)
Solving (22) would provide a function for the investment switching curve.
This curve defines the points where biomass is higher than the steady state
biomass, µ˜t = θ, and investment is zero after the initial jump along the tra-
jectory until reaching the steady state from below. Due to the non-linearities
stemming from the shadow price for biomass in (22) and from the non-linear
nature of harvest production, this problem does not have a closed-form so-
lution. Compared to the same differential equation under open access, the
capital shadow price development is reduced by an expression for the shadow
price of the stock ψt. A larger stock shadow value reduces the shadow price
of capital. Since biomass is bounded by its carrying capacity, investment is
bounded as well. We will subsequently assume that for trajectories emanat-
ing from B0 > B˜∗, investment behavior will be similar to that under perfect
complements in that one initial jump occurs, and investment is subsequently
zero until the steady state is reached. This is an awkward assumption and
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owing to the complicated dynamics in the model under optimal management.
However, it is plausible that this particular behavior is similar as under per-
fect complements. It also makes sense from a logical perspective: As long
as biomass is below the steady state level B˜∗, the optimal solution under
malleable capital would be a harvest moratorium to increase biomass to its
long-term level as fast as possible. Above B˜∗, the switching curve increases in
B0, and investment exceeds the equilibrium level. Biomass will decrease af-
terwards. From the investment switching curve, the path would not continue
horizontally (with positive investment), because that would mean there is a
point after which investment is no longer positive, but this point lies strictly
above the investment switching curve. This is not possible by definition of
the investment switching curve.
4.2 Qualitative comparison
For the following comparison, the text will refer to Figure 8 and Figure
9, that show transition paths for an initial biomass starting above B˜∗. We
show here the perfect complements case (see Section A.7 in the Appendix for
a Hamiltonian derivation of perfect complements results) and σ = 0.6 as an
example for behavior under a strictly positive substitution elasticity between
effort and capital. Figures showing the time paths of capital shadow value
µ˜t emanating from the investment switching curve are provided in A.10.
Since the intention is to show all qualitative differences, the depreciation
rate is slightly decreased and set equal to δ = 0.1 only for the sake of these
two figures10. The figures show also trajectories that emerge from the stock
10Under the standard parametrization, δ = 0.15. Then, perfect complements trajectories
do not reach the important point Q, which will be discussed below, for any level of B0 <
CC.
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Figure 8: Stock-capital-transition paths under optimal management, σ=0
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switching curve, where initial capital is exogenously above the stock switching
curve at the beginning. The Golden rule curve is also shown for perfect
complements, which coincides with the trap curve under open access. The
figures will be explained as the comparison proceeds.
Qualitative differences arise in particular concerning the turning point,
where biomass starts to grow again. Using (16) in (26) and (A.53) shows that
upper Golden rule biomass levels as well as the corresponding equilibrium
capital levels are equal across 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 under the standard normalization
given by (16). Comparing this with the open access levels, optimal man-
agement requires a higher biomass and a lower capital stock. The optimal
steady state thus lies at a point strictly below the open access investment
switching curve.
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Figure 9: Stock-capital-transition paths under optimal management, σ=0.6
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Proposition 4. The optimal steady state requires a higher biomass and a
lower capital stock than the steady state under open access.
Under perfect complements, and if the initial capital stock is large enough,
the system approaches a short-term steady state at the lower level Golden
Rule stock B˜∗. The lower level Golden rule only differs from the upper
Golden rule level (A.53) in setting θ = 0. The stock switching curve, i.e. the
curve that gives the level of biomass below which a harvesting moratorium
is optimal, meets this lower Golden rule level at the point (B˜∗, K˜∗) for non-
malleable capital (δ = 0) and above this at some point (B˜∗, K˜Q) named Q
for quasi-malleable capital (δ > 0). Below point Q, the stock switching curve
lies to the left of this level, such that a moratorium is optimal above KQ.
Once capital has depreciated enough, a kink occurs at point Q, followed by
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a leftwards curve before the trajectories turn and biomass is restored to its
long-term steady state. Due to this kink, transition paths are identical from
Q on-wards, and lead to identical capital levels upon reaching B˜∗.
Figure 8 shows that under perfect complements, three different types of
trajectories can emerge from B0 > B˜∗, K0 > K˜∗. Blue lines mark those
trajectories that do not reach B˜∗ and continue smoothly towards the long
term steady state. One red path shows that it is possibly that a path meets
B˜∗ below point Q, defined as the intersection point of the stock switching
curve and B˜∗, and then continues on smoothly. The green paths exhibit a
kink: They run into the fix lower Golden rule level B˜∗, continue vertically
until Q, before they all follow an identical path towards B˜∗. Hence, at point
Q, the trajectories directly reach the stock switching curve.
By contrast, this can not happen if capital and effort are imperfect com-
plements. The social planner has the leniency to determine optimal harvest
independently from the capital stock St. She does so by using all capital
available, and adapting effort input. Therefore, there is no excess capital as
long as harvest is positive, which is different from the perfect complements
case. Capital is never unused along the trajectories, and µ˜t does not fall to
zero (which is the case under perfect complements). Therefore, we may not
simply disregard investment cost and derive some lower steady state level,
as presented in Clark et al. (1979) for the perfect complements case11. Paths
are always smooth12, no lower short term steady state occurs.
11This operation actually requires a steady state in which µ˜t = θ0, which is then set to
zero.
12Due to the smooth nature of trajectories with 0 < σ, programming is again reduced
to a single region problem (see Section A.8), instead of a two case distinction with three
regions in case the lower level Golden rule stock is reached, that is needed to solve the
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This has one more implication for the trajectories. Under 0 < σ, in the
immediate vicinity of the stock switching curve, harvest is infinitesimally
small. Therefore, the stock switching curve can only be met by trajectories
if, along the trajectories, harvest goes to zero. However, in that case, the
trajectory turns already before, at a higher biomass level.
Proposition 5. Turning occurs strictly to the right of the stock switching
curve for 0 < σ. Trajectories under perfect complements meet the stock
switching curve at point Q, if the initial biomass is high enough.
Under σ > 0, the optimal turning point biomass level depends on t, as is
subsequently denoted by B˜t∗. This can be shown by setting B˙t = 0, inserting
(23), and solving for St as a function of Bt, to derive the analogue for the
trap curve under open access. This function encompasses all capital stock
levels for which St > S˜∗ and their corresponding Golden Rule turning point
stock level, B˜t∗ < B˜∗. Thus, it must also pass through B˜∗.
Under perfect complements, it was possible to find the lower Golden rule
stock level by setting ψ˙t = 0 due to the fact that capital was actually in
excess, and the biomass level did constitute an actual steady state for some
time whenever a trajectory met this biomass level at a high capital level. The
trap curve did not depend on the shadow price of the stock at all, because
harvest fully depends on capital. In the case where capital can substitute for
flexible inputs, there is no excess capital, and it is not feasible to set the time
derivative of the stock shadow price to zero, since the level of used capital
changes throughout the trajectory. In addition, the social planner can now
decide on capital input and harvest separately. This entails that harvest
always depends on ψt. Therefore, (29) depends on the time derivative of ψt
perfect complements problem.
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at the turning point, which must be negative, since capital decreases and
biomass is constant.
S˜GR = α
σ
1−σ
g(B˜t∗)
q B˜t∗
(29)1− (1− α)σ
(
c
p q B˜t∗
)1−σ

p
(
ρ− g′(B˜t∗) + g(B˜t∗)
B˜t∗
)
p(ρ− g′(B˜t∗))− ˙ψGR

1−σ
σ
σ−1
If capital is perfectly non-malleable, ψ˙t = 0. If the system starts at
B0 > B˜∗, it approaches a steady state biomass B˜∗ < B˜∗. The Golden rule
curve (29) for δ = 0 is downward sloping and convex in biomass. For δ = 0, it
lies strictly above the curve for δ > 0 due to ˙ψGR < 0: If capital depreciates,
future capital scarcity would lead to an even lower turning biomass than for
δ = 0. The same result holds under perfect complements.
5 Over-capitalization
Over-capitalization is defined as the employment of capital at a level
above the optimal level. Now that investment levels under open access and
under optimal management have been computed, a comparison of the two
sheds light on the extent of over-capitalization. The analysis focuses on the
case where capital is quasi-malleable.
As noted in section 4.1, over-capitalization is present in the open-access
steady state: The optimal steady state requires a higher biomass and a lower
capital level than the open-access steady state. Over-capitalization, and
associated over-fishing, is caused by the common pool resource nature of wild
fish. Irreversibility is not an issue since investment is positive in steady state.
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If the system started out at biomass levels above the open access steady state,
and investment was reversible, the open access capital level would shortly
overshoot the steady state level, but return to the steady state level once the
stock was fished down. However, when accounting for irreversible investment,
the investment switching curve determines initial investment and thus capital
levels throughout the transition to the steady state. This transition takes
longer than without this additional constraint, and involves that the biomass
is temporarily fished down to levels below even the open access steady state.
A similar analysis applies to the system under optimal management. While
in steady state, investment is positive. Starting at a higher biomass leads
to optimal investment above the optimal steady state capital level. As was
already pointed out in the previous literature, the irreversibility constraint is
costly to overall welfare, because of the gradual transition towards the steady
state.
Using the numerical results, one can compare the investment switching
curves under different levels of complementarity. Figure 10 shows the differ-
ence between investment switching curves for starting biomass levels between
the open access steady state and 200kt (curves continue on up to CC). In-
vestment is too high for all levels of σ under all levels of starting biomass
above the open access steady state, B∗ < B0. Between the open-access and
optimal steady states, the difference between complementarity levels is mi-
nor. The difference grows larger for initial biomass levels above the optimal
steady state. Initial over-capitalization decreases in σ. This results from
decreasing investment incentives under open access. The higher the starting
biomass level, the higher is over-capitalization. On the other hand, numer-
ical results show that optimal investment is very similar under all levels of
complementarity.
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Proposition 6. Investment is too high for all levels of σ under all levels of
starting biomass above the open access steady state, B∗ < B0. In our example
and if the system is normalized to equal steady states for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, initial
over-capitalization decreases in σ.
Figure 10: Absolute initial over-capitalization for different realizations of σ
as a function of initial biomass
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Proposition 7. Minimum biomass attained during transition is higher un-
der optimal management than under open access, if over-capitalization oc-
curs and the optimal steady state lies below the maximum sustainable yield
biomass.
However, initial over-capitalization is only part of the problem. With
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Figure 11: Optimal management minimum biomass for different realizations
of σ as a function of initial biomass
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irreversible investment, invested capital stays in the fishery for long time
horizons. Thus, it is also important to look at transition paths. A comparison
of effort levels under open access (3) and optimal management (18) shows
that the latter is reduced by the shadow price of the stock. If capital and
biomass levels were equal across levels of σ, harvest would be lower under
optimal management. When in addition, initial capitalization is higher under
open-access and the optimal steady state lies below the maximum sustainable
yield, as is the case in our example, this means that the minimum biomass
attained during transition must be lower under open access. This result is
also visible from a comparison of Figures 5 and 11. This finding entails
that the system remains over-capitalized, in the sense that for the associated
biomass level, capital is higher than it would be under optimal management,
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until after the open access trajectory turns and biomass starts growing again,
i.e. for most of the transition path.
6 Conclusion
In open-access fisheries, over-fishing occurs because fishers’ do not take
into account the stock externality. They employ more capital than would be
optimal, as long as the biomass level is high enough. The problem is com-
plicated by imperfect malleability of capital in fisheries. This article set out
to analyze qualitative and quantitative differences of this over-capitalization
problem for different levels of complementarity between the irreversibly in-
vested capital and flexibly adaptable inputs.
The major qualitative difference between different levels of complemen-
tarity is that whenever substitution is possible, invested capital will always
be fully used. Harvest is flexibly adapted via effort input. Therefore, un-
der both open access and optimal management, transition paths starting
at a biomass level above the steady state, are smooth until at last, an up-
ward jump in investment occurs once biomass has reached its steady state
level. Trajectories turn strictly before reaching the level of the resource stock
where operating profit goes to zero under open access. Factor substitution
also alters the relationship between capital and biomass. The better the sub-
stitution possibilities, the larger becomes the imbalance between high profits
per unit capital at high biomass levels, and low profits per unit capital at low
biomass levels. The shadow value of investment at the beginning is lower:
Fishers perceive that the system remains for long in a low profitability state,
and invest less. According to numerical results, investment incentives are
lower when complementarity is imperfect. Under optimal management, the
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regulator can separately manage harvest and capital if substitution is pos-
sible. In our example, over-capitalization at any level of starting biomass
above the long-term equilibrium is higher, the less substitution possibilities
exist. This results from higher investment incentives.
These results are relevant for policymakers: A fishery may be economi-
cally under-exploited, for example due to a regime shift, a sudden change in
policy – such as the introduction of an ongoing subsidy – or because the fish-
ery wasn’t developed formerly, such as the large mesopelagic biomass. Our
results can help to prevent initial over-capitalization, and indicate that the
risk of over-capitalization is particularly high when substitution possibilities
are lacking.
Further research is required to understand over-capitalization better. Since
the “Global fishing watch” project (Kroodsma et al., 2018) has started, infor-
mation on capital involved in fishing has improved, which opens new possi-
bilities for more detailed empirical analysis. Concerning theoretical analysis,
the model can in the future be extended to a spatial model with more than
one stock, such that fishers or the social planner can decide upon where to
use invested capital. Furthermore, other inputs, in particular human capi-
tal, may not be perfectly malleable as well (Clark et al., 2005). The recent
literature focuses on the inclusion of environmental effects. An important
contribution would be the analysis of substitution when environmental sea-
sonality causes the system to be periodic in steady state.
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Appendix
A.1 A model of an open access fishery under perfect
complements and quasi-malleable capital (McK-
elvey, 1985)
The following analysis is identical to (McKelvey, 1985). We shortly
present the Hamiltonian derivation here for reference in the main text. As-
sume that capital Kt is non- or quasi-malleable and depreciates linearly at
rate 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Under a Scha¨fer model (Scha¨fer, 1957) with a bell-shaped
logistic growth curve for biomass:
g(Bt) = z Bt
(
1− Bt
CC
)
(A.30)
with natural growth rate 0 < z and carrying capacity CC, as well as a
production function that is linear in biomass Bt and underlies a perfect-
complements-constraint for the input of effort Et and capital Kt with unit
prices c and θ respectively. Fishers dynamically maximize profit subject
to the disinvestment constraint and capital dynamics. In their optimiza-
tion, they take the future path of biomass as given, such that investment
and harvesting patterns arise as the equilibrium between fishers’ interaction.
Let 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 denote the social discount rate. The shadow value of cap-
ital is denoted by µt, and νt is the shadow price of disinvestment, or the
value of relaxing the non-negativity constraint by one unit. The following
Kuhn-Tucker-condition and two dynamic differential equations follow from
Hamiltonian first order conditions:
179
θ = µt + νt with νt ≥ 0, It ≥ 0, νt (It − 0) != 0 (A.31)
K˙t = It − δ Kt (A.32)
µ˙t = (ρ+ δ) µt − pit
Kt
= (ρ+ δ) µt − (pqBt − c) (A.33)
In addition, stock dynamics are given by:
B˙t = g(Bt)−Ht(Bt, Et, Kt) = zBt
(
1− Bt
CC
)
− qBtKt (A.34)
The long term steady state occurs at:
pit = q Bt (Kt, Et)− c Et − (ρ+ δ) θKt != 0 (A.35)
⇐⇒ B∗ = c+ (ρ+ δ)θ
p q
(A.36)
⇒ K∗ = z
q
B∗
(
1− B
∗
CC
)
(A.37)
The biomass level at which operating profit is zero is given by
B∗ =
c
pq
(A.38)
The trap line is given by
KTL(Bt) =
z
q
(
1− BTL
CC
)
(A.39)
The intercept of B∗ and the trap line occurs at K∗ =
z
q
(
1− B∗
CC
)
.
Under open access starting at a biomass level above the long-term steady
state, fishers initially invest capital according to the “switching curve” (unless
initial capital is already at or above this level) at investment time τ :
µτ =
∫ ∞
τ
pqBt − c
Kt
e−(ρ+δ)( t−τ) dt != θ (A.40)
The interpretation is that investment lies at its optimal level if the shadow
value of capital equals the unit price for capital.
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A.2 Standard parametrization
I use the example from Clark and Lamberson (1982) to compare our
CES specification with the perfect complements case most often covered in
the literature. The example is about Antarctic pelagic whaling in the 20th
century and is used also as the example for irreversible investment in the
textbook by Clark (1990) and has been reused for illustration by Eisenack
et al. (2006). Thus, this has become the standard example in the literature
and provides a convenient reference point. The parametrization is presented
in Table 2:
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Table 2: Parametrization for the irreversible investment model from Clark
and Lamberson (1982):
Original
parameter
name
Parameter
name
Parameter
value
Parameter definition unit of measure-
ment
Xt Bt – whale stock at time t blue whale units
13
Kt Kt – capital used at time t factory units (fac-
tory and catcher
vessel) per catcher
day
Et Et – effort used at time t catcher days
r z 0.05 natural growth rate –
K CC 400000 carrying capacity BWU
q q 0.000013 catchability –
p p 7000 price per blue whale unit $/BWU
c c 5000 variable cost per unit of effort $/catcher day
ci
α
θ 10000 buying price of capital $/per capital unit
δ ρ 0.1 discount rate –
γ δ 0.15 depreciation rate –
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A.3 Figure: Operating profit under different levels of
σ
Figure 12: Operating profit pit over biomass for different levels of σ at K∗
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A.4 Implementation in Matlab: Open access
To compute results under perfect complement, implementation in Matlab
is achieved using the boundary value problem solver bvp5c in a three-region-
setting (multi-point boundary value problem). Implement the model by use
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of three ordinary differential equations for biomass, capital and the shadow
price of capital. The multi-point formulation is needed due to the non-
linearities in the differential equations at the two points where lower level
steady state biomass is achieved and left again. These two points in time
form the boundaries of the first two regions. The third region is identical
for all transition paths that reach the lower steady state level and encom-
passes the transition from lower level steady state up to upper level steady
state biomass. Boundary conditions are initial capital and capital shadow
price values as well as final shadow price and smoothing conditions for the
transition between regions. A fourth boundary condition, namely that the
biomass path ends at B∗, is used to solve for the correct time horizon. Since
this has to be done twice in the multi-point setting, namely for the first and
last region’s time horizon, this is costly in terms of both accuracy of the nu-
merical solution and computation time. The solver starts in the immediate
vicinity of the long-term equilibrium. The program iterates outwards and
updates the initial guess for the solution with each step.
A major difference of production functions with σ > 0 is that this multi-
point solution procedure is no longer required, and only one time horizon
needs to be solved for. The numerical implementation in Matlab is done
straightforward using the bvp5c solver. A regional implementation using a
multi-point formulation is no longer necessary. Apart from this, program-
ming proceeds as explained above.
A.5 Capital shadow price development under open ac-
cess
The following Figures, 13 and 14, are the paths of mut corresponding to
Figures 2 and 1, respectively.
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Figure 13: Capital shadow price µt for σ = 0 under open access
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A.6 Conditions for the optimal management case and
in case Ht = 0
The following Hamiltonian first-order conditions and Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions describe the system under optimal management for σ > 0 in case
ψt > p− c
qBt
(1− α) σ1−σ :
θ = µ˜t + ν˜t with ν˜t ≥ 0, It = 0 (A.41)
˙˜µt = (ρ+ δ) µ˜t (A.42)
ψ˙t = ψt (ρ− g′(Bt)) (A.43)
S˙t = −δ St (A.44)
B˙t = g(Bt) (A.45)
(A.46)
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Figure 14: Capital shadow price µt for σ = 0.6 under under open access
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A.7 A model of an optimally managed fishery under
perfect complements and quasi-malleable capital
(Clark et al., 1979)
The following analysis is identical to (Clark et al., 1979). We shortly
present the Hamiltonian derivation here for reference in the main text. The
current-value welfare maximizing Hamiltonian function reads:
H = pit − θ It + µ˜t (It − δ Kt) + νt It + ψ (g(Bt)−G(Bt, Kt, Et))
= (p q Bt − c) Kt−θ It+µ˜t (It − δ Kt)+νt It+ψt
(
z Bt (1− Bt
CC
)− q BtKt
)
(A.47)
The system is characterized by one Kuhn-Tucker-condition and four dif-
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ferential equations:
θ =µ˜t + νt (A.48)
˙˜µt =(ρ+ δ) µ˜t − ((p− ψt) qBt − c) (A.49)
ψ˙t =ψt
(
ρ− g′(Bt) + Ht
Bt
)
− p Ht
Bt
(A.50)
K˙t =It − δ Kt (A.51)
B˙t =g(Bt)−Ht (A.52)
In steady state, fishers should invest exactly the amount of capital that
depreciates in the same period. The shadow value of capital equals the price
for capital, and the shadow value of the stock equals marginal profit from
one unit of harvest.
The long-term Golden rule biomass level B˜∗ is determined by:
g′(B˜∗) + g(B˜∗)
c+ (ρ+ δ)θ(
pqB˜∗ − (c+ (ρ+ δ)θ)
)
B˜∗
= ρ (A.53)
Fishing is optimal if the own rate of interest of the stock, including
marginal growth and the stock effect, equals the social discount rate.
For the short term equilibrium, disregard capital cost and arrive at a
lower level Golden rule biomass B˜∗:
g′(B˜∗) + g(B˜∗)
c(
pqB˜∗ − c
)
B˜∗
= ρ (A.54)
Clark et al. (1979) demonstrated a premature-switching phenomenon be-
low the lower level Golden rule stock. Fishing may be optimal below that
level, because the abundance of capital is strictly temporary, and the coming
capital shortage, leading to lower than optimal harvesting, is anticipated.
The expression for the stock switching curve is derived for biomass levels
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below B˜∗, setting θ = 0. Consider trajectories start on the curve at time τs.
Then, the stock switching curve is defined by:
ψτs
!
= p− c+ (ρ+ δ) θ
q Bt
(A.55)
The interpretation is that the current benefit of harvesting one unit of
stock (left hand side) equals future benefits of one unit of stock (right hand
side). Harvesting is optimal to the right of this increasing and concave curve.
For quasi-malleable capital, δ > 0, Clark et al. (1979) was able to prove that
(A.55) meets B˜∗ at point Q with KQ > K˜∗.
A.8 Implementation in Matlab: Optimal management
Programming of the perfect complements case proceeds as follows: First,
the stock switching-curve is determined using differential equations for Bt,
Kt, µ˜t and ψt. Initial biomass and biomass shadow price, as well as end
values for the two shadow values provide boundary conditions. The time
horizon is determined using BT = B˜∗. This approach provides the point Q
where the stock switching curve and the lower Golden rule level intercept.
For the transition paths starting from B0 > B˜∗, that are used to derive
the investment switching curve, a two-case distinction is necessary. In case
the transition path never reaches points with Bt = B˜∗ and Kt ≥ KQ, the
implementation is a straightforward single-region boundary value problem.
In all other cases, a three-region multi-point programming is used. The
first region switch occurs when the short term steady state stock level B˜∗ is
reached (T1). The second switch at time T2 occurs in point Q and the path
ends at the long-term steady-state biomass B˜∗ in T3.
Boundary conditions in addition to those defining the three time hori-
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zons include K0 (exogenous), µ˜0 = θ, µ˜T = θ and ψT = p − (c+(ρ+δ) θ)q B˜∗
and smoothing conditions for all four differential equations. Note that using
starting capital instead of starting biomass as exogenous does not alter the
solution, but allows to determine T2 immediately using KQ = e
−δ T2 K0. This
saves computation time. T1 and T3 again have to be determined with mul-
tiple iterations as described above using the additional boundary condition
BT3 = B˜∗.
For the programming of all cases where 0 < σ, a single-region problem
results. Programming to derive the two switching curves and associated
trajectories proceeds similar to the single region case under perfect comple-
ments.
A.9 Differential equations under CES optimal man-
agement
The Hamiltonian first order conditions and Kuhn-Tucker-conditions are:
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∂H
∂It
=− θ + µ˜t + ν˜t != 0 (A.56)
with ν˜t ≥ 0, It ≥ 0, ν˜t (It − 0) != 0
∂H
∂Et
=(p− ψt) q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) 1
σ−1
(1− α)E−
1
σ
t − c != 0
∂H
∂Kt
=(p− ψt) q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) 1
σ−1
αK
− 1
σ
t − φt != 0
∂H
∂St
=φt − δ µ˜t != ρ µ˜t − ˙˜µt
withφt ≥ 0, St −Kt ≥ 0, φt (St −Kt) != 0
∂H
∂Bt
=(p− ψt) q
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1
+ ψt z
(
1− 2 Bt
CC
)
!
= ρψt − ψ˙t
∂H
∂µ˜t
=It − δ St != S˙t (A.57)
∂H
∂ψt
= z Bt
(
1− Bt
CC
)
− q Bt
(
αK
σ−1
σ
t + (1− α)E
σ−1
σ
t
) σ
σ−1 !
= B˙t
(A.58)
A.10 Capital shadow price development under optimal
management
The following Figures, 15 and 16, are the paths of m˜ut corresponding to
Figures 8 and 9, respectively.
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Figure 15: Capital shadow price µ˜t for σ = 0 under optimal management
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Figure 16: Capital shadow price µ˜t for σ = 0.6 under optimal management
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RE subsidy is differentiated according to productivity and derive a condition
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1 Introduction
In recent years, policies to internalize learning-by-doing spillovers have
gained relevance in particular for, but not limited to, green technology, such
as renewable energy (Fischer and Newell, 2008) or green transport (Fox
et al., 2017). Many papers in the economic literature argue for technology-
specific support rates (e.g. Gawel et al., 2017; Haas et al., 2008; Lehmann and
So¨derholm, 2017; Schmalensee, 2012). The major concern is the question how
such support should be designed to avoid adverse effects from inadvertently
“picking a winner” that might not be the long-term optimal choice. This is
of particular importance if technologies exhibit path dependency (Acemoglu
et al., 2016; Jaffe et al., 2005; Kalkuhl et al., 2012; Sande´n and Azar, 2005).
The status quo in practical renewable energy (RE) support policies is to
grant technology-specific subsidies that are differentiated according to gen-
eration cost with costlier technologies receiving more subsidies. This con-
tradicts an approach of static efficiency, that is, the subsidy for the same
good – green electricity – should be the same. However, the question of op-
timal FITs has to be answered in its dynamic learning environment. The
value of the spillover externality depends inter alia on the amount of future
deployment of a technology. Even if a technology exhibits higher cost due
to relative immaturity, it may learn more in the future and be the optimal
choice as a winner. Still, technology specific subsidies according to generation
costs can hardly distinguish between ‘immaturity’ and ‘baseline costliness’
of a technology (for example due to the dependence on certain high-cost raw
materials).
A related matter is the question of capacity constraints. It has previously
been shown and is an intuitive result that if overall technology deployment
is capped by an exogenous upper limit, this changes the dynamic outcome of
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winning and losing technologies (Nachtigall and Ru¨bbelke, 2016; Tahvonen
and Salo, 2001; Wang and Zhao, 2018). Increasing marginal cost on sector
level limits the value of spillovers. Then, technological diversification may
be economically justified. Hence, economically sensible subsidies should take
such capacity constraints into account.
In this paper, we use RE technologies as an example and develop a dy-
namic model to characterize how welfare-maximizing subsidies depend on
current efficiency of technologies and the increasing marginal costs at the
industry level that stem from overall limitations for deploying specific RE
technologies. Learning leads to increased productivity and learning spillovers
justify policy-intervention.
The results show that the optimal subsidy is technology-specific. Dif-
ferentiation depends on learning- and production-related elasticities. We
show that it is optimal to strongly support less advanced technologies, i.e.
to promote diversification, if (i) marginal costs are strongly increasing, i.e.
for each RE technology there is only a limited amount of suitable production
sites available, and if (ii) the marginal benefit of learning-by-doing spillovers
strongly decreases with experience. A necessary condition for an increasing
relationship between costliness and optimal support is that sites are in lim-
ited supply. In quantitative terms, we find that for learning rates between
10-20% as typically found in empirical studies, the propensity for technolog-
ical diversification is highest if the sector cost elasticity with respect to sites
is at about 1.3, and thus relatively steep.
Our model thus provides a theoretical basis for the widespread and in-
ternationally applied type of RE support differentiation. It offers policy
guidance for situations where a relevant spillover externality exists and more
than one technology compete in the learning process, and thus beyond the
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scope of RE.
The paper is structured as follows: After a short literature review in sec-
tion 2, the model layout is presented in section 3 and the optimal FIT is
derived. Section 4 analyses the link between costliness and optimal remuner-
ation. The final section discusses some potential extensions and concludes.
2 Experience and related literature
2.1 Current practice of renewable energy support poli-
cies
In practice, renewable energy support is mostly technology-specific and
differentiated according to production costs. In 2008, 19 of 22 European
countries applied technology-specific tariffs (del R´ıo, 2012). The German
national action plan of 2009, for example, states that the calculation of
tariffs for different technologies underlies the principle of cost-covering re-
muneration (Bundesumweltministerium , BMU). Rates are calculated to ac-
count for investment, operating and capital costs, tax write-off and other
expenditure constituents (Fell, 2011). This induced highly differentiated tar-
iffs. Since 2016, support is based on tendering, but auctions continue to be
technology-specific (EEG 2016/2017). Ontario applied technology-specific
FIT-rates as well, based on costs and a projected rate-of-return (Yatchew
and Baziliauskas, 2011). According to Huang and Wu (2011), land scarcity
is the primary reason for technology-specific tariffs and thus diversification
in Taiwan. In China, a solar-exclusive subsidy came into effect in 2011 (Ye
et al., 2017). Renewable energy certificates applied by Australia were com-
plemented specifically by a Solar Credits Multiplier to support otherwise
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non-competitive small scale PV installations (Simpson and Clifton, 2014).
2.2 Economic models on RE subsidies
Technology-specific subsidies for RE technologies are also commonly ad-
vised in economic literature (e.g. Haas et al. 2008; Ragwitz et al. 2005;
Schmalensee 2012; Lehmann 2013). According to a simulation study by Hu-
ber et al. (2004), differentiation leads to a more significant deployment of
RE in the future and hinders a lockout of promising technologies. With
differentiation, cost-recovery and investment security can be ensured for sev-
eral technologies at the same time at overall lower cost. For this to occur,
support is to be differentiated either according to the generation cost (Cou-
ture and Gagnon, 2010; Haas et al., 2011; Mendonc¸a, 2009) or according to
technological maturity1 with respect to learning effects (e.g. IEA, 2011). Fur-
ther empirical evidence finds that cost-differentiated support rates promote
a “more homogeneous distribution among different technologies” (Ragwitz
et al., 2005), but low cost options are more effectively promoted in countries
with technology-neutral systems (Bo¨hringer et al., 2017; Johnstone et al.,
2010). From an economic point of view, the trouble with this approach is
that it does not expressly account for cost effectiveness. Del Rı´o (2012) ar-
gues that while the improved adaptability of differentiated rates may lead
to overall lower costs of support, technology-neutral tariffs may spur com-
petition between technologies. If this competition is dampened, supporting
less-mature and costlier technologies may lead to the massive diffusion of an
expensive technology, incurring high costs in the long run.
Theoretical modeling studies link technology-specific subsidies to effi-
1Arguably, a differentiation mode that targets cost-coverage will not be able to fully
distinguish between immaturity-caused and inherent costliness of a technology.
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ciency in reaching the policy goal, i.e. either abatement or spillover inter-
nalization. If the focus is on abatement, success may be technology-specific,
thus justifying differentiated support rates (Lehmann and So¨derholm, 2017;
Streitberger et al., 2017; Wibulpolprasert, 2016). If the policy aims to inter-
nalize spillovers from learning, efficiency requires a differentiation according
to, inter alia, learning and spillover rates and the mass of adopting firms (van
Benthem et al., 2008; Bla¨si and Requate, 2005; Lehmann, 2013; Lehmann
and So¨derholm, 2017; Reichenbach and Requate, 2012; Schmalensee, 2012;
Shrimali and Baker, 2012). The models by Kalkuhl et al. (2012, 2013) and
Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007) show that the optimal FIT depends on
parameters related to learning, production costs, and spillovers. They give
an analysis on lock-in risks between technologies of different maturity lev-
els, but no discussion on optimal differentiation strategies. Lehmann and
So¨derholm (2017) adds risk and uncertainty to the number of reasons why
technology-specific subsidies may be cost-effective. Overall, the literature
that studies technology-specific subsidies from the perspective of economic
theory is limited. No study has yet resolved the question under which cir-
cumstances an optimal differentiation of FITs should give higher tariffs to
more costly technologies. It remains unclear to what extent this practical
approach is compatible with theoretical justification of cost effective differ-
entiation. In addition, the impact of limited overall capacity on the optimal
subsidy remains unclear.
2.3 Increasing marginal costs: Theory and empirical
evidence
Increasing marginal cost is a standard assumption in economic models.
For RE, it is realistic to assume increasing marginal cost on both plant and
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industry level. Site productivity on plant-level is subject to decreasing re-
turns: Not all of the natural energy that a better site can provide can be
as efficiently transformed as the first unit. Neither wind nor PV applica-
tions can deal with extreme wind or sun exposure. Wind turbines need to
be switched off at too high wind speeds, while PV cells that become too
hot lose efficiency (IEA Wind, 2012; Machniewicz et al., 2015; Radziemska,
2003). Even if that is not the case, eventually, some of the good days need to
be sacrificed to do regular maintenance, that would otherwise be scheduled
to occur on sub-optimal resource days (e.g. Scheu et al., 2012).
A limited overall potential for RE deployment, in particular scarce suit-
able sites for windmills, hydro, PV etc., forms the basis for increasing marginal
costs at industry level (Mercure and Salas, 2012). Taking into account eco-
nomic limitations severely decreases this potential further (Moriarty and
Honnery, 2012). Our interpretation is that increasing marginal costs stem
from a higher price for the energy resource (e.g. wind full load hours), if the
most efficient sites are occupied first (i.e. for those with equal costs, resource
quality decides upon sequence of occupation).
Several studies estimate the impact of site constraints on wind energy
costs or energy yield (e.g. Honnery and Moriarty, 2009; Hoogwijk et al., 2004;
de Vries et al., 2007). All indicate increasing marginal costs and a limitation
of suitable sites. Wiser and Bolinger (2017) document that the “Index of
Built Wind Resource Quality at 80m” declined nearly continuously between
1998–2012. This shows a trend of building wind power projects in progres-
sively lower-quality wind resource areas. Average capacity factors have only
weakly increased for projects installed from 2009 through 2012. They re-
bound slightly afterwards, as old plants are gradually replaced. For New
Zealand’s hydro energy, Baines (1987) show that energy ratios (i.e. the ratio
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of energy output to energy input for an installation) started declining after
roughly 1985. This is reflected in increasing and convex unit cost of pro-
duction when plotted against cumulative installed capacity (Kumar et al.,
2011). Conventional energy production methodologies commonly show de-
clining energy yield ratios as well (Hall et al., 2014).
Early economic models on RE supply have been based on the literature
about clean backstop technologies that has been developed since the early
1970s (e.g. Heal, 1976; Nordhaus, 1973; Tahvonen, 1997). This literature
typically assumed constant marginal costs of energy generation. An excep-
tion is made by Oren and Powell (1985), who assume that marginal costs
decrease due to learning-by-doing. Later on, the dynamic literature features
also papers that include increasing marginal costs on industry level (Wang
and Zhao, 2018), sometimes combined with decreasing marginal cost through
technical change or learning (Nachtigall and Ru¨bbelke, 2016; Kalkuhl et al.,
2012, 2013; Tahvonen and Salo, 2001). Then, typically, different production
technologies are used simultaneously for a long time horizon. This depends
in particular on the size of the learning rate and the leniency of the capacity
constraint. Notably, both characteristics depend heavily on the identity of
the “winning” technology, which in turn depends on the regulators subsidy
choice. As Wang and Zhao (2018) point out, capacity constraints may vary
substantially between technologies and countries. This is not taken into ac-
count, except implicitly for Kalkuhl et al. (2012, 2013) who do not further
discuss this trait. Similarly, in a two period dynamic model, Reichenbach
and Requate (2012) incorporate industry-level increasing marginal cost via
heterogeneous firms that reflect different plant locations. However, their fo-
cus is on market structure and the welfare loss when feed-in tariffs are only
second-best.
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2.4 Evidence on learning by doing and spillovers
Empirical estimates on rates of learning-by-doing in green technologies
vary widely, but most lie in a range of 10–20% and nearly all percentage
quotes are positive (Fischedick et al., 2012; Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015; Lind-
man and So¨derholm, 2012; Rubin et al., 2015; So¨derholm and Sundqvist,
2007). For example, Rubin et al. (2015) review 18 studies on onshore wind
power learning rates and find a mean learning by doing rate of 16%, 16 stud-
ies on solar/PV power with a mean rate of 23%, and two studies on biomass
power generation with a mean learning-by-doing rate of 11%.
Learning rates are decreasing with the maturity of a technology, however,
as shown by the empirical observation that immature technologies tend to
have a significantly steeper learning curve than mature technologies (Gru¨bler
et al., 1999). This fact has been incorporated in previous modeling studies as
well (e.g. Kverndokk and Rosendahl 2007; Reichenbach and Requate 2012;
Rivers and Jaccard 2006).
Learning spillovers cause a positive externality which provides a reason
for economic policy intervention. This RE subsidy justification is, among
others, used in models of Bla¨si and Requate (2010); Helm and Scho¨ttner
(2008); Reichenbach and Requate (2012) and Jaffe et al. (2005). Table 1
provides an overview of empirical evidence for learning spillovers in RE.
3 The model
We consider renewable energy (RE) production in a dynamic (two pe-
riod) setting. The two main features of the model are (a) learning-by-doing
spillovers that increase total factor productivity in the future period depend-
ing on the scale of present RE production and (b) increasing marginal costs
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Table 1: Empirical estimates of spillovers in energy related technologies
Author(s) Technology Spillover-rate
Irwin and Klenow (1994) semiconductors 0.30
Zimmermann (1982) nuclear power plants > 0
Bostian et al. (2010)
(working paper)
PV cells 0.088
Braun et al. (2010)
(working paper)
wind and solar plants > 0
Verdolini and Galeotti (2011) energy supply and demand technologies
(patent data)
> 0
Dechezlepreˆtre and Glachant
(2014)
wind energy > 0
at the industry level due to limited availability of sites suitable for RE pro-
duction. We consider both the market equilibrium under a feed-in tariff and
the social optimum to derive the optimal regulation. In the next step, we use
a comparative static analysis of the market equilibrium to study the optimal
differentiation of the feed-in tariffs depending on technology parameters.
3.1 Technology
We consider an endogenous mass nt of RE generation devices (e.g. wind
turbines or photovoltaic panels) in period t ∈ {1, 2}, where t = 1 is the
‘present’ period and t = 2 is the ‘future’ period. We consider each of these
devices as operated by a single firm, and think of each of these firms as being
very small compared to the overall size of the market. Each RE device is
operated on an individual site, and RE output y (e.g., kilowatt hours per
year) depends on site productivity s (e.g., the wind full load hours, or hours
of sunshine) and total factor productivity At according to
y = At f(s), (1)
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where f(s) with f ′(s) > 0 describes how output depends on site productivity.
Productive sites are scarce. We assume that the most productive sites
are used for RE generation, and use S(nt) to denote the productivity of the
last site in use if nt is the total mass of RE devices, which equals the total
mass of sites occupied. Total RE output in period t thus is
Yt = At
∫ nt
0
f(S(j)) dj. (2)
While total factor productivity in the first period, A1, is given, total factor
productivity in period t = 2 depends on production decisions in the first
period due to learning-by-doing with spillovers between firms (Arrow, 1962).
In terms of the model, A2 depends on cumulative output in the first period,
Y1. This assumption also means that the spillover rate is uniform and that
there is no private learning, consistent with the assumption that the RE
sector is competitive with a continuum of many small firms involved.
Learning-by-doing is positive, A′2(Y1) > 0, but at a diminishing rate
A′′2(Y2) < 0. We focus on the case in which the elasticity of the marginal
increase of future productivity with present output is smaller than unity,
−Y1A
′′
2(Y1)
A′2(Y1)
< 1. (3)
The interpretation is that productivity is not bounded from above, A2
goes to infinity when Y1 goes to infinity. Instead, Y1 is restrained by dimin-
ishing productivity, which also constrains learning in the sense that learning
becomes costly.
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3.2 Market equilibrium
RE firms are price takers on output and input markets. To set up one RE
device, the firm has to pay the price Ft for the device and rent the site at a
price rt, which we assume to be the same, independently of site productivity
for RE generation, i.e., rt captures the opportunity costs of using the site for
RE generation.
On the output market, the RE firms compete with each other and with
other firms on the overall electricity market. Let pt denote the market price of
electricity2. There may be a subsidy ∆t paid by the regulator, such that the
producer price for RE firms becomes pt +∆t. Under constant prices within
the first period, ∆t can be interchangeably interpreted as a feed-in premium
or the markup on the price under a feed-in tariff (FIT), where pt+∆t would
be the FIT. In the following, we will work under the assumption that the
government pays a FIT, as this is the prevailing support scheme in Europe
(Kitzing et al., 2012).
Hence, the profit pit(j) for firm j in period t is
pit(j) = (pt +∆t)At f(S(j))− rt − Ft (4)
Profit is positive for the firms occupying the most productive sites. The over-
all mass nt of RE devices is determined by the condition that the marginal
2Electricity prices are exogenous. In practice, dampening effects on the wholesale
electricity price have been shown for increased RE production (Mulder and Scholtens,
2013; Traber and Kemfert, 2011). Also, the subsidy itself may have an impact on consumer
electricity prices (Traber and Kemfert, 2009). For the question of this paper – the optimal
differentiation of subsidies – these effects are not relevant, although they would influence
the level of the optimal feed in tariff.
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firm earns no profit,
(pt +∆t)At f(S(nt)) = rt + Ft. (5)
We allow for late entry and early exit, i.e. n2 ≥ n1 and n2 ≤ n1 are both
possible, depending in particular on market price development. Since firms
do not appropriate learning, we do not have to distinguish between incum-
bents and late entrants. We further assume that market prices are such that
the number of firms in both periods is strictly positive, as otherwise, there
would be no benefit from learning and the optimal subsidy was zero.
3.3 Social optimum and optimal RE support
Let δ denote the discount factor, such that δ = 1/(1 + i), where we use
the market interest rate i as the discount rate. The social optimum is found
by maximizing welfare
W = max
n1,n2
{
p1 Y1 − n1 (r1 + F1) + δ (p2 Y2 − n2 (r2 + F2))
}
(6)
where Yt is given by (2) for both periods and where total factor productivity
in period t = 2 depends on first period’s output as A2(Y1). By our assump-
tions, the social welfare function is jointly concave in n1 and n2, such that
the first-order conditions characterize a welfare optimum.
The conditions that determine the welfare-maximizing masses of firms in
both periods can be written as
(
p1 + δ p2A
′
2(Y1)
∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
)
A1 f(S(n1)) = r1 + F1 (7)
p2A2(Y1) f(S(n2)) = r2 + F2 (8)
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In the Appendix, we show that both n1 and n2 increase with the total factor
productivity in period 1, i.e. dn1
dA1
= n′1(A1) > 0 and n
′
2(A2) > 0. The more
productive the RE technology is the more firms will enter the market in
period 1. Furthermore, as productivity increases output in period 1, and
thus also productivity in period 2 – due to learning by doing – also the mass
of RE devices in period 2 increases with A1.
We derive the optimal RE subsidies by comparing the masses of RE de-
vices in the market equilibrium under the subsidy (condition 5) and the
conditions for the socially optimal masses of RE devices (conditions 7 and
8). We find that it is optimal not to intervene in the market in the second
period, i.e. to set ∆2 = 0, which is a result of the assumption that there will
be no third period that would benefit from further learning-by-doing.
The optimal mass of firms in the first period will be implemented by a
RE subsidy
∆⋆1 = δ p2A
′
2(Y1)
∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj (9)
It is just equal to the marginal external benefit of output in the first period
in terms of learning-by-doing spillovers – this is the discounted present value
of extra output in period 2 due to extra output in period 1. With no subsidy
or a subsidy below ∆⋆1, the mass of RE devices in period 1 is smaller than
socially optimal.
We now turn to our main question how ∆⋆1 should be differentiated accord-
ing to different technologies. In particular we are interested in the question
how the initial productivity A1 affects ∆
⋆
1.
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4 Optimal differentiation of FITs: Should costlier
technologies receive higher support?
We are now ready to derive the main equation of this paper. The elasticity
of the optimal RE subsidy with respect to the first period’s productivity is
(see Appendix):
A1
∆⋆1
d∆⋆1
dA1
=
decreasing-marginal-learning-effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
Y1A
′′
2(Y1)
A′2(Y1)
(
1 +
n1 f(S(n1))∫ n1
0
f(S(j)) dj
A1 n
′
1(A1)
n1
)
+
learning-utilization-effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
n2 f(S(n2))∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
A1 n
′
2(A1)
n2
(10)
If this elasticity is negative, the conclusion is that less productive, i.e. more
costly, technologies should receive higher support. If this elasticity is positive,
more productive technologies should receive higher support. Equation (10)
shows that there is no general conclusion with respect to the optimal dif-
ferentiation of RE subsidies. The two terms in equation (10) have opposite
signs: The sign of the first term is negative, the sign on the second one is
positive. We associate these two terms with two counteracting effects.
The first is the “decreasing-marginal-learning-effect”. For a more produc-
tive technology, output in period t = 1 is higher. This increases learning-
by-doing. The technology advances faster to a more mature state. Due to
decreasing marginal productivity of learning, the marginal extra contribution
of the FIT to spillovers will thus be smaller the more productive the tech-
nology is. The magnitude of this effect depends on the elasticity of marginal
future productivity gain with respect to present output, −Y1A′′2(Y1)/A′2(Y1).
If this elasticity is large, the industry learns faster at the beginning, but
rapidly becomes mature with little further scope for learning benefits.
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The second is the “learning-utilization-effect”. The mass of firms that
benefit from per-firm-spillovers changes over time. All n2 firms active in pe-
riod t = 2 (or RE devices, as in the model’s interpretation), benefit from
increased productivity due to the learning in the period before. The impor-
tant feature is that knowledge is non-rival and its value for one firm will not
dilute just because more firms use it. Again, limits on technology utilization
would put a limit on this effect.
To further specify conditions under which it is reasonable to differentiate
FITs according to costliness, we further look at the relevant elasticities. An
assumption of constant elasticities, which is not required for the subsequent
analysis, is common in theoretical models that include learning-by-doing (e.g.
Nachtigall and Ru¨bbelke, 2016).
Specifically, we assume that, at least locally, f(S(j)) ∝ jα−1 is a power
function of j, with 0 < α < 1. With this specification, the elasticity
α =
n f(S(n))∫ n
0
f(S(j)) dj
(11)
is equal to α. In a similar fashion consider that A2(Y1) is, at least locally,
iso-elastic, i.e. A2(Y1) ∝ Y
1−β
1
1− β , such that
β = −Y1A
′′
2(Y1)
A′2(Y1)
(12)
with 0 < β < 1.
Both (11) and (12) are inputs into the “experience parameter”, −1−β
α
.
The estimation of this experience parameter is standard in empirical work
concerning learning rate estimation (see Rubin et al. (2015) for an overview).
Learning follows a power law: If output Y1 doubles, the fractional cost re-
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duction equals 2
1−β
α . The learning rate then is defined as LR = 1 − 2− 1−βα .
This model of learning by doing, related to unit cost, was first suggested by
Wright (1936).
With this specification, still the model is not solvable in closed form, but
from (8) we find that under the assumptions (11) and (12),3
n′2(A1)
n2
= (1− β) α
1− α
n′1(A1)
n1
. (13)
Thus, using (11) and (12) in (10), we get
A1
∆⋆1
d∆⋆1
dA1
= −β
(
1 + α
A1 n
′
1(A1)
n1
)
+ α
A1 n
′
2(A1)
n2
(14)
= −β + α (1− β) A1 n
′
1(A1)
n1
(
α
1− α −
β
1− β
)
(15)
Thus, α < β is a sufficient condition such that the less productive, or more
costly, technologies should receive higher support.
This shows that the elasticities of aggregate production with respect to
the mass of firms and the elasticity of the learning curve are key parameters
that determine whether more or less productive technologies should receive
stronger support. A low value for α and a high value for β favor a higher
FIT for costlier technologies:
(i) A high value of β means that the marginal benefit of current output in
terms of future productivity decreases fast. If the current technology is
already rather productive, there is not much scope for future learning
spillovers. A high value of β means that the “decreasing-marginal-
learning-effect” is large, thus favoring the support of technologies that
3This can be shown by constructing an example using the specifications above in (8).
We obtain n
α (1−β)
1 n
α−1
2 = k with some constant k > 0. Thus, n2 = k
− 11−α n
(1−β) α1−α
1 .
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are not yet advanced.
(ii) A low value of α means that marginal costs are strongly increasing –
or, equivalently, marginal productivity is strongly decreasing – at firm
and industry level. Scarcity of productive sites for one type of RE
technology calls for diversification of RE technologies in use and thus
for support of currently less advanced technologies. The low value of α
leads to a small “learning-utilization-effect”.
This result can provide guidance for policy-makers: Optimal differentia-
tion depends (inter alia) on generation costs, but the sign of this dependence
can be both positive or negative. Whenever sites are in strongly limited sup-
ply and sites are an important production factor, countries should tend to
give a higher FIT to costlier technologies. If the limits to learning as well as
the limits to utilization restrict learning benefits, diversification is optimal.
By contrast, when sites are not very scarce (as for example for some countries
that are especially suited for solar technology, where the entire regional en-
ergy consumption could be produced from one technology), concentration on
the cheaper technology is preferable (ceteris paribus). Condition (15) shows
that the more efficient technologies should always receive the higher support
if α is close to one.
To explore which is the the empirically relevant case of RE subsidy differ-
entiation, we consider the following numerical example. Empirical estimates
of learning rates concerning the reduction in unit costs were most often be-
tween 10–20% (cf. Section 2.4). For this range, the experience parameter
would lie between 0.152 and 0.322. Area C in figure 1 illustrates combina-
tions of α and β in this range for which the sufficient condition, α < β holds,
denoted by area C. Thus, for all combinations in area C, costlier technolo-
gies should receive more support. A necessary condition for an increasing
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relationship between costliness and optimal support is that sites are in mod-
erately limited supply, i.e. α < 1. The higher the learning rate, the stronger
would site scarcity have to be. For a sector cost elasticity with respect to sites
of 1.3 (α = 0.77), the propensity for technological diversification is highest.
Figure 1: The shaded area indicates the combinations of α (the elasticity
of aggregate output with respect to the mass of firms) and β (the elasticity
of marginal future productivity with respect to current output) for which
costlier technologies should receive higher support
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have set up a theoretical model to study the optimal
differentiation of renewable energy (RE) support policies. The rationale for
RE subsidies are learning-by-doing spillovers. We have further taken into
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account the limits to expand individual RE technologies that come about due
to the limited availability of sites suitable for RE generation. This translates
into increasing marginal costs of RE production at firm- and industry-level.
Thus, two competing forces drive the dynamic development of a technology,
and both depend on cumulative production in the first period: Increasing
marginal costs and increasing productivity due to learning-by-doing. Using
comparative statics with regard to differences in generation costs, we have
provided a theoretical analysis of a very common practice in politics: The
differentiation according to the level of generation cost.
Linear differentiation on the basis of generation costs cannot do the trick
of efficient support alone, because the optimal support level depends on costs
in several different and non-linear ways. However, the sign of optimal dif-
ferentiation, so to say, the direction of differentiation, can be derived. The
negative decreasing-marginal-learning-effect captures that a cheaper indus-
try will optimally learn more, but the effect on the margin is lower. This
effect tends to favor the support of less advanced technologies. The positive
learning-utilization-effect goes in the opposite direction. It comes about, as
more productive technologies tend to attract more firms in the future, thus
extending the external benefit of learning-by-doing spillovers. We have shown
that it is optimal to give higher support to more costly technologies, as it is
common practice, if the elasticity of learning by doing is large and marginal
costs are steeply increasing, i.e. if productive sites are scarce. In such a case,
the policy-maker should seek to support a differentiated set of technologies.
Several model extensions are possible. First, we have not considered
variable inputs in production, such as labor needed for maintenance of RE
devices. Including such variable inputs, the model would further allow for
the possibility of learning being either driven by aggregate output or by
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specific inputs such as wind turbines or PV panels. Most empirical studies use
installed capacity as independent experience variable, this includes turbine
number and size. In addition, learning could also be caused by progress in
the operational management (Neij, 1997, 1999). In such a setting, a FIT on
RE output can only reach a second-best outcome. A similar analysis as done
in the present paper can be applied nevertheless. Second, we have studied a
two-period setting only. The present model can be extended to an arbitrary
number of periods, considering total factor productivity as a state variable
that changes with current output. Such an approach would allow to study
how the optimal RE subsidy changes over time, although analytical results
would most likely be restricted to a steady-state analysis.
Despite the abstractions necessary to generate clear insights, our analy-
sis led to theoretical results that could inform empirical research and policy
making. In terms of empirical research, an advantage of our results is that
conditions on optimal differentiation of RE support are formulated in terms
of elasticities, which are typically well measurable in statistical analyses. In
terms of policy-making, we provide the background for the common differ-
entiation according to the costliness of RE technologies. Specifically, we find
that considering the scarcity of sites suitable for RE generation under the
different technologies is an important driver for such a differentiation and
the resulting diversification of RE technologies.
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Appendix
The assumption that the social welfare function W is jointly concave in
n1 and n2, implies
Wn1n1 < 0
Wn2n2 < 0
Wn1n1 Wn2n2 −W 2n1n2 > 0.
(A.16)
It is straightforward to check that the social welfare function (6) satisfies these
conditions. The conditions for the social optimum, or equivalently the market
equilibrium under the optimal RE subsidy, can be written as Wn1 = 0 and
Wn2 = 0. Differentiating with respect to A1, we get the following conditions
Wn1n1 n
′
1(A1) +Wn1n2 n
′
2(A1) +Wn1A1 = 0 (A.17)
Wn2n1 n
′
1(A1) +Wn2n2 n
′
2(A1) +Wn2A1 = 0 (A.18)
Solving leads to
n′1(A1) =
Wn1n2 Wn2A1 −Wn2n2 Wn1A1
Wn1n1 Wn2n2 −W 2n1n2
(A.19)
n′2(A1) =
Wn1n2 Wn1A1 −Wn1n1 Wn2A1
Wn1n1 Wn2n2 −W 2n1n2
(A.20)
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For the welfare function (6) we have
Wn1A1 = δ p2A
′′
2(Y1)
(∫ n1
0
f(S(j)) dj
) (∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
)
A1 f(S(n1))
+
(
p1 + δ p2A
′
2(Y1)
∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
)
f(S(n1))
(A.21)
=
(
p1 + δ p2A
′
2(Y1)
(∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
) (
1 +
Y1A
′′
2(Y1)
A′2(Y1)
))
f(S(n1))
(A.22)
Thus, condition (3) implies Wn1A1 > 0. Moreover,
Wn2A1 = p2A
′
2(Y1)
(∫ n1
0
f(S(j)) dj
)
f(S(n2)) > 0. (A.23)
Thus, n′1(A1) > 0 and n
′
2(A1) > 0.
Differentiating (9) with respect to A1, we obtain
1
δ p2
d∆⋆1
dA1
= A′′2(Y1)
(∫ n1
0
f(S(j)) dj + A1 f(S(n1))n
′
1(A1)
) (∫ n2
0
f(S(j)) dj
)
+ A′2(Y1) f(S(n2))n
′
2(A1) (A.24)
Rearranging leads to (10).
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